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In a recent movie by Quentin Tarantino, an American man pretends to be 
German. As I watched the movie in a theater, I caught my breath when he asked 
for three glasses with a bottle of whiskey. Not that anything was wrong with his 
pronunciation of drei Gläser (three glasses). Yet he held up three fingers while 
ordering: his index, middle, and ring finger! This easily gave away his disguise, 
since in Germany the common way of gesturing three is by extending the thumb, 
index, and middle finger. Although I was worried about the character being 
exposed, I was at the same time quite pleased that gesture played such an 
important part on the big screen. 
The fact that our hands are somehow involved in communication seems to be 
universal. Until today, not a single language or culture is known in which people 
do not gesture. While speaking, most people tend to move their hands around, 
seemingly indicating references, simulating action or movement, depicting 
objects or concepts, placing emphasis… Though very common, most of these 
movements seem less conventional than speech is (Kendon, 2004). What role do 
these speech accompanying hand gestures play? Do they somehow aid speech 
production, do they regulate our interactions, or might they speak for 
themselves?  
The idea that our hands can (almost) be said to speak goes back at least as far 
as the Roman era, when it was mentioned in the Institutio Oratoria (‘Education 
of the Orator’), written by Marcus Fabius Quintilianus in the first century AD (as 
described in Kendon, 2004). Quintilianus recognized that hands could be used to 
communicate what we want from others (such as by demanding or pleading), 
express attitudes or feelings (e.g. joy, sorrow, hesitation, approval) and indicate 
concrete things such as measurement, quantity, number and time. Clearly, 
Quintilianus assumed a communicative purpose of gesture. Yet although he 
recognized that hands can sometimes communicate on their own, without 
speech, his work mostly describes how to best use the hands and body so as to 
comment on and help convey ideas that are predominantly expressed in speech.  
The idea that gesture is somehow subordinate to speech is still a popular view 
today, albeit for different reasons. According to some studies, our hands rather 
literally serve speech (e.g. Krauss, 1998; Krauss, Chen, & Gottesman, 2000). 
That is, producing gestures may aid the retrieval of lexical or phonological 
forms, which eventually leads to the articulation of speech. Producing hand 
gestures may also play a role in the process of thinking for speaking (De Ruiter, 
1998; Kita, 2000), or support cognition more generally (Chu & Kita, 2008; 
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Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001). 
What these views have in common is that gesture production first and foremost 
serves the person producing the gesture.  
This is not to say that addressees cannot benefit from seeing gestures as well. 
Yet some theories go beyond this accidental benefit and propose that gesture is 
meant to convey information. For example, gestures may play a role in 
regulating interaction (Bavelas, Chovil, Lawrie, & Wade, 1992). Speakers may 
also gesture to convey part of their message. Kendon (2004) regards both speech 
and gesture as part of a speaker’s communicative effort. McNeill (2005) even 
assumes a single process underlying both gesture and speech production. In his 
growth point theory, an idea arises (the growth point) and is then developed as it 
is translated into an utterance, which will be expressed in speech and gesture 
jointly. In these latter two views, gesture is on par with speech in it being 
communicative and it being intended as such.  
This dissertation addresses the question of whether the role of gesture is 
limited to facilitating speech, or whether it goes beyond that, with gesture (like 
speech) being part of language production itself. The first two studies assess 
whether speakers have a communicative intent with their gesturing. We test 
whether speakers adapt their gesturing to their beliefs about their addressee. For 
example, if speakers gesture to communicate, then they will gesture differently 
depending on whether they believe their addressee can see them or not, 
independent of any changes in the speaker’s environment. The same may hold 
for whether a speaker believes to be addressing another person, or an artificial 
system. If speakers gesture in the same way under all these circumstances, then it 
is unlikely that gesture is intended communicatively.  
The final two studies examine whether gesture behaves like speech in two 
more ways. In our third study, we investigate what happens when interlocutors 
spontaneously copy each other’s gesture forms. We compare this copying of 
gestures to the spontaneous copying of other nonverbal behaviors as well as to 
the repetition of each other’s words. If gesture acts like speech, the repetition of 
gesture forms across interlocutors will resemble the repetition of words. In our 
fourth and final study, we test what happens to gesture when speech is impaired 
as a result of stroke, specifically, we examine the gestures of aphasic speakers. 
Can gesture be used as an alternative means of communication by speakers with 




Contrary to the earliest studies on gesture, our goal is not to prescribe how 
gesture is best adapted to our thought or to our narrative, but rather to look at 
how gestures are commonly produced by speakers. The methods employed are 
empirical in nature. By examining how speakers gesture under different 
circumstances, how speakers adapt their gesturing to one another, and how 
gesture is affected by impairment of speech due to brain damage, we aim to 
inform theories on why speakers produce gestures, how gesture relates to 
thought, and how gesture and speech production are interrelated. Clearly, these 
questions are too big to be answered by just the four studies described in this 
dissertation. Yet each in their own way, the studies contribute to our 
understanding of gesture production.  
Dissertation outline 
This dissertation contains four studies, which have been published, have been 
accepted for publication, or have been submitted for publication as full papers in 
scientific journals. Being self-contained, each of the next four chapters has its 
own abstract, introduction, discussion and reference list. Chapter 6 contains a 
general discussion and conclusion. 
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The communicative import of gestures: evidence 
from a comparative analysis of human-human and 
human-machine interactions 
Abstract 
Does gesturing primarily serve speaker internal purposes, or does it mostly 
facilitate communication, for example by conveying semantic content, or easing 
social interaction? To address this question, we asked native speakers of Dutch 
to retell an animated cartoon to a presumed audiovisual summarizer, a presumed 
addressee in another room (through web cam), or an addressee in the same room, 
who could either see them and be seen by them or not. We found that 
participants gestured least frequently when talking to the presumed summarizer. 
In addition, they produced a smaller proportion of large gestures and almost no 
pointing gestures in this setting. Two perception experiments revealed that 
observers are sensitive to this difference in gesturing. We conclude that gesture 
production is not a fully automated speech facilitation process, and that it can 
convey information about the communicative setting a speaker is in. 
This chapter is based on: 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2009). The communicative 
import of gestures: Evidence from a comparative analysis of human-human and 
human-computer interactions. Gesture, 9(1), 97-126. 








In this chapter, we explore the functional roles of spontaneous hand gestures 
produced during narrative speech, by looking at it from the production as well as 
the perception perspective. If gesture production primarily serves speaker 
internal processes, then we would expect it to be a highly automated process that 
is little influenced by the communicative setting a speaker is in, and by whom a 
speaker is addressing. On the other hand, if gestures primarily aid 
communication between a speaker and an addressee, then we would expect 
gesturing to be a more flexible process, which is adapted to different 
communicative environments and audience characteristics.  
If speakers gesture mostly for themselves, then addressees may or may not be 
able to use information from gestures. However, if addressees are unable to use 
information from the gesture modality, this would make it less likely that 
speakers intend their gestures communicatively. Since people continuously 
switch roles between speaker and addressee in day-to-day communication, we 
think it unlikely that speakers would put communicative effort into a modality 
that they never use in comprehension. And for the same reason, if speakers 
gesture partly to communicate, then we would expect that addressees are able to 
gain information from speakers’ gestures. 
In this chapter we describe two studies. First we describe an experiment from 
the speaker’s perspective, in which we manipulated the nature of the addressee 
(either artificial or human) and whether the speaker and addressee could see each 
other. We were interested in the effects of these manipulations on gesture 
production. Our second study consists of two perception experiments using 
video-clips from the first study. We measured whether addressees were sensitive 
to possible differences in gesturing that resulted from a speaker addressing a 
human or an artificial addressee. 
Background 
The functional role of gestures  
Many studies have been conducted to investigate the primary functional role of 
hand gestures. One view is that gestures are mostly produced for the benefit of 
the speaker, for example to aid speech production. Many studies have found 
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evidence in support of this view (e.g. De Ruiter, 1998; Hadar, 1989; Hostetter, 
Alibali, & Kita, 2007; Hostetter & Hopkins, 2002; Kita, 2000; Krauss, 1998). 
Other studies have shown that gesturing may facilitate cognition in processes 
other than language production, which is another for-speaker function (Goldin-
Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001; Goldin-Meadow & Sandhofer, 
1999). Another view is that speakers produce gestures with a communicative 
intent. Kendon (2004) for example, argues that speakers produce gestures as an 
integral part of their communicative effort. Much support for this hypothesis has 
been found (Bangerter & Chevalley, 2007; Cohen, 1977; Cohen & Harison, 
1973; Jacobs & Garnham, 2007; Özyürek, 2002), also see the review paper by 
Kendon (1994). 
Alibali, Heath, and Myers (2001) have tried to reconcile various seemingly 
contradictory experimental results by associating different types of gestures with 
different functional roles. They conducted a study in which narrators told a story 
to an addressee either face-to-face, or with an opaque screen in between speaker 
and addressee. They found that speakers produced more representational 
gestures (gestures that depict some of the content of the story) in the face-to-face 
condition than in the screen condition, when the addressee could not see the 
speaker, although representational gestures were also produced in this condition. 
Beat gestures (biphasic gestures that do not depict narrative content) on the other 
hand, were produced at comparable rates under both conditions. The fact that 
speakers still produced many (representational) gestures when it was clear that 
the addressee could not see them is not easily explained by a theory that stresses 
the communicative function of gestures. Alibali et al. concluded that both types 
of gesture serve both speaker-internal and communicative functions. They 
suggested examining ‘how different speakers use gestures in different types of 
contexts for both speaker-internal and communicative purposes’ rather than 
trying to find a single primary role of gesture production. We will briefly review 
several factors that have been suggested to affect gesture production, which are 
relevant to the present study. 
Factors influencing gesture production  
Visibility and dialogue Bangerter and Chevalley (2007) investigated the effect of 
mutual visibility on pointing gestures in a referential communication task. They 
found that pointing movements that did not involve raising the arm, were 
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produced at equal rates, regardless of whether conversational partners could see 
each other or not. This suggests that they are automatic in production. However, 
pointing movements that did involve raising the arm were used more when 
interlocutors could see each other, suggesting that they are intended to 
communicate. Thus, gesture size seems to be indicative of the gesture’s 
functional role, and of the nature of the cognitive processes underlying its 
production. 
In a somewhat similar vein, Enfield, Kita, and De Ruiter (2007) describe a 
theory of how different sizes of pointing gestures serve different pragmatic 
functions in face-to-face communication. Based on data from the language Lao, 
they argue that larger pointing gestures carry primary, “informationally 
foregrounded” information, whereas smaller pointing gestures carry 
“informationally backgrounded information, which refers to a possible but 
uncertain lack of referential common ground”. 
The importance of gesture size in relation to visibility was also found by 
Bavelas, Gerwing, Sutton, and Prevost (2008). In a picture description task, they 
compared face-to-face communication (which enables dialogue and visibility) to 
talking through a hand held phone (dialogue, but no visibility) and talking to a 
tape recorder using a hand held microphone (no dialogue, no visibility). They 
found that speakers gestured more while being engaged in dialogue, and also that 
they gestured very differently if there was the possibility to demonstrate things to 
the addressee by gesture. Participants described a picture of an old-fashioned 
dress. In the face-to-face condition, gestures were done to describe features of 
the dress as if it was full size. In the phone condition, gestures were only the size 
of the picture, and proved harder to interpret. In the tape recorder condition, 
gestures were very small and it was hard for the coders to interpret their 
meaning. Thus, visibility had a large effect on how people gestured and the 
presence of dialogue had a large effect on gesture rate. 
Listener needs Besides mutual visibility and dialogue, Jacobs and Garnham 
(2007) point out that gesture production may depend on the behavior and needs 
of the addressee (also see Enfield, et al., 2007) and on the type of task that the 
speaker is performing. They found that narrators produced fewer gestures when 
they knew that their addressee already knew part of the content of the story they 
were telling. They also found that speakers produced more gestures when the 
addressee appeared attentive, than when the addressee appeared inattentive. They 
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therefore concluded that during narrative tasks, gestures are produced primarily 
for the benefit of the addressee. 
Content Melinger and Levelt (2004) looked at the type of information being 
represented. They found that speakers who used gestures representing spatial 
information omitted more critical spatial information from their verbal 
descriptions than speakers who did not gesture. They showed that some speakers 
divided information between the gesture and speech modality. This shows that 
co-speech gestures expressing spatial information can be used communicatively. 
Hostetter and Hopkins (2002) have shown that speakers accompanied their 
narration with more representational gestures (which they term “lexical 
movements”) if they watched an animated cartoon and subsequently were asked 
“to picture the events they saw in the cartoon in their head and then describe 
them” (p. 25), than when they read a description of the events in the cartoon and 
were asked “to picture the words as they had read them on the page and then 
relate them” (p. 25) while retelling the events. They interpret this as evidence 
that representational gestures (lexical movements) are produced more frequently 
when expressing a thought that is encoded spatially, than when expressing a 
thought that is encoded textually. 
Human-machine interaction 
Next to the above-described factors that influence gesture production, human-
machine interaction is an important factor in our present study as well. Reeves 
and Nass (1996) state that “people’s responses to media are fundamentally social 
and natural”. This is the so-called media equation and it applies to everyone. 
They state that the confusion of mediated life and real life is not rare and 
inconsequential, and that it cannot be corrected with age, education, or thought. 
Even though their studies focused on social responses, e.g. empathy, rather than 
on communicative behavior, this would suggest that, even if gestures are used to 
communicate, people would still gesture at computers and other media, since 
their social responses may underlie their communication. 
Although people show social responses to media and artificial agents, one 
can ask whether they do so to the same extent as to human interlocutors, and 
how exactly this influences their communicative behavior. Aharoni and Fridlund 
(2007) conducted a study in which participants smiled more and used more 
silence fillers to a purported human interviewer than to a computer interviewer. 
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In both cases a prerecorded stimulus was used. They found that simply labeling 
the stimulus as ‘human’ caused people to be more communicative. In addition, 
Maes, Marcelis and Verheyen (2007) showed that if speakers assume that their 
addressee is human, more referential effort will be made than if they assume the 
addressee is a computer. Respondents more frequently described more attributes 
than necessary to identify an object to the presumed human addressee, than 
towards the presumed computer. These findings suggest that at least in some 
cases, people are wordier toward human than toward computer addressees. 
Present study 
We are interested in the effect of the addressee being human or artificial on 
gesture production, and in whether possible differences in gesturing resulting 
from this manipulation are informative to naïve observers. This is because the 
different functional roles that gesture may serve imply different predictions on 
how people would gesture toward an artificial addressee, and place different 
requirements on addressees’ sensitivity to differences in gesturing. We will first 
describe our production study and then our perception study. 
If gesturing is mostly a for-speaker process, either facilitating language 
production or supporting cognition in another way, then with a similar task, we 
would expect speakers to gesture in the same way, regardless of the addressee. 
On the other hand, if gestures are produced to communicate or if gesturing is tied 
to other aspects of human dialogue, then the addressee being human or artificial 
may very well influence gesture production. Therefore, we compared a condition 
in which there was a human addressee with a condition in which there was an 
artificial addressee, keeping other factors as similar as possible. 
For this we have made use of computer mediation. We created a situation 
similar to one-way video conferencing. A speaker was filmed and was told that 
an addressee was watching the recordings live, in another room. Throughout this 
chapter we refer to this condition as the ‘Web cam condition’. In this condition 
there was one-way visibility, no physical co-presence, no dialogue, but the 
speaker believed there was a human addressee. In a very similar condition, the 
speaker was told instead that the audiovisual signal of the camera went to an 
audiovisual summarizer that was located in another room. This condition has 
similar one-way ‘visibility’ and, as in the Web cam condition, there was no 
physical co-presence and no dialogue. Yet this time, the speaker believed there 
was an artificial addressee. 
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In both of these settings, participants were asked whether they understood 
whom they were addressing, before they started their narration. Only if this was 
clear to them did the experiment proceed. This is different from the tape-recorder 
condition in the experiment by Bavelas et al. (2008), in which participants were 
excluded if they had imagined an addressee. Thus, in their tape-recorder 
condition the addressee was absent entirely rather than artificial. With this design 
we have also been able to separate the effects of being visible to an (artificial) 
addressee from the effect of dialogue, since we have been able to introduce a 
condition in which the speaker could be seen by another person, yet there was no 
possibility of dialogue. 
To control for the effects of physical co-presence and mutual visibility, 
which are absent in both the condition with the artificial addressee and the 
condition with a human addressee in another room, we have included two more 
conditions in our design. These were the conditions used in Alibali et al. (2001): 
face-to-face communication, in which there is a human addressee, physical co-
presence and mutual visibility, and a condition in which speaker and addressee 
are in the same room, but separated by an opaque screen. Although both of these 
conditions enable dialogue, we prevented true dialogue from happening by 
instructing addressees not to interrupt the speaker, but to act naturally otherwise. 
Thus, addressees were looking at the speaker and gave occasional non-verbal 
feedback, but they tried to avoid speaking themselves. 
For our production study, we asked speakers to retell an animated cartoon in 
which there are many actions involving direction and moving from one location 
to another. According to Hostetter and Hopkins (2002), this should lead speakers 
to produce many representational gestures. And based on the results found by 
Melinger and Levelt (2004), we would expect speakers to use gestures that 
express spatial information communicatively in this narration task. Content was 
always said to be new to the addressee and, as explained above, addressees were 
instructed not to interrupt the speaker. This was in order to minimize the effects 
found by Jacobs and Garnham (2007). 
Based on the results by Aharoni and Fridlund (2007) as well as the results 
found by Maes et al. (2007), and the assumption that gesturing bears a 
communicative function, we would expect participants to produce more gestures 
in our conditions with a human addressee, than in our condition with an artificial 
addressee. In addition, based on previous results with imagistic gestures 
(Bavelas, et al., 2008) and pointing gestures (Bangerter & Chevalley, 2007) we 
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would expect representational gestures to be larger in conditions in which they 
have communicative potential. 
As mentioned in the introduction, we think it unlikely that speakers would 
put communicative effort into the gesture modality if they never use this 
modality as a source of information. In addition, a possible difference between 
gesturing to a human or to an artificial addressee cannot play a significant role in 
interaction if addressees are ignorant to this difference. We therefore also 
conducted a perception study, in which we asked participants to judge whether a 
speaker was talking to a human or to an artificial addressee, based on movie 
clips from our production study. These clips were played without sound and 
different conditions included or excluded the hands and face of the speaker. 
Production study 
Method  
Design As outlined in the previous section under ‘Present study’, we have used a 
between subjects design with four conditions. A schematic overview of the 
settings can be found in Figure 1. We are mainly interested in the effect of the 
addressee being human or artificial, which is the only difference between our 
Computer condition and Web cam condition. In both conditions the speaker does 
not receive any feedback from the addressee. 
So that we may see how closely communication through web cam resembles 
face-to-face communication, we have added a Screen and Face-to-Face 
condition. Addressees in these conditions were instructed not to interrupt the 
speaker, but to act naturally otherwise, in order to enhance similarity with the 
aforementioned conditions. In contrast to the Web cam condition, in both of 
these conditions the addressee was seated in the same room as the speaker. In the 
Face- to-Face condition there is mutual visibility as well. If either physical co-
presence or seeing the addressee plays a critical role in performing the narration 
task, then this should result addressee plays a critical role in performing the 
narration task, then this should result in notable differences between the Web 
cam, Face-to-Face, and Screen condition. By comparing these three conditions, 
we get an idea of how closely the Web cam condition resembles a condition with 
a true and physically present human addressee. 




Figure 1: Experimental settings. 
Participants Forty-three participants volunteered as narrators for this study. We 
excluded three participants, because they either were suspicious about the 
experimental setup or ignored the instructions. The remaining 40 participants (10 
male, 30 female) were between the age of 17 and 48 (M = 23, median 19). They 
were all native speakers of Dutch. None of the participants objected to being 
recorded, and all of them consented to their data being used for research and 
educational purposes. There were 11 participants in the Computer condition, 10 
in the Web cam condition, 9 in the Screen condition, and 10 in the Face-to-Face 
(FtF) condition. The listeners in the Screen and FtF condition were confederates. 
Procedure We randomly assigned participants to one of four conditions. 
Narrators first read the instructions (see below for more detail) and could ask any 
questions they had on the task. The instructions focused on the task of the 
addressee, namely to summarize the speaker’s narration. This way we suggested 
that the study was on summarizing. Speakers were explicitly asked not to 
summarize themselves, but to just retell the story. They then watched a seven 
minute animated cartoon called “Canary Row”, which we chose because it has 
proven to elicit gestures in several other studies, such as McNeill (1992) and 
Alibali et al. (2001). After being seated in front of the camera, in the Computer 
and Web cam condition the experimenter asked whether the participant had 
understood whom they were going to talk to, and paraphrased their answer if it 
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Face condition, the experimenter repeated that the speaker was not to address the 
camera, but the other participant. 
In the Computer condition, the written instructions stated that the signal of 
the camera was sent to a beta version of an audiovisual summarizer (AViSum) 
that was located in another building on campus, and which would produce a 
summary of their narration afterward. It was emphasized that the system could 
process both auditory and visual information. A fake phone call was made by the 
experimenter to check whether the signal was received well, and whether the 
system was ready for use. In reality, there was no such computer system. 
However, it is not inconceivable that such a system could exist. Dupont & 
Luettin (2000), for example, describe a speech recognition system that uses both 
acoustic and visual speech information, and McCowan et al. (2005) describe 
how automatic analysis of meetings can benefit from information from the visual 
modality. 
In the Web cam condition, the instructions said that the camera was used as a 
web cam, and that another participant was watching the speaker in another 
campus building, with the purpose of summarizing their narration afterwards. 
The experimenter pretended to set up a one-way videoconference with a 
presumed experimenter in the other building, and then made a fake phone call to 
check whether the image and sound were received well and whether they were 
ready to begin. In reality, there was no other participant watching. 
In the Screen condition, two students came to the lab, one of which was a 
confederate. The experimenter pretended to randomly assign the roles of speaker 
and listener, but always assigned the true participant the role of speaker. After 
the participant had watched the animated cartoon, narrator and addressee were 
allowed to ask any questions they had about the task. A wooden screen separated 
them, such that they could not see each other during the story telling. The 
narrators’ instructions stated that the addressee had to summarize the story 
afterward, and that they were videotaped with the purpose of comparing the 
addressee’s summary to their narration. We instructed addressees not to interrupt 
the narrator, but to act naturally otherwise. Occasionally, there was some 
auditory feedback (laughs, occasional uh-huh’s). The Face-to-Face condition 
differed from the Screen condition only in that narrators retold the story in a 
face-to-face situation, without the screen in between narrator and addressee. 
In each condition, participants were videotaped using a digital video camera. 
They were seated in front of the camera. The camera position was such that the 
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entire upper part of the body was visible, including the upper legs. In all 
conditions, the narrator could look at snapshots of each of the episodes of the 
cartoon that hung either on the wall or on the screen in front of them. This was 
done in order to aid memory, and to facilitate more structured, and more 
comparable stories. 
After retelling the cartoon, in the Screen and Face-to-Face condition the 
experimenter first took the addressee to another room, supposedly to write the 
summary. Narrators then completed a questionnaire, which included questions 
on how they had experienced the conversation and whether they had believed the 
experimental setup. We fully debriefed all participants and asked their consent to 
use the recordings. The experimenter also asked whether the participants had 
believed the experimental setup and whether they had suspected any deception. 
Transcribing and coding The first author transcribed each narration from the 
videotape. Repairs, repeated words, false starts, and filled pauses were included. 
The annotation of gestures was done blind to condition and initially by the first 
author. Difficult cases were resolved by discussion among the authors. 
Initially, coding concentrated on movements of the hands. Later on, when 
coding for gesture size, movements of other body parts were considered, but 
only if they occurred simultaneously with a hand gesture. We first discriminated 
between gestures and other movements such as self-adjustment. We then coded 
gestures according to McNeill (1992, pp. 78-82), but adding interactive gestures 
as a category (Bavelas, Chovil, Lawrie, & Wade, 1992). Gestures were first 
coded as representational, beat, or interactive. This first division could largely be 
made based on the shape of the gesture. Simple, biphasic movements of the 
hands were labeled as beat rather than interactive (in Bavelas’s definition, 
interactive gestures subsume the category of beats). Subsequently, we further 
divided representational gestures into imagistic (iconic or metaphoric) and 
pointing gestures. Our most important criterion for labeling a gesture as a 
pointing gesture was the shape of the hand, which should have one or more 
fingers extended as an index. In addition, we have judged for each of those 
gestures whether it seemed to only express information on location or direction, 
or whether it additionally seemed to express information about manner or path. 
If the latter was the case, the gesture was counted both as imagistic and pointing 
gesture. Thus, all representational gestures that were not just pointing gestures 
were counted as imagistic gestures. 
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In a separate round of gesture coding, we coded for gesture size. Gestures 
that were produced using only the fingers received a score of 1. If the wrist was 
moved significantly the gesture received a score of 2. Gestures that also involved 
significant movement of the elbow or lower arm received a score of 3, and 
gestures in which the upper arm was also used in a meaningful way, or that 
involved movement of the shoulder received a score of 4. 
Statistical analysis For all tests for significance we used univariate analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), with condition as the fixed factor (levels: computer, web 
cam, screen and face-to-face) and a significance threshold of .05. For pairwise 
comparisons we used the least significance difference test (Fisher, 1951). 
Results  
Gesture rate Condition had a significant effect on the number of gestures 
produced per 100 words, F(3, 36) = 6.27, p < .01, !p2 = .34, see Figure 2. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that gestures were significantly less frequent in 
the Computer condition (M = .64, SD = .84) than in the Web cam (M = 3.84, SD 
= 4.30), Screen (M = 3.69, SD = 1.89), and Face-to-Face (FtF) condition (M = 
6.40, SD = 3.86). The differences between the mean gesture rates in the Web 
cam, Screen, and FtF conditions were not significant. 
 
Figure 2: Mean number of gestures produced per 100 words in each condition. 
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When performing the analysis with gestures per second rather than per word, 
we found that gestures were reliably more frequent in the FtF condition (M = .22, 
SD = .13), than in the Screen (M = .12, SD = .06) and Web cam condition (M = 
.12, SD = .14), F(3, 36) = 7.04, p < .001, !p2 = .37. In this analysis too, 
significantly fewer gestures were produced in the Computer condition (M =.02, 
SD = .02) than in any of the other three conditions. 
Four of the eleven participants in the Computer condition did not produce 
any gestures. In the other conditions there were no participants that did not 
gesture at all. 
Gesture rate and type We also found a significant effect of condition on 
representational gestures per 100 words, F(3, 36) = 5.66, p < .01, !p2 = .32, see 
Figure 3. Representational gestures were produced at a reliably lower rate in the 
Computer condition (M = .37, SD = .55) than in the Web cam (M = 2.88, SD = 
3.48) and FtF condition (M = 4.79, SD = 3.20). There was a trend toward 
significance for the difference between the Computer and Screen condition (M = 
2.38, SD = 1.37), p = .08. In the Screen condition, reliably fewer representational 
gestures were produced than in the FtF condition.  
For non-representational gestures per 100 words, we found a significant 
effect of condition as well, F(3, 36) = 4.75, p < 0.01, !p2 = .28, see Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 3: Mean number of representational gestures produced per 100 words in each 



































































Figure 4: Mean number of non-representational gestures produced per 100 words in each 
condition. Bars represent standard errors. 
Non-representational gestures were produced at a significantly lower rate in the 
Computer condition (M = .26, SD = .43) than in the Screen (M = 1.31, SD = .78), 
and FtF condition (M = 1.63, SD = 1.22). There was a trend toward significance 
for the difference between the Computer and Web cam condition (M = .96, SD = 
.90), p = .08. In all conditions, representational gestures occurred more 
frequently than non-representational gestures. 
For imagistic gestures, condition had a significant effect on the mean gesture 
rate, F(3, 36) = 5.01, p < .01, !p2 = .29. In the Computer condition (M = .37, SD 
= .55), imagistic gestures were produced significantly less frequently than in the 
Web cam (M = 2.46, SD = 2.97) and FtF condition (M = 4.01, SD = 2.88). There 
was a trend toward significance for the difference between the Screen (M  = 
2.07, SD = 1.16) and FtF condition, p = .06. 
Only one pointing gesture was produced in the Computer condition. This was 
a combined imagistic/ pointing gesture. There was an effect of condition on the 
number of pointing gestures per 100 words, F(3, 36) = 4.82, p < .01, !p2 = .29. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that there was a significant difference between the 
Screen (M = .50, SD = .65) and FtF condition (M = 1.24, SD = .80). There was a 
trend toward significance for the difference between the FtF and Web cam 
condition (M = .61, SD = 1.06), p = .06. The Computer condition (M = .03, SD = 
.10) differed significantly from the FtF condition and there was a trend toward 
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= .08. When combined imagistic/ pointing gestures were excluded from the 
analysis, we found similar results. Figure 5 shows the mean number of gestures 
per 100 words for the different gesture types. In the first bar for pointing 
gestures, pointing gestures that also seemed to convey significant information on 
manner or path (imagistic/ pointing gestures) are included, in the second they are 
not. 
Gesture size Using the coding system described in previously, we computed a 
score that represented the average size of a gesture for each participant. For each 
participant, we took the sum of the scores of all gestures and divided this sum by 
the number of gestures produced by that participant. Although overall gesture 
size did not differ significantly across conditions, F(3, 32) = 1.34, p = .28, there 
was a tendency for gestures to be larger in the conditions where speakers thought 
that the addressee could see them. Gestures were smallest in the Computer 
condition (M = 2.05, SD = .80), followed by the Screen (M = 2.24, SD = .51), 
Web cam (M = 2.37, SD = .65), and FtF condition (M = 2.60, SD = .38). In the 
pairwise comparisons, there was a trend toward significance for the difference 
between the Computer and the FtF condition, p = .07.  
 
 
Figure 5: Mean number of gestures produced per 100 words  
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The proportions of large and small gestures differed across conditions, as can 
be seen in Figure 6. Condition had a significant effect on the percentage of 
gestures involving shoulder movement, F(3,32) = 4.04, p < .02, !p2 = .28, see 
Figure 7. These gestures made up a significantly larger portion of the total 
number of gestures in the Web cam condition (M = .16, SD = .14) than in the 
Computer (M = .03, SD = .08), and Screen condition (M = .01, SD = .03). We 
found a trend toward significance, for the difference between the FtF (M = .10, 
SD = .11) and Screen condition, p = .08. 
Gesture size and type For representational gestures, overall gesture size was very 
similar across conditions, ranging from M = 2.69, SD = .25 in the Screen 
condition, to M = 2.98, SD = .51 in the FtF condition, F(3, 28) = .53, p = .67. We 
found no significant main effect of condition on the size of imagistic, F(3, 27) = 
1.08, p = .37, or pointing gestures, F(2, 17) = 2.43, p = .12. However, for 
pointing gestures, gesture size was significantly smaller in the Screen condition 
(M = 1.67, SD = .82) than in the FtF condition (M = 2.76, SD = .68). Combined 
imagistic/ pointing gestures were counted as imagistic in this analysis. We found 
no significant main effect of condition on the size of non-representational 






































Figure 7: Mean proportion of gestures involving shoulder movement in each condition. 
Bars represent standard errors. 
representational gestures were significantly smaller in the Computer (M = 1.34, 
SD = .47) than in the FtF condition (M = 1.87, SD = .36). No significant 
differences in the size of interactive gestures, F(3, 14) = .40, p = .76, and beats, 
F(3, 31) = 1.42, p = .26, were found when analyzing them separately. 
Figure 8 gives an overview of the average size scores for the different gesture 
types for each condition. It must be noted though that some means are derived 
from very few data points, since some types of gesture were produced by only 
very few participants in some conditions. Figure 9 gives an overview of the 
mean number of gestures produced of each gesture type in each condition, and 
can help in interpreting Figure 8. 
Number of words Condition had a significant effect on the total number of words 
used by participants, F(3, 36) = 4.26, p < .02, !p2 = .26, see Figure 10. In the 
Web cam condition (M = 841.80, SD = 373.93), significantly more words were 
used than in the Computer (M = 472.64, SD = 130.66) and FtF condition (M = 



























































Figure 8: Average size score (1 = Finger, 2 = Wrist, 3 = Elbow, 4 = Shoulder) of gestures 
produced of each gesture type (Imagistic, Pointing, Beat, Interactive) in each condition. 
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Figure 10: Mean total number of words spoken in each condition.  
Bars represent standard errors. 
Speech rate We found a significant effect of condition on the number of words 
spoken per second, F(3, 36) = 4.92, p < .01, !p2 = .29, see Figure 11. Speech was 
slower in the Computer condition (M = 2.64, SD = .24) than in the Screen (M = 
3.26, SD = .18) and FtF condition (M = 3.27, SD = .70). Pairwise comparisons 
showed a trend toward significance for the difference between the Computer and 
Web cam condition (M = 3.00, SD = .14), p = .07.  
Filled pauses No significant main effect of condition on the number of filled 
pauses (i.e. uhs) per word was found, F(3, 36) = 1.82, p = .16. However, 
pairwise comparisons showed that filled pauses were more frequent in the Web 
cam (M = .10 , SD = .04) than in the FtF condition (M = .06, SD = .04). 
Discussion 
Participants who thought they were talking to an audiovisual summarizer 
produced fewer gestures than participants who thought they were talking to a 
human addressee, regardless of whether the addressee was in the same room or 
not and whether or not there was mutual visibility. Also, gestures produced by 
participants who believed that they were talking to the computer system were 
more frequently small (not involving shoulder movement) than the gestures 















































Figure 11: Mean number of words per second in each condition.  
Bars represent standard errors. 
through the web cam. So the (presumed) nature of the addressee, either human or 
artificial, clearly influenced gesturing. 
The only difference between the Computer and Web cam condition was 
whether participants were told they were speaking to an audiovisual summarizer, 
or to another participant. Both were said to be in another room, so in both 
conditions the participant was narrating in front of a camera, without seeing or 
receiving any feedback from the addressee. Therefore, the difference in gesture 
rate and gesture size that we found between these two conditions can only result 
from speakers’ mental representations of the addressee and this representation 
must include whether the addressee is artificial or not. 
More words were used in the Web cam condition than in the Computer 
condition. Participants also spoke a little more slowly when they thought they 
were interacting with the computer system. Part of the difference in gesturing 
that we found between these two conditions could therefore result from 
differences in verbal behavior, rather than directly from differences in speakers’ 
knowledge of the addressee’s nature. However, the Web cam condition rather 
than the computer condition is the atypical one when looking at the number of 
words. The number of words used in the Computer condition did not differ 
significantly from the number of words used in the Screen and Face-to-Face 
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condition and these two conditions is striking. Descriptions in the Computer 
condition were generally detailed and elaborate, just like in the other conditions. 
We therefore think it unlikely that possible differences in the verbal behavior are 
the only source of the differences in the gestural behavior that we found. In 
addition, it would be hard for such a theory to explain why pointing gestures 
were almost completely absent in the Computer condition, while the same spatial 
content had to be expressed. Rather, we think that both the verbal and gestural 
modality were affected by the addressee being an artificial system or a human 
participant in another room. 
Is the comparison between our Web cam and Computer condition a valid 
way of comparing human–human and human–machine communication? As can 
be seen from Figure 8 and 6a, the gestural behavior of participants in the Web 
cam condition was very similar to that of participants in the FtF condition. 
Similar patterns can be observed for the proportions of different gesture types 
and sizes. In this way, gesture production in the Web cam condition resembles 
that in the FtF condition. When looking at the average gesture rate (Figures 2 
and 5), the Web cam condition is more similar to the Screen condition. Both 
these conditions show a lower gesture rate than the FtF condition. This suggests 
that both not seeing the addressee, or the absence of the possibility of dialogue, 
and not being seen by the addressee decrease gesture production. The 
comparison between the Computer and Screen condition shows that the very low 
gesture rate in the Computer condition does not just result from speakers not 
being seen by a human addressee. Neither can the low gesture rate be explained 
by the factor of not seeing the addressee or the lack of physical co-presence, 
since the Computer condition differed significantly from both the Web cam and 
the FtF condition. It thus seems that our design was indeed able to capture the 
difference between human–human and human–machine communication we were 
interested in. 
The effect of mutual visibility on gesture production was replicated for the 
number of representational gestures per word, the number of pointing gestures 
per word, and the size of pointing gestures. For these variables we found 
significant differences between the Screen and FtF condition, as did earlier 
studies (e.g. Alibali, et al., 2001; Bangerter & Chevalley, 2007). 
People behaved very differently toward the artificial system as compared to 
how they behaved toward people. This is contrary to the findings of Reeves and 
Nass (1996), who state that people behave toward ‘media’ as they would toward 
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a real person. It seems that speakers conveyed less information to the artificial 
system. It is unlikely that information was mostly transmitted through speech 
instead of through gestures when talking to the computer, since fewer and 
relatively fewer large gestures were produced, while participants did not use 
more words. Rather, it seems that less information was transmitted through both 
modalities. This corroborates well with the idea that people are less 
communicative when communicating to computers (Aharoni & Fridlund, 2007; 
Maes, et al., 2007). It would be interesting to do a comparative analysis of the 
verbal discourse to arrive at more clarity in this. 
The differences we found in gesturing in different communicative settings 
can be explained by the idea that people make gestures for the benefit of their 
addressees. As explained under ‘Present Study’, we would find this explanation 
less believable if addressees are not sensitive to such differences. To test whether 
they are, we conducted two perception experiments, which will be described in 
the next section. 
Perception study 
It has been shown that addressees are able to process information from gestures 
(Beattie & Shovelton, 1999, 2002; Goldin-Meadow, 1999). However, in these 
studies information was directly related to the message a speaker was trying to 
convey, rather than to the communicative setting that a speaker was in. Chawla 
and Krauss (1994) found that observers could discriminate better than chance 
between spontaneous and rehearsed speech, both based on audio and audio-
visual presentations. However, it remained unclear what cues observers had used 
in making their judgments. 
With this study we want to determine whether observers are sensitive to 
differences in gesture production that result from differences in the 
communicative setting, especially the difference between addressing a human or 
an artificial addressee. At the same time, this perception study can be seen as a 
way to verify the gesture coding in our production experiment. 




In this experiment we asked observers to watch movie clips that were taken 
either from a setting with an artificial addressee (the Computer condition of our 
production study), or with a human addressee (the Screen condition of our 
production study). To separate the effect of gesturing from the effects of other 
visual cues, we measured the relative contributions of seeing the face and seeing 
the upper-body (including hands and arms) of the speaker. 
Method 
Design We used a between subjects design with three conditions. In condition 1, 
the ‘Whole speaker condition’, participants saw video clips in which the 
speaker’s upper-body was fully visible. In condition 2, participants saw video 
clips in which the speaker’s head was covered by a black rectangle (the ‘Hands 
only condition’). And in condition 3, the ‘Face only condition’, participants saw 
video clips showing the head of the speaker only. In all conditions, the video 
clips were played without sound. After each video clip, participants were asked 
to judge whether the speaker was talking to a human or to an artificial addressee 
and to state on a binary scale whether they were certain or uncertain about their 
decision. 
Participants Ninety first and second year students from Tilburg University and 
Eindhoven Technical University, all native speakers of Dutch, volunteered for 
this experiment. Most of them received half an hour of course credits for their 
participation. 
Stimuli For this experiment we used 18 video clips from our production study: 9 
of participants in the Screen condition, in which the story of an animated cartoon 
was retold to another participant (a confederate) who was seated behind an 
opaque screen, and 9 from participants in the Computer condition, in which 
participants retold the same story to a purported audiovisual summarizer. In both 
of these settings the speaker was seated in front of a camera. 
From each video clip, 30 seconds were selected, starting from the point 
where the speaker began to describe the sixth episode of the cartoon, in which 
Sylvester builds a seesaw in order to catapult himself up to the window where 
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Tweety sits. This episode was chosen because it is very prone to elicit gestures. 
For the Whole Speaker condition, we used movie clips in which the speaker and 
all gestures were fully visible. Two different edited versions were then created, 
one such that everything was covered except the head of the speaker, for the 
Face Only condition, and one in which the head of the speaker was covered by a 
black rectangle, for the Hands Only condition. 
Before the actual experiment started, there were two practice trials, for which 
video clips similar to the ones in the actual experiment were used. They were of 
a speaker in the Computer condition, and of a speaker in the Web cam condition 
of the production study. 
Procedure Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. 
First, they read a written instruction and could ask the experimenter any 
questions they had. The instruction explained the task, but only stated that the 
participant had to indicate whether the speaker was talking to a human addressee 
or to an audiovisual speech recognition system. Details about the communicative 
setting, such as the difference in visibility (the computer could make use of video 
whereas the human addressee could not see the speaker) or co-presence (the 
computer was in another room, whereas the human addressee was in the same 
room) were not mentioned. Participants then did two practice trials, on which 
they did not receive any feedback. After the practice trials, the experimenter 
asked them again whether the task was clear and gave further instruction if 
necessary. Then followed the actual experiment. 
Fragments were shown on a computer monitor. Half of the participants 
watched them in a certain random order, and the other half in reversed order. 
After each video fragment the screen turned black for seven seconds. On the 
black screen a sentence was shown in white, stating which fragment the 
participant was to fill out. This text disappeared after six seconds. The seven 
second pause was to be used by the participant to fill out on a paper sheet 
whether the speaker in the previous clip was talking to an audiovisual speech 
recognition system or to a human addressee, and whether the participant was 
certain or uncertain about this judgment (binary scale). After having judged all 
video clips, participants completed a brief questionnaire asking what features of 
the stimuli they had used in judging. 
 




Error rate The error rate refers to the proportion of movie clips that were judged 
incorrectly by a participant. We found a significant effect of condition on the 
average error rate, F(2, 87) = 6.68, p < .01, !p2 = .13. The error rate was 
significantly higher in the Face Only condition (M = .34, SD = .12) than in the 
condition in which participants could see the speaker entirely (M = .22, SD = 
.10), and in the condition where the face could not be seen (M = .25, SD = .17), 
see Figure 12. The latter two conditions did not differ significantly. The error 
rate was significantly below chance (.5) in all conditions. For the Whole Speaker 
condition: one-sample t(29)= !15.57, p < .0001, for the Hands Only condition: 
one-sample t(29) = !8.15, p <.0001, and for the Face Only condition: one- 
sample t(29) = !7.11, p < .0001. 
We also found significant correlations between the number of gestures in our 
coding of the fragments and the number of participants who thought the speaker 
was talking to a human addressee (Whole: r(28) = .88, p < .01, Hands Only: 
r(28) = .81, p < .01). 
 
































The results of experiment 1 suggest that hand gestures are an important cue 
when judging whether a speaker is addressing a human addressee or a computer 
system. Participants could make this judgment reliably better than chance, even 
when they only saw the hands and upper-body of the speaker (without the face), 
and could not hear the speaker. They had the correct intuition that more hand 
gestures were produced toward a human, than toward the artificial addressee. 
The difference in gesturing that we found by analysis of the movie clips from our 
production experiment thus was confirmed by untrained observers, who could 
see parts of the movie clips only once. 
In this first perception experiment, we compared movie clips from the 
Computer condition to movie clips from our Screen condition of our production 
experiment, rather than from our Web cam condition. Gesture rate, and overall 
gesture size did not differ significantly between these two conditions, although 
more very large gestures were produced in the Web cam condition. Also, in 
neither of these conditions did speakers receive visual feedback from the 
addressee. There was occasional auditory feedback in the Screen condition, but 
this was so rare that we trust it not to have had a major influence on our results, 
which is also indicated by the non-differing gesture rates. Nevertheless, one 
could argue that the differences that observers in the perception experiment made 
use of, resulted from a difference between the Computer and Screen condition of 
our production study other than the difference in the nature of the addressee. We 
therefore did a control experiment, in which movie clips of speakers from the 
Computer and Web cam condition were compared, to see whether participants 
could still reliably judge the nature of the addressee. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was similar to experiment 1, but this time we used movie clips 
from the Computer and Web cam condition of our production study. There was 
only one condition, in which participants could see the entire upper-body of the 
speaker. The instruction asked participants to judge whether a speaker was 
talking to an audiovisual speech recognition system in another room, or to a 
human addressee, who was watching them live on video from another room. 
Movie clips were played without sound, and were projected life-size onto a wall. 
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Sixty Master students from Tilburg University, all native speakers of Dutch, 
volunteered to participate in this experiment. 
Results 
The error rate (M = .33, SD = .08) was significantly below chance (.5), one-
sample t(59)= !16.87, p < .0001. There was a significant correlation between the 
number of hand gestures in our annotation and the number of participants that 
thought a speaker was talking to a human addressee, r(58) = 0.81, p < .001. 
Discussion 
The results of our perception experiments clearly confirm that there are 
differences in gesture production when talking to a human addressee or to a 
computer system (even though the human addressees in the production 
experiment could not always see the speaker). More importantly, they show that 
observers are sensitive to these differences and have an intuition about how 
speakers gesture when talking to a human addressee or to an artificial system. 
When asked to explain the basis of their judgments afterward, most participants 
answered that they thought more gestures would be produced when talking to a 
human addressee, which is indeed the case. 
Many participants also made comments on facial expressions. They expected 
speakers to be more vivid toward human addressees. Though gestures were the 
better cue for judging movie clips in experiment 1, we do not conclude that 
information from the face is less relevant to addressees. We did not inform 
viewers in experiment 1 that speakers could not see their addressee, or be seen 
by their addressee. Therefore, information from the face may have been 
misleading. Also, mutual visibility may influence facial expressions more than it 
does gesturing. 
Even though in both studies participants performed better than chance, the 
error rate was lower in experiment 1 than it was in experiment 2. We think this 
may have to do with differences between speakers. Individual differences in 
gesture rate were relatively large among speakers from the Web cam condition. 
Apparently, some speakers matched the observers’ expectations better than 
others. Participants expected speakers in the Web cam condition to gesture more 
than speakers from the Computer condition, but for some speakers this 
difference was quite small. This may have to do with the selection of the 
fragments from the speakers’ narrations. We chose an episode in which 
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relatively many gestures were produced, which causes there to be relatively 
many gestures especially in the Computer condition, in which usually only a few 
gestures occurred throughout the entire narration. In addition, some speakers, 
especially in the Web cam condition, may have had more difficulty imagining 
their addressee than others. 
General discussion  
Our production study shows that just the speaker’s idea of the nature of the 
addressee can be enough to influence gesture rate, the type of gestures produced, 
and the size of the produced gestures. Speakers gestured a lot more toward 
human addressees than toward a presumed audiovisual summarizer, they did not 
make pointing gestures toward the artificial addressee, and gestures that involved 
movement of the shoulder made up a larger portion of the gestures when talking 
to a human addressee through web cam than when talking to the artificial 
system. Since we found that people can largely refrain from gesturing, and do so 
spontaneously when asked to retell a story to a computer system, we conclude 
that gesture production is not a fully automated process and that it is related to 
the addressee. 
Why would it be that people hardly produce gestures toward an audiovisual 
summarizer? One reason may be that information in gestures is largely 
redundant with information in speech. It could be that people do not expect a 
computer system to need such redundant information. Or perhaps gestures are 
not symbolic enough in nature, but rather relate to knowledge of the world too 
directly for speakers to expect the computer to benefit from them. Another 
reason may be that speakers did not feel the need to accommodate the artificial 
system as much as a human addressee. It has been found that speakers adapt less 
to an artificial addressee provided that it does not give feedback (Branigan, 
Pickering, Pearson, & McLean, 2010; Maes, et al., 2007). This may have caused 
speakers to be less informative in the gestural modality, but also they may have 
felt free to speak as slowly as they needed to the artificial system, thereby not 
needing gestures to “organize rich spatio-motoric information” (Kita, 2000, p. 
163) or to facilitate word retrieval (Krauss, 1998). It would be interesting to 
measure the effect of time pressure on gesturing to test these hypotheses.  
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From the perspective that gestures are intended communicatively, the 
question remains open why the difference in gesturing is not more dramatic 
when people can or cannot be seen by their addressee. This may have had to do 
with the relative unresponsiveness of our addressees. Another possibility is that 
it was difficult for participants to apply their knowledge that the addressee could 
or could not see them. It has been shown for example that people do not always 
make optimal use of their knowledge of what the addressee can and cannot see 
when interpreting referential expressions (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). The small 
difference between the gesture rates in our Screen and Web cam condition 
somewhat points in this direction. One would expect speakers to gesture more 
frequently in the Web cam condition, in which they can be seen by their 
addressee, yet we found very comparable gesture rates for each gesture type in 
the Web cam and Screen condition. 
If speakers indeed had problems applying their knowledge of the addressee, 
then the difficulty of the narration task may have further contributed to speakers 
not fully adjusting their behavior to the communicative setting. Most participants 
had some problems remembering parts of the animated cartoon they were 
retelling. Both processes: using one’s knowledge of the addressee and 
remembering the story of the animated cartoon, may compete for the same 
cognitive resources. In a follow-up experiment, we manipulated the memory 
demands of the narration task, to observe whether participants adapt their (verbal 
and non-verbal) language production more to the communicative setting when 
doing an easier task, or whether they always gesture less when memory demands 
are lower (Mol, Krahmer, Maes, & Swerts, 2009). 
A third possible explanation of our results is that gesturing is foremost a 
social activity. This social aspect may be a largely automated process that is 
simply not applicable when interacting with a computer system. This 
corroborates well with the idea of gestures having an interactive function 
(Bavelas, et al., 1992; Bavelas, et al., 2008). Yet it goes against the idea 
formulated by Reeves and Nass (1996), that people’s responses to media are 
fundamentally social in nature. However, their studies did not avoid 
personalizing the computer by, for example, asking questions such as ‘Did the 
computer help you well?’, whereas we carefully formulated our instructions 
without attributing human actions, qualities or intentions to the audiovisual 
summarizer. The wording of such questions and instructions may influence the 
way participants think about an artificial system. 
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It has also been shown that the difference between gesturing on the phone 
and in a face-to-face situation is qualitative rather than quantitative (Bavelas, et 
al., 2008). Gesturing on the phone or to a person behind a screen may therefore 
serve a different purpose than does gesturing face-to-face. Still, our study shows 
that even this type of gesturing has something to do with interpersonal 
communication, besides the effect of dialogue, and may not be fully automated. 
The effects of visibility on different gesture types that we found corroborate 
well with the results found in an earlier study (Alibali, et al., 2001). For 
representational gestures we found that significantly more gestures were 
produced in the Face-to-Face condition, in which speaker and addressee could 
see each other, than in the Screen condition in which they could not. This 
supports the hypothesis that representational gestures can be intended for the 
addressee. However, we did not find this difference between the Web cam and 
Screen condition. In the Web cam condition addressees were said to be able to 
see the speaker, but the speaker could not see the addressee and speaker and 
addressee were not physically co-present. One or both of these factors may 
influence the rate of representational gestures produced. For non-representational 
gestures, we found no significant difference between the Face-to-Face and 
Screen condition. However, we did find a difference between the Computer 
condition and the conditions with a human addressee, which may point to a 
communicative function of these gestures. In both the study by Alibali et al. and 
our study, large individual differences between speakers were found. 
Like Bangerter and Chevalley (2007), we found an effect of visibility on the 
size of pointing gestures. Pointing gestures were larger in the Face-to-Face, than 
in the Screen condition. We also found that fewer pointing gestures were 
produced in the Screen condition than in the FtF condition and that no pointing 
gestures were produced toward the audiovisual summarizer. This supports the 
idea that pointing gestures are meant to be communicative and that their size is 
relevant to their meaning (Enfield, et al., 2007). 
Our perception study has shown that gestures can be highly informative 
about the communicative setting that a speaker was in. Even when only seeing a 
speaker’s gestures and not hearing the speaker, viewers could reliably judge 
whether that speaker had been talking to a human addressee or to an artificial 
system. This is consistent with a theory that speakers intend their gestures 
communicatively, as well as with a theory that speakers gesture mostly for 
themselves. 




Whether the addressee is human or artificial can have an important influence on 
gesture production. People gesture less and produce a smaller proportion of 
gestures involving shoulder movement when narrating to an audiovisual 
summarizer, than when narrating to a human addressee. In addition, almost no 
pointing gestures were produced toward the artificial addressee. Just the 
speaker’s mental representation of the nature of the addressee (either human or 
artificial) can be sufficient to influence the number and size of the gestures 
produced. We therefore conclude that gesture production is not a process that is 
fully automated in every communicative setting. 
Given the size of the difference in gesture production that we found between 
narrating toward a human and an artificial addressee, it seems unlikely that 
gestures solely facilitate speech production. Rather, we think that some gestures 
are intended communicatively. However, part of the difference in gesturing that 
we found may relate to differences in verbal behavior. 
A speaker’s gestural behavior can convey information about the 
communicative setting that the speaker is in. It can reveal whether a speaker is 
talking to a human addressee or to a computer system. People are able to make 
this judgment better than chance from watching a speaker’s hand gesture 
behavior alone.  
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Seeing and being seen: the effects on gesture 
production 
Abstract 
Speakers are argued to adapt their language production to their addressee’s 
needs. For instance, speakers produce fewer and smaller hand gestures when 
interlocutors cannot see each other. Yet is this because speakers know their 
addressee cannot see them, or because they do not see their addressee? By means 
of computer-mediated communication we manipulated these factors 
independently. We found that speakers took into account what their addressee 
saw. They produced more and larger gestures when they knew the addressee 
could see them. Seeing the addressee increased gesture production only if the 
setting allowed for near-natural gazing behavior, which is not usually the case in 
mediated interaction. Adding this affordance resulted in gesturing being similar 
in mediated and unmediated communication.  
This chapter is based on: 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (In Press). Seeing and Being 
Seen: The effects on gesture production. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication. 









Language use sometimes requires taking into account what another person can or 
cannot see. For example, when watching a documentary on Venice with a friend, 
you might ask your friend “have you ever been there?”, where there refers to 
Venice. However, if your friend was in the same room, but working on her 
computer “have you ever been to Venice?” may be more appropriate. Because 
you know your friend is not watching the documentary, you may choose a more 
explicit reference. On the other hand, if you were asked by your friend, “have 
you ever been there?”, while working on your computer, your knowledge of her 
watching a documentary on Venice may help in arriving at the correct 
interpretation. Yet would you do so correctly if you happened to be browsing a 
website on Berlin?  
Language production and interpretation are argued to be adapted to our 
knowledge of another interlocutor, including what the other person knows about 
and sees (e.g. Grice, 1989). In this paper we focus on language production. 
Gesture and speech production can both be considered part of a speaker’s 
language production (Kendon, 2004; McNeill, 1992). Therefore, one way of 
measuring to what extent speakers adapt their language production to their 
addressee is by looking at the hand gestures people spontaneously produce along 
with speech. It is well established that speakers produce fewer and different co-
speech gestures when interlocutors cannot see each other (Cohen & Harison, 
1973), such as on the phone (Bavelas, Gerwing, Sutton, & Prevost, 2008) or on 
both ends of an opaque screen (Alibali, Heath, & Myers, 2001). Thus, speakers 
seem to take into account what their addressee cannot see and thus cannot know 
about. Yet several empirical studies suggest that interlocutors tend to base their 
language production and interpretation on their own visual perspective, rather 
than that of their conversation partner (e.g. Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Wardow 
Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 2006). So do speakers truly take into account what 
their addressee sees? 
Traditionally, in studies on hand gesture production, visibility has been 
manipulated symmetrically, such as by a screen that keeps the addressee from 
seeing the speaker, but at the same time keeps the speaker from seeing the 
addressee. We know that speakers tend to gesture less when visibility is 
obstructed in this way. Yet is this due to the addressee not seeing the speaker, or 
because of the speaker not seeing the addressee? Can we correctly apply our 





knowledge of what the other sees to our language production, or do we tend to 
base it on our own observations?  
To answer these questions, we need to somehow manipulate visibility 
asymmetrically, such that the speaker’s perspective differs from the addressee’s. 
Computer-mediated communication offers this possibility. With communication 
through web cams, we can separate the factors of seeing the addressee and being 
seen by the addressee, thus gaining important insights into what knowledge 
speakers apply to their language production.  
To support the validity of this method, we need to draw the comparison 
between mediated and unmediated communication. Can we generalize from the 
results found in mediated communication to unmediated communication? What 
exactly is needed to make these two forms of communication optimally similar? 
Is it enough for interlocutors to have a live audiovisual presentation of each 
other? One possibly important difference between face-to-face interaction and 
communication through web cams is how readily interlocutors can interpret each 
other’s eye gaze. We know that gaze and mutual gaze serve a variety of 
functions in unmediated interaction (Argyle & Cook, 1976; Kendon, 1967).  In 
the second part of this paper we examine whether being able to interpret each 
other’s eye gazing patterns influences speakers’ language production in mediated 
communication.  
Before describing how we used computer-mediated communication to study 
perspective taking, and presenting our findings on the importance of (mutual) 
gaze, we provide a brief overview of the literature on the communicative use of 
co-speech hand gestures, on when interlocutors have trouble taking into account 
each other’s visual perspective, on the comparison of mediated and unmediated 
communication, and on the role of eye-gaze in interaction. 
Background 
Communicative co-speech gestures 
When talking, many people move their hands and arms around, without the 
objective of directly manipulating their environment: they gesture. Several 
functions of such hand gestures have been identified, such as facilitating speech 
production (e.g. Hadar, 1989; Krauss, 1998), supporting learning (e.g. Goldin-
Meadow, 2010), and aiding cognition (e.g. Chu & Kita, 2008; Melinger & Kita, 
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2007). In this paper, we focus on the communicative import of co-speech hand 
gestures. Numerous studies have addressed the communicative role of co-speech 
gestures. Some studies have shown that addressees gain information from 
gesture (e.g. Beattie & Shovelton, 1999; Cassell, McNeill, & McCullough, 1998; 
Chawla & Krauss, 1994; Cutica & Bucciarelli, 2008; Goldin-Meadow & 
Sandhofer, 1999; Mol, Krahmer, Maes, & Swerts, 2009). Additionally, other 
studies have rendered converging evidence that hand gestures are part of a 
speaker’s communicative effort (Kendon, 2004). We will address this viewpoint 
below. 
Kendon (1988) recognizes a continuum of how conventional and language-
like hand gestures are. On the one end of this continuum are sign languages, in 
which signs have a conventional meaning and can be interpreted in the absence 
of speech. On the other end of the continuum is gesticulation. This is the 
production along with speech, of gestures that are not embedded in the 
grammatical structure of speech. For example, while saying “he went away”, one 
could move one’s arms back and forth along one’s upper body, illustrating the 
manner of the action described. Alternatively, quickly wiggling one’s down 
pointing fingers while moving the hand forward could illustrate the same event. 
Gestures at this end of Kendon’s continuum are the most idiosyncratic gestures 
and their interpretation is highly dependent on the accompanying speech 
(Feyereisen, Van de Wiele, & Dubois, 1988).  
These co-speech gestures are generally divided into several categories (e.g. 
McNeill, 1992). One broad distinction can be made based on whether a gesture 
depicts some of the content of the message a speaker is trying to convey, or 
whether it rather structures the conversation (e.g. Bavelas, Chovil, Lawrie, & 
Wade, 1992), or emphasizes certain parts of speech (e.g. Effron, 1941; Ekman & 
Friesen, 1969; Krahmer & Swerts, 2007).  In this paper we focus on gestures that 
express some of the content a speaker is conveying, which are known as 
illustrators (Ekman & Friesen, 1969), or representational gestures (McNeill, 
1992). Especially these gestures have been found to be produced differently by 
speakers in different communicative settings (e.g. Alibali, et al., 2001).  
Effects of the communicative setting on representational gestures 
When gestures have communicative potential, that is, when they can be seen by 
an addressee, they have been found to be larger (Bangerter & Chevalley, 2007; 
Bavelas, et al., 2008) and more frequently produced (Alibali, et al., 2001; 





Bavelas, et al., 2008; Cohen, 1977). Yet does this imply that speakers take into 
account the addressee’s visual perspective? In one study, Bavelas et al. (2008) 
asked participants to describe a picture of an elaborate dress. When participants 
interacted face-to-face, their gestures about the dress were full sized, as of an 
actual dress one could wear, whereas when interaction took place over the 
telephone, gestures were only the size of the dress in the picture. Although this 
study clearly illustrates speakers’ sensitivity to the communicative context, we 
can not be sure that speakers were adapting to what their addressee saw, since 
gesturing based on what they themselves saw would result in the same behavior.  
Alibali et al. (2001) found that when speakers were asked to retell an 
animated cartoon to an addressee, they produced representational gestures more 
frequently in a face-to-face setting than when speaker and addressee were 
separated by an opaque screen. Again, this shows speakers’ sensitivity to the 
environment. Yet it does not tell us whether speakers were taking into account 
their addressee’s visual perspective, since whether or not the addressee saw the 
speaker corresponded with whether or not the speaker saw the addressee. 
Therefore, speakers may have based their gesturing on their own visual 
perspective. Using a similar narration task, Jacobs and Garnham (2007) found 
that gestures were produced more frequently when a speaker knew that 
information was new to the addressee as well as when the addressee appeared 
attentive and interested. This suggests that speakers do take into account listener 
needs, but again these needs were also readily visible to the speaker. (Speakers 
either retold the same cartoon twice to the same addressee or to two different 
addressees, and either saw an interested or a less interested addressee.) This also 
holds for a study by Özyürek (2002), which showed that speakers produce their 
gestures differently, depending on where the addressee is located relative to 
them. Although speakers were shown to change the orientation of their gestures 
based on the addressee’s location, we do not know if this resulted from the 
change in their own visual perspective or in that of their addressee. 
As described in the previous chapter, in an earlier study (Mol, et al., 2009), 
we manipulated whether speakers thought to be talking to a human addressee or 
to an audiovisual speech recognition system. In this study, contrary to the 
aforementioned studies, the environment of the speaker was exactly the same 
across conditions. The only difference was in the preceding instruction. The 
speaker was seated alone in a room in front of a camera and was either told that 
the audiovisual output of this camera was sent to another participant, or to an 
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artificial system. Speakers were found to gesture more frequently and produce 
more large gestures when they thought to be addressing a human addressee. This 
time, the difference in gesturing could only be caused by a different belief about 
the addressee. Yet it remains unknown whether speakers apply more of their 
knowledge about the addressee to their language use than just whether the 
addressee is human.  
Although the above-mentioned results all point in the direction that speakers 
do apply their knowledge of their addressee to their hand gesture production, and 
thereby to their language production, these results leave open the possibility that 
the actual application of such knowledge is very limited and that speakers mostly 
use an egocentric perspective. That is, they may base their language production 
on what they themselves see. We therefore turn to some studies that have shown 
people’s difficulty in applying knowledge about their addressee’s visual 
perspective to their language use. 
Taking into account what an interlocutor sees 
Keysar, Lin, and Barr (2003) have shown that people tend to make ‘mistakes’ in 
their interpretation of speech, when arriving at the correct interpretation requires 
taking into account what a speaker can and cannot see. By studying participants’ 
eye movements, they found that addressees mistakenly considered objects that 
they knew a speaker could not see as possible referents of speakers’ referring 
expressions. Wardlow Lane, Groisman, and Ferreira (2006) found similar results 
for reference production. In their study, a speaker had private visual access to an 
object that only differed from the target object in size. Even though the addressee 
could not see this competing object, speakers often included a contrasting 
adjective, such as ‘small’, in their reference to the target object, despite this not 
being informative to the addressee. Surprisingly, they did so even more when 
instructed to conceal their private information from the addressee. Note that the 
contrasting adjective provides a cue to the properties of the object that was 
hidden from the addressee. Therefore, it seems that speakers have difficulty in 
applying their knowledge of what their addressee sees to their speech production. 
Similar difficulties may affect speakers’ hand gesture production.  
Computer-mediated vs. unmediated interaction 
Mediated communication can help us resolve the issue of whether speakers 
employ an egocentric perspective or not, when it comes to adapting their co-





speech gestures to a communicative setting. Yet can mediated communication be 
representative of face-to-face interaction? Social presence theory (Short, 
Williams, & Christie, 1976) proposes that the extent to which social presence is 
experienced in mediated communication depends on the affordances offered. 
The more affordances available, the more warmth and affection interlocutors will 
experience and express. Social information processing theory (Walther, 1992) 
adds that interlocutors can also adjust both their motives and their 
communicative efforts to a medium, such that mediated communication does not 
necessarily fall short of face-to-face interaction when it comes to experienced 
presence. For example, Walther, Slovacek, and Tidwell (2001) have shown that 
seeing a picture of the addressee promotes affection and social attraction in 
short-term mediated interaction, but that this is not true for long-term mediated 
interaction. Given ample time, the highest levels of affinity were established 
through a text-based medium.  
Consistent with this approach, Brennan and Lockridge (2006) use the 
grounding framework to describe how communication is affected by mediation: 
“The grounding framework conceptualizes mediated communication as a 
coordinated activity constrained by costs and affordances (Clark & Brennan, 
1991)”, p. 1.  From this perspective, the more the costs and affordances of 
mediated communication resemble the costs and affordances of face-to-face 
interaction, the more similar the two will be. For example, Brennan and Ohaeri 
(1999) argue that mediated written conversation can be less polite compared to 
spoken interaction, because the production costs of politeness are higher when 
typing than when speaking. This in turn could lead to interlocutors perceiving 
each other differently, rather than these different perceptions resulting from 
mediation directly. From these frameworks, we can infer that both being able to 
see the addressee and being seen by the addressee will result in mediated 
communication being more similar to face-to-face interaction.  
Communication through desktop video-conferencing, such as with Skype, 
offers many of the affordances available in face-to-face communication. The use 
of web cams and microphones allows speakers to see and hear each other almost 
real time, even though they are in different locations. Would this result in 
interlocutors behaving the same way as in face-to-face interaction? Isaacs and 
Tang (1994) observed interactions between technical experts that took place over 
the phone, through desktop video-conferencing, or face-to-face. They found that 
the experts indeed used the visual modality in video-conferencing much like they 
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did in face-to-face communication. “Specifically, participants used the visual 
channel to: express understanding or agreement, forecast responses, enhance 
verbal descriptions, give purely nonverbal information, express attitudes through 
posture and facial expression, and manage extended pauses”, p. 65. However, 
Isaacs and Tang also listed some differences between video-conferencing and 
face-to-face communication, for example, managing turn-taking, having side 
conversations, and pointing to objects in each other’s space were more difficult 
in video-conferencing.  
One difference in affordances between video-conferencing and face-to-face 
interaction is the availability and interpretability of information from gaze. For 
example, when interlocutors are not co-present and the physical environment is 
not shared, the direction of each other’s gaze cannot readily be interpreted. When 
using a web cam, it can even be misleading. Since the image of the conversation 
partner and the web cam are not in the same location, looking at the web cam 
means not looking at the other interlocutor. Yet when someone looks into the 
camera, their image misleadingly appears as though they are looking at the 
person watching the image. To what extent do the availability of an 
interlocutor’s gaze and the ease with which it can be interpreted influence 
language production? Can the difference in the availability of information from 
gaze account for some of the differences found between communicating face-to-
face and by means of video-conferencing?  
Using information from others’ gaze 
We know that gaze and mutual gaze serve many functions in unmediated 
interaction (Argyle & Cook, 1976; Kendon, 1967). Among other functions, gaze 
can be used to infer if the other person is attending and whether a message is 
understood, as well as to solicit such signals from the conversation partner. It has 
also been found that when speakers gaze at their own gestures, addressees are 
more likely to fixate on these gestures as well, and are also more likely to retain 
information from these gestures (Gullberg & Kita, 2009). Thus, speakers may 
use gaze as a way to direct their addressee’s attention to their gestures.  
Hanna and Brennan (2007) found that addressees use speakers’ eye gaze to 
disambiguate referring expressions. Addressees could do so both when a 
speaker’s visual perspective matched their own perspective and when it was a 
mirror image, showing that they could map the speaker’s visual perspective onto 
their own. Brennan, Xin, Dickinson, Neider and Zelinsky (2008) found that 





participants were able to benefit from seeing another participant’s gaze indicated 
on their screen, when performing a simple collaborative search task. Seeing each 
other’s gaze represented by a cursor on the display was shown to allow for a 
more optimal division of labor than did talking to each other. This shows that 
participants were able to adapt their behavior, based on their knowledge of where 
their partner was looking. 
These studies show that people can sometimes benefit from observing other 
people’s gaze when communicating or co-operating, both in unmediated and 
mediated settings. They also show that the interpretation and production of gaze 
can be adapted to a task or a medium. How important is this factor when it 
comes to the difference between mediated and unmediated communication? Do 
interlocutors behave differently dependent on whether gaze is easily interpreted 
or not, or do they interpret gaze correctly independent of the effort involved, 
resulting in similar communicative behavior (including gesture production)? 
Present study 
Our present study consists of three experiments. First, we investigate whether the 
fact that speakers produce fewer hand gestures when interlocutors cannot see 
each other is due to the speaker not seeing the addressee, to the addressee not 
seeing the speaker, or to both of these factors. We do so by asking participants to 
perform a narration task in one of four settings, in which we independently 
manipulate visibility of the speaker and addressee, by means of communication 
through web cams. Second, we investigate how important it is for speakers to be 
able to readily interpret their addressee’s gaze. For this we make use of a newer 
video-conferencing technique: the Eye-Catcher (GreenEyes, 2007). This device 
enables interlocutors to interpret each other’s gazing behavior more readily than 
when using web cams. We measure how this affects gesture production. Third, 
we test what the differences in speakers’ production behavior due to this 
difference in the interpretability of gaze, mean to naive observers. 
Study 1: Seeing and being seen through web cams 
In order to manipulate visibility asymmetrically, we make use of video-
conferencing through web cams. Our communication task is chosen such that the 
differences found by Isaacs and Tang (1994) between video-conferencing and 
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face-to-face interaction are minimized. There are only two interlocutors, so there 
is no possibility of having side conversations. We use a task in which a speaker 
retells an animated cartoon to an addressee, who is instructed not to interrupt 
(after Alibali, et al., 2001). Therefore, there is little need for coordinating turns. 
Also, this task does not relate to the physical environment of either the speaker 
or the addressee, so there is no need to point at real objects in the environment. 
Therefore, for this task, the costs and affordances of video-conferencing are a 
close match to face-to-face interaction. Hence, we expect that manipulating 
mutual visibility will have similar effects in our mediated settings as it does in 
unmediated settings. 
The use of gesture production as a dependent variable enables us to measure 
how participants’ communicative behavior is influenced by the communicative 
setting, rather than how they subjectively experience it. We can look at both the 
frequency and the quality of the gestures produced. Both these factors have been 
related to communicative effort, and speakers are known to adjust these aspects 
of their communicative behavior to whether or not there is mutual visibility. 
Therefore, gesture is a suitable measure for determining if speakers tend to base 
their language use on their own visual perspective or if they correctly apply their 
knowledge of the addressee’s visual perspective.  
Seeing the addressee could influence gesture production for several reasons. 
One reason is that speakers may base their gesturing on their own visual 
perspective, and will therefore gesture as though there is mutual visibility when 
in fact they can only see the addressee. This would mean that speakers gesture 
more when they can see the addressee, regardless of whether the addressee can 
see them. If speakers solely use their own visual perspective, this would also 
mean that when speakers cannot see their addressee, they will produce an equal 
number of gestures, irrespective of their knowledge of whether the addressee can 
see them. 
Another reason why seeing the addressee may influence gesture production is 
because of the signals the speaker receives from the addressee. In this case, 
seeing the addressee may elicit more gestures if it motivates speakers to put in 
more communicative effort, for example because they experience a higher 
degree of social presence (Short, et al., 1976) or affinity (Walther, et al., 2001), 
or because the addressee seems more interested (Jacobs & Garnham, 2007). Yet 
receiving cues from the addressee may also reduce gesture production, especially 
when the addressee’s gaze is hard to interpret, which may cause the addressee to 





appear inattentive. Regardless of its direction, this effect would be independent 
of the effect of being seen by the addressee.  
Being seen by the addressee can only influence gesture production directly if 
speakers correctly apply their knowledge of the addressee’s visual perspective, 
thereby possibly overriding or replacing an egocentric perspective. If speakers 
indeed base their language production on their knowledge of the addressee’s 
perspective rather than their own visual perspective, this would mean they 
gesture more when they can be seen by the addressee, rather than when they see 
their addressee.  
Method 
Design We used a 2 x 2 between participants design in which we manipulated 
whether or not the speaker could be seen by the addressee and whether or not the 
speaker could see the addressee, see Figure 1. In all conditions speaker and 
addressee could hear each other.  
Participants Thirty-eight (21 female) native Dutch speakers, all students from 
Tilburg University, participated in this study as part of their first year 
curriculum. Two participants were excluded from our analysis (see Analysis). 
The remaining 36 participants (20 female) had a mean age of 22, range 18 - 33. 
 
Figure 1: Schematic overview of the settings. Speaker and addressee are seated in 
separate rooms and can either see the other interlocutor on a monitor or not. 
= Speaker = Addressee
Mutual visibility
Audio only
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The addressee was a female confederate, who also was a student from Tilburg 
University.  
Procedure The experimenter received the participant and the confederate in the 
lab and assigned the role of speaker to the participant and the role of addressee to 
the confederate. Narrators were asked to retell the story of an animated cartoon 
(Canary Row by Warner Bros) to the addressee. After reading the instructions, 
participants could ask any remaining questions. The confederate always posed a 
clarification question. The narrator’s instructions stated that the addressee had to 
summarize the narration afterward and explained that the narrator was 
videotaped to enable comparison of the summary and the narration.  
When all was clear the narrator was seated behind a table with a computer 
screen on it, which in some settings showed a live video-image of the addressee 
(full screen), and in the remaining settings showed just the interface of the video-
conferencing application we used (Skype). If the addressee was shown, the entire 
upper body of the addressee was visible, rather than just the face. The computer 
screen was connected to a computer, which also had a web cam connected to it. 
Behind the table stood a tripod, which held the web cam and a digital video 
camera. The position of the web cam was such that the entire upper body of the 
speaker was captured. On the wall behind the video camera were eight stills from 
the animated cartoon, one from each episode, as a memory aid for the narrator 
and to elicit more structured and hence more comparable narrations.  
The experimenter took the addressee to another room with a similar setup 
(but without the stills) and established a connection between the two computers 
over the internet, using Skype. Sound and video were both captured by the web 
cams and sound was played back through speakers. To familiarize the 
participants with the setting, sound was tested by the narrator and addressee 
talking to each other and if applicable, the video-image was tested as well. The 
connection was then suspended temporarily, while the narrator was left alone to 
watch the animated cartoon on a different computer. When the cartoon had 
finished the experimenter re-established the connection, and seated the narrator 
behind the camera. In conditions where the addressee could see the narrator, 
narrators were briefly shown what the addressee saw. In the remaining 
conditions, the experimenter repeated that the addressee could not see the 
narrator. The experimenter then started the video recording and left the room. 





When the narrator was done telling the story, participants completed a 
questionnaire, which included questions on how the communicative setting had 
been experienced, how interested the addressee had appeared, and whether any 
deception was suspected. Meanwhile, the addressee ostensibly wrote a summary 
on yet another computer in the lab room. None of the participants had suspected 
any deception. After filling out the questionnaire, they were fully debriefed. All 
of the participants gave their informed consent for the use of their data, and if 
applicable for publishing their photographs. 
During the narration, the confederate refrained from interrupting, laughing, 
etc. When necessary, minimal feedback was provided verbally. She always 
gazed somewhere near the web cam capturing her, independent of whether she 
could see the speaker. 
Transcribing and coding We transcribed each speaker’s narration from the 
videotape. Filled pauses, such as ‘uh’ were included in the transcription. A Perl 
script was used to compute the number of unique words in each narration. 
We coded all hand gestures produced by speakers. Based on the gesture’s 
shape and the accompanying speech, we coded whether a gesture depicted some 
of the content of the animated cartoon, or whether it was about the current 
conversation, e.g. placing emphasis. In our analysis we focus on the former 
category, which we refer to as representational gestures. Figure 2 depicts two 
examples of our coding. In the scene on the left, the speaker imitates a hitting 
motion while talking about someone hitting. In the scene on the right, the 
speaker refers to the main character and briefly moves his fingers up and down. 
We also coded the size of each gesture. Gestures that were produced using 
only the fingers received a score of 1. If the wrist was moved significantly the 
gesture received a score of 2. Gestures that also involved significant movement 
of the elbow or lower arm received a score of 3, and gestures in which the upper 
arm was also used in a meaningful way, or that involved movement of the 
shoulder received a score of 4. This way, an average gesture size was computed 
for each participant. 
Statistical analysis Analyses were done using a 2 x 2 ANOVA, with factors 
speaker is seen by addressee (levels: yes, no) and speaker sees addressee (levels: 
yes, no). The significance threshold was .05 and we report partial eta squared as 
a measure of effect size. As dependent variables for participants’ gestures, we  




Figure 2: Left: example of a representational gesture (depicting hitting), Right: example 
of a non-representational gesture (placing emphasis while referring to a character). 
use the number of representational gestures produced per minute (gesture rate) 
and the average size of representational gestures. We use the mean gesture rate 
rather than the mean total number of gestures produced, to control for any 
differences in the duration of the narrations between participants. 
Twoparticipants were excluded from the analysis, because they deviated more 
than 2 standard deviations from the mean gesture rate in their condition. As a 
result, there were 9 participants in each condition. Inclusion of these two 
participants did not affect the significant effects found, but did reduce the 
significance of the overall model.  
Although our focus is on participants’ hand gestures, we also report some 
general measures of participants’ speech. This addresses the question of whether 
different behavior in gesturing follows from the verbal narrations being much 
different across settings, rather than it being a direct result of the communicative 
setting. As global measures of the content of the narrations, we report the total 
number of words produced and the ratio of the number of unique words divided 
by the total number of words (type-token ratio). In addition, we report the 
number of words per second (speech rate) and the number of filled pauses per 
100 words, as measures of fluency. To exclude a possible confounded effect of 
speech rate, we used the speech rate as a covariate in all our ANOVAs on 
gesture data in this and the following studies. Throughout the entire paper we 
report all means before this correction. 






Gesture rate Analyses of the number of representational gestures per minute, 
shown in Figure 3, revealed a main effect of the speaker being seen by the 
addressee, such that speakers gestured more frequently when they were seen (M 
= 5.66, SD = 5.82) than when they were not (M = 2.58, SD = 2.03), F(1, 32) = 
4.25, p < .05, !2p  =.13. The main effect of the speaker seeing the addressee 
showed a trend toward significance, such that speakers gestured less frequently 
when they saw their addressee (M = 2.75, SD = 3.35) than when they did not (M 
= 5.49, SD = 5.27), F(1, 32) = 3.74, p = .06, !2p  =.11. The two factors did not 
interact, F(1, 32) < 1. 
Gesture size Analyses of the average size of representational gestures, shown in 
Figure 4, revealed a trend toward significance for the main effect of the speaker 
being seen by the addressee, such that speakers’ gestures were larger when 
speakers were seen (M = 3.03, SD = .73) than when they were not (M = 2.53, SD 
= .78), F(1, 29) = 2.93, p = .10, !2p  =.09. When including non-representational 
gestures, being seen exerted a main effect on gesture size, F(1,31) = 4.59, p < 
.05, !2p = .13. The speaker seeing the addressee did not exert a main effect on 
the gesture size, F < 1, and the two factors did not interact, F < 1.  
 
Figure 3: Mean gesture rate depending on whether the speaker could be seen by the 
addressee (separate columns) and whether the speaker could see the addressee (x-axis).  
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Figure 4: Mean average size of representational gestures, depending on whether the 
speaker could be seen by the addressee (separate columns) and whether the speaker could 
see the addressee (x-axis). Bars represent standard errors. 
Speech Neither the speaker being seen by the addressee, nor the speaker seeing 
the addressee exerted a main effect on the total number of words used, the type-
token ratio, or the number of filled pauses per 100 words. The speaker being 
seen by the addressee exerted a main effect on the number of words per second, 
such that speakers spoke faster when they were seen (M = 2.99, SD = .24) than 
when they were not (M = 2.73, SD = .45) , F(1, 32) = 4.61, p < .05, !2p   = .13. 
The speaker seeing the addressee did not exert a main effect on the speech rate, 
F < 1. The two factors did not interact, F(1, 32) = 1.05, p = .31. 
Perceived interest Analyses of the extent to which speakers perceived the 
addressee as disinterested, shown in Figure 5, revealed an interaction between 
the factors being seen by the addressee and seeing the addressee, F(1, 31) = 
11.87, p < .01, !2p   =.28: Speakers agreed to the statement that the addressee was 
disinterested more when they could see the addressee, but the addressee could 
not see them. The main effect of the speaker seeing the addressee showed a trend 
toward significance, such that speakers agreed to the statement more when 
speakers could see the addressee (M = 3.53, SD = 1.42) than when they could not 
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Figure 5: Means of speakers’ answer to the statement “The addressee was disinterested” 
on a 7 point scale, 1 = completely disagree, 7 = strongly agree.  
Bars represent standard errors. 
Other Neither the speaker being seen by the addressee, nor the speaker seeing 
the addressee exerted a main effect on the duration of the narration. There was 
no significant correlation between the speech rate and the gesture rate, p = .13. 
Discussion 
Representational gestures were produced more frequently when speakers knew 
their addressee could see them. This was true both when speakers saw the 
addressee and when not, but especially the difference when speakers could not 
see their addressee is striking. This clearly shows that it was speakers’ belief of 
being seen by the addressee that increased gesture production. In addition, 
gestures tended to be larger when speakers knew their addressee could see them, 
independent of whether speakers saw their addressee or not. These results clearly 
show that speakers applied their knowledge of the addressee’s visual perspective 
to their gesture production, rather than solely using their own visual perspective. 
Other than in previous work (Alibali, Kita, & Young, 2000; Bavelas, et al., 
2008; Cohen, 1977; Jacobs & Garnham, 2007; Özyürek, 2002), our results 
cannot be explained by observable changes in the environment of the speaker. 
Our study therefore supports the interpretations of these earlier studies in terms 
of audience design. Speakers are able to adapt their gesturing to their 
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Participants’ verbal narrations in each setting were similar, as can be seen 
from their length in words, the variation in vocabulary, their duration in time, 
and the frequency of filled pauses. Interestingly, participants spoke faster when 
they could be seen. It therefore seems that speakers also applied their knowledge 
of the addressee’s perspective to their speech production. Perhaps speakers have 
an intuition that their speech can be understood more easily when they can be 
seen. It has been shown that visual information can indeed aid speech 
interpretation (e.g. Sumby & Pollack, 1954).  
When speakers could see their addressee, they tended to produce fewer 
gestures than when they could not. At first sight it may seem surprising that 
speakers did not gesture more frequently when they saw their addressee, but the 
video-image of the addressee may have been confusing. The confederate 
addressee always gazed somewhere near the web cam capturing her, regardless 
of whether she could see the speaker or not. This somewhat unnatural gazing 
behavior may have been interpreted as the addressee being less interested. The 
results of our offline measure, a questionnaire, support this. After the narration 
task, the addressee was rated as less interested when the speaker could see the 
addressee but the addressee could not see the speaker. Speakers are known to 
gesture less when the addressee appears uninterested or inattentive (Jacobs & 
Garnham, 2007). Interestingly, this did not affect gesture size. Once a gesture 
was produced, it was produced larger when it was visible to the addressee, 
independent of how interested the addressee appeared to be.  
Because of the effects of being seen by the addressee and seeing the 
addressee acting in opposite directions, the gesture rate in the setting in which 
speaker and addressee could see each other is surprisingly low compared to the 
setting in which only the speaker could be seen, and perhaps not quite 
representative of face-to-face interaction. Our second experiment addresses this 
issue. 
Study 2: Eye-Catcher  
One important difference remains between our setting with mutual visibility 
through web cams and a face-to-face setting: the usability of gaze. In study 2, we 
investigate the effect of the possibility for mutual gaze and the cost of 
interpreting gaze on language production. We do so by using a new technology 





for mediated communication: the Eye-Catcher, which enables interlocutors to 
look at each other’s video-image and straight into the camera at the same time. 
This way, interlocutors can both look at each other simultaneously and appear to 
be looking at each other as well. This is not possible in communication through 
web cams, where giving the impression of looking at the other interlocutor 
requires looking into the camera, while seeing the other interlocutor requires 
looking at the screen.  
Note that for the task we use, there is not much difference between using a 
web cam and using Eye-Catchers when using one-way visibility. In this case, 
either the addressee has nothing of interest to look at and thus it is of little use to 
the speaker to be able to interpret the addressee’s gaze, or the speaker does not 
see the addressee and thus cannot make use of the addressee’s gaze. Therefore, 
we use the Eye-Catcher in a setting with mutual visibility only. In such a setting, 
the addressee’s gaze can inform the speaker of what the addressee is looking at. 
By comparing the Eye-Catcher setting to the Web Cam setting with mutual 
visibility, we can see how the availability of information from gaze affects 
language production.  
If the availability of mutual gaze affects language production, we can re-
examine the effects of being seen by the addressee and seeing the addressee, 
replacing the data from the Web Cam setting with mutual visibility with the data 
of the Eye-Catcher setting. This may provide a closer match with unmediated 
communication. Also, we can compare the effect of mutual visibility in mediated 
and unmediated communication, to see if the results obtained with mediated 
communication are likely to generalize to unmediated communication. To draw 
this comparison, we make use of the data of an earlier study (Mol, et al., 2009), 
in which we used the same paradigm of retelling a cartoon in two unmediated 
settings. In the Face-to-Face setting, speaker and addressee were seated in the 
same room facing each other, such that visibility was unimpaired. In the Screen 
setting, interlocutors sat in the same room but on either side of an opaque screen, 
such that they could not see each other. 
Method 
The method of our second study was the same as in our first study, except that 
this time we used Eye-Catcher technology instead of communication through 
web cams. The Eye Catcher consists of a one-way mirror, in which a screen is 
reflected. Behind the one-way mirror is a camera. This way, the person in front  





Figure 6: The Eye Catcher seen from the front, with a video image of the addressee. 
of the Eye-Catcher can be captured while watching the reflected screen. We used 
two connected Eye-Catchers, such that the image captured by one Eye-Catcher’s 
camera was shown on the screen of the other Eye-Catcher. This way, it appears 
as though interlocutors can look each other in the eyes, see Figure 6.  
Through the Eye-Catchers, the narrator and the (confederate) addressee were 
able to see and hear each other and there was a possibility for mutual gaze. They 
were each seated in front of a table with an Eye-Catcher on it, at the same angle 
and distance, such that the setting was maximally symmetrical, enhancing the 
interpretability of gaze. The confederate’s gazing was natural and her other back-
channeling behavior was restricted in the same way as before. 
Participants Nine (6 female) native Dutch speakers, all students from Tilburg 
University, participated in this study as part of their first year curriculum. They 
had a mean age of 21, range 19 - 26. In the earlier study we used for comparative 
analyses, 19 native Dutch students from Tilburg University participated. In the 
Face-to-Face setting, there were 10 (8 female) participants with a mean age of 
19, range 17 - 21. In the Screen setting, there were 9 (7 female) participants with 
a mean age of 18, range 18 – 19. 
Transcribing, coding & statistical analysis We transcribed participants’ speech 
and coded their hand gestures in the same way as before. First, we compare the 
Eye-Catcher setting to the Web Cam setting with mutual visibility in an 
independent samples t-test. This way, we can see if and how the Eye-Catcher’s 





affordance of mutual gaze affects gesture and speech production.  Second, we 
repeat our ANOVA with factors speaker is seen by addressee (levels: yes, no) 
and speaker sees addressee (levels: yes, no), with the data of the Eye-Catcher 
setting replacing the data of our previous setting with mutual visibility through 
web cams. The one-way visibility settings were not replaced in this analysis. As 
explained earlier, there is no relevant difference between using Eye-Catchers and 
using a web cam in one-way visibility settings. We also perform an ANOVA 
with factors mutual visibility (levels: yes, no) and mediation (levels: yes, no), 
comparing the mediated Audio Only setting of experiment 1 and the Eye-
Catcher setting, to the unmediated Face-to-Face setting and the Screen setting of 
our earlier study (Mol, et al., 2009).  
Results 
Comparing the Web Cam and Eye-Catcher settings 
Gesture Representational gestures were produced more frequently in the Eye-
Catcher setting (M = 14.25, SD = 8.08) than in the Web Cam setting (M = 3.60, 
SD = 4.26), t(16) = 3.50, p < .01. The gesture size was comparable in both 
conditions, t(16) = .26, p  = .80. 
Speech The total number of words produced, the duration of the narration, the 
type-token ratio, and the number of filled pauses per 100 words did not differ 
significantly across the two settings. The speech rate was also comparable in the 
Web Cam (M = 2.92, SD = .29) and Eye-Catcher setting (M = 3.01, SD = .45), 
t(16) = -.46, p = .74. 
Analysis with factors: speaker is seen by addressee, speaker sees addressee 
Since the gesture rate was much different in the Web Cam and Eye-Catcher 
setting, we repeat our previous analysis of experiment 1, with the data of the 
Eye-Catcher setting replacing the data of the Web Cam setting with mutual 
visibility. 
Gesture rate Analyses of the number of representational gestures per minute, 
shown in Figure 7, revealed a main effect of the speaker being seen by the 
addressee, such that speakers gestured more frequently when they were seen (M  




Figure 7: Mean gesture rate depending on whether the speaker could be seen by the 
addressee (separate columns) and whether the speaker could see the addressee (x-axis).  
Bars represent standard errors. 
= 11.0, SD = 7.92) than when not (M = 2.58, SD = 2.03), F(1, 31) = 15.34, p < 
.001, !2p = .33. The speaker seeing the addressee did not exert a main effect on 
the gesture rate, F(1, 31) = 1.41, p = .24. The two factors interacted, F(1, 31) = 
5.34, p < .05, !2p = .15: Seeing the addressee only increased gesture production 
if the addressee could also see the speaker.  
Gesture size Analyses of the average size of representational gestures, shown in 
Figure 8, revealed a main effect of the speaker being seen by the addressee, such 
that speakers produced larger gestures when they were seen (M = 3.07, SD = .46) 
than when they were not (M = 2.53, SD = .78), F(1, 29) = 4.60,  p < .05, !2p = 
.14. The speaker seeing the addressee did not exert a main effect on gesture size, 
F < 1. The two factors did not interact, F < 1. 
Speech Neither the speaker being seen by the addressee, nor the speaker seeing 
the addressee exerted a main effect on the total number of words used, the 
number of filled pauses per 100 words, or the type-token ratio. The speaker 
being seen by the addressee exerted a main effect on the speech rate, such that 
speakers spoke faster when they were seen (M = 3.03, SD = .32) than when they 
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Figure 8: Mean average size of representational gestures, depending on whether the 
speaker could be seen by the addressee (separate columns) and whether the speaker could 
see the addressee (x-axis). Bars represent standard errors. 
seeing the addressee did not exert a main effect on the speech rate, F < 1. The 
two factors did not interact, F < 1.  
Other Neither the speaker being seen by the addressee, nor the speaker seeing 
the addressee exerted a main effect on the duration of the narrations in seconds. 
There was a significant correlation between participants’ speech rate and their 
gesture rate, r = .34, p < .05. 
Analysis with factors: mutual visibility and mediation 
In this analysis we assess the effects of the speaker and addressee being able to 
see each other and communication being mediated on language production. 
Gesture rate Analyses of the number of representational gestures per minute, 
shown in Figure 9, revealed a main effect of mutual visibility, such that speakers 
gestured more frequently when interlocutors could see each other (M = 11.89, 
SD = 7.28) than when they could not (M = 3.92, SD = 2.30), F(1,32) = 19.75,  p 
< .001, !2p  = .38. The main effect of mediation showed a trend toward 
significance, such that speakers gestured more frequently when communication 
was mediated (M = 8.75, SD = 8.02) than when it was not (M = 7.31, SD = 5.36), 
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Figure 9: Mean gesture rate depending on whether communication was mediated (x-axis) 
and whether speaker and addressee could see each other (separate columns). 
Bars represent standard errors. 
speech rate as a covariate (F < 1). The two factors did not interact, F(1, 32) = 
1.76, p = .19. 
Gesture size Analyses of the average size of representational gestures, shown in 
Figure 10, revealed a main effect of mutual visibility, such that speakers 
produced larger gestures when interlocutors could see each other (M = 3.04, SD 
= .41) than when they could not (M = 2.62, SD = .52), F(1, 31) = 7.64, p < .01, 
!2p  = .20,. Mediation did not exert a main effect on gesture size, F < 1, and the 
two factors did not interact, F < 1. 
Speech Neither mutual visibility nor mediation exerted a main effect on the total 
number of words used, or the type-token ratio. Mutual visibility exerted a main 
effect on the number of filled pauses per 100 words, such that speakers used 
filled pauses less frequently when interlocutors could see each other (M = 5.70, 
SD = 3.02) than when they could not (M = 7.46, SD = 1.93), F(1, 33) = 4.18, p < 
.05, !2p = .11. Mediation did not exert a main effect on the rate of filled pauses, 
F < 1, and the two factors did not interact, F < 1. Mediation exerted a main effect 
on the number of words per second, such that speakers spoke slower when 
communication was mediated (M = 2.84, SD = .50) than when it was not (M = 





















































Figure 10: Mean average size of representational gestures, depending on whether 
communication was mediated (x-axis) and whether speaker and addressee could see each 
other (separate columns). Bars represent standard errors. 
exert a main effect on the speech rate, F(1, 33) = 1.14, p = .29 and the two 
factors did not interact, F < 1. 
Other Neither mutual visibility nor mediation exerted a main effect on the 
duration of the narrations in seconds. There was a significant correlation between 
participants’ speech rate and their gesture rate, r = .38, p < .05. 
Discussion  
Comparison of the Eye-Catcher setting to the setting with mutual visibility 
through web cams revealed that the extra affordance offered by the Eye-Catcher 
affected gesture production. Gestures were produced far more frequently when 
information from gaze could readily be interpreted and speakers could look at 
their addressee’s eyes and see their addressee look at their eyes simultaneously. 
Therefore, it seems that the decrease in gesture production that we found in our 
first study when speakers could see their addressee, indeed resulted from the 
somewhat unnatural gazing behavior of the addressee, which may have caused 
her to appear inattentive or uninterested. Being able to use gaze may also have 
affected gesture production more directly, since speakers can use gaze to direct 
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Provided that interlocutors can see each other (mutual visibility), the Eye-
Catcher seems to allow for natural gazing behavior. Therefore, the Eye-Catcher 
setting is more suitable for addressing how being seen by the addressee and 
seeing the addressee affect language production. With the Eye-Catcher setting 
replacing our previous setting with mutual visibility through web cams, the 
effects of the speaker being visible to the addressee and vice versa become easier 
to interpret. What we see is that whether the speaker can be seen influences both 
the frequency and the size of representational gestures, showing that speakers 
adapt their gesture production to their knowledge of whether the addressee can 
see them. Seeing the addressee also causes speakers to put more communicative 
effort into their gesture production, but only if the addressee can see them, and 
only if the addressee’s gaze can readily be interpreted. 
Comparison of our mediated settings with mutual or no visibility to similar 
unmediated settings showed that mutual visibility affected language production 
similarly, independent of whether communication was mediated or not. This 
suggests that the Eye-Catcher setting is a close match to face-to-face 
communication, and that our finding that speakers do take into account their 
addressee’s visual perspective are likely to generalize to unmediated 
communication. We also found that speakers did not gesture less when 
communication was mediated, provided that the costs and affordances were a 
close match to unmediated communication. This supports the grounding 
framework by Brennan and Lockridge (2006) and is consistent with social 
presence theory (Short, et al., 1976) as well as social information processing 
theory (Walther, 1992). Our results do not reveal whether the effect of the lack 
of interpretability of gaze in web cam settings can be overcome with time, as 
may be predicted by social information processing theory. 
Our global measures related to the content of the narrations showed that the 
narrations were very similar in all settings. Therefore, it does not seem that the 
differences in gesture production resulted from differences in speech content. In 
some of our analyses we again found that being seen by the addressee caused 
speakers to speak faster, as we found in the analysis of our first experiment. 
Additionally, one of our analyses showed that speakers produced fewer filled 
pauses when the addressee could see them. When visual information is 
unavailable, it may be more necessary to use filled pauses communicatively, 
indicating that one is still thinking (Clark & Fox Tree, 2002). We also found that 
speech was faster in unmediated settings, compared to mediated ones. This may 





indicate a limited trust in the signal quality in mediated communication. 
Although we found some correlation between participants’ speech rate and their 
gesture rate, it does not seem that the increased gesture production in some 
settings resulted from a need to speak faster, because also in unmediated settings 
speech was faster, without there being an increased gesture rate. We think it 
more likely that the differences in the communicative settings affected both 
speech and gesture, with expectedly, manipulations of visibility affecting gesture 
production more dramatically than speech production.  
The differences we found in speakers’ gesture production are informative of 
whether speakers apply their knowledge of the addressee’s visual perspective to 
their language production. Yet do these differences in language production 
matter to the addressee? Our third study examines whether naive observers are 
sensitive to some of the differences we found in speakers’ language production. 
It thereby also examines in yet another way how similar mediated and 
unmediated communication were in our study. 
Study 3: Perception study  
In this study, we ask participants to rate movie clips from speakers who 
communicate either through web cams, with the Eye-Catcher, or face-to-face, all 
with mutual visibility between speaker and addressee. As a measure of how well 
speakers are perceived to perform the narration task, we ask participants to rate 
the speakers for their expressivity. If whether communication is mediated 
influences speakers’ behavior most, then we would expect speakers in the Face-
to-Face setting to be rated differently from speakers in the two mediated settings. 
On the other hand, if not mediation but the interpretability of gaze affects 
language production most, we would expect speakers in the Face-to-Face and 
Eye-Catcher setting to be rated differently from speakers in the Web Cam 
setting. If both of these factors play a role, then speakers from each setting may 
be rated differently. Another possible outcome is that although differences can 
be found in a formal analysis of gesture, these differences do not matter for how 
speakers are perceived in terms of their expressivity.  




Participants Twenty (17 female) native Dutch first year students from Tilburg 
University took part in this study. Their mean age was 21, range 18 – 25. 
Stimuli We created 27 trials, using 9 movie clips from speakers in each setting 
with mutual visibility: the Face-to-Face, Eye-Catcher, and Web Cam setting. In 
addition, we created two practice trials, using data from speakers in an unrelated 
experiment in which we used a similar cartoon narration task. From each 
speaker, we chose a fragment of 10 seconds, starting as soon as the speaker 
started to talk about the third episode of the cartoon. In this episode Sylvester 
tries to climb up to Tweety’s window through an adjacent drainpipe, but gets 
stopped by a bowling ball, which was thrown into the drainpipe by Tweety. 
Speakers were visible from the knees up. Each movie clip was preceded by a 
short beep and an order number that corresponded to a line on the answering 
form, which was displayed for 2 seconds. After each clip, 4 seconds of blank 
video were inserted allowing participants time to fill out their answer. After the 
last movie clip a text was displayed, which indicated that the experiment had 
ended. The 27 actual clips were presented in a random order. We created two 
versions, the second one showing the clips in reversed order. 
Procedure Participants came to the lab and were asked to rate video-fragments 
of speakers for how expressive the speaker was. They indicated their answer for 
each speaker on an answering form, by circling a number on a 1 to 5 scale, ‘1’ 
meaning ‘very little expressive’ and ‘5’ meaning ‘very expressive’. Participants 
first saw two practice trials. After the practice trials they were allowed to ask any 
clarification question on the task, which were answered by the experimenter 
(without her ever mentioning gesture). The participant then watched the actual 
fragments, filling out the answering form after each fragment. Half the 
participants saw the fragments in a certain order and the other half in reversed 
order. After this task participants filled out a brief questionnaire, which asked for 
participants’ age, native language and what they had based their ratings on. 
Statistical analysis We used a Repeated Measures analysis with the setting that 
the movie clips were taken from as a factor (levels: face-to-face, Eye-Catcher, 
web cam). For each setting we first computed each participant’s mean rating of 





the nine movie clips from that setting, which we used as the dependent variable. 
Pairwise comparisons were done using the LSD method with a significance 
threshold of .05. 
Results 
Analyses of participants’ ratings of speakers’ expressivity revealed a main effect 
of the setting that the speaker was in, F(2, 38) = 26.10, p < .001, !2p = .58. 
Posthoc analysis showed that speakers from the Web Cam setting were rated as 
less expressive (M = 2.42, SD = .53) than speakers from the Face-to-Face (M = 
3.07,  SD = .78) and Eye-Catcher setting (M = 3.24,  SD = .54). The ratings for 
speakers from these latter two settings did not differ significantly. The order of 
presentation of the clips did not exert a main effect on participants’ rating, F < 1.  
In answer to an open question of what participants had based their judgment 
on, 14 out of 20 participants (70%) spontaneously mentioned that they had 
partially based their judgments on speakers’ hand movements. Participants also 
mentioned that they had paid attention to the speakers’ facial expressions (55%), 
posture (35%), body language (15%), gaze (10%), eye-brow movements (5%), 
intonation (40%), use of voice (30%), loudness (10%), clarity of voice (5%), and 
laughing (15%). 
Discussion 
Participants were sensitive to the differences in how speakers narrated between 
the setting with communication through web cams on the one hand, and face-to-
face communication and communication through Eye-Catchers on the other. 
Speakers from the Web Cam setting were rated as less expressive. Most 
participants took a speaker’s hand gestures into account when judging the 
speaker’s expressivity. It therefore seems that producing hand gestures more 
frequently (as speakers in the Eye-Catcher and face-to-face settings did), is 
associated with greater expressivity. In addition, there was no perceived 
difference in expressivity between speakers from the Face-to-Face and from the 
Eye-Catcher setting, again suggesting that these settings were a closer match 
than face-to-face interaction and communicating through web cams. Thus, 
whether communication is mediated or not seems of lesser influence on 
speakers’ language production than whether gaze in mediated settings resembles 
gaze in unmediated settings.  
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General discussion and conclusion 
When it comes to their gesturing, speakers apply their knowledge of their 
addressee’s visual perspective to their language production. Speakers produced 
more and larger gestures when they knew their addressee could see them. This 
suggests that gesturing is at least partly intended communicatively. Other than in 
previous work, our results cannot be explained by observable changes in the 
environment of the speaker. Our study therefore supports the interpretations in 
terms of audience design of earlier studies (Alibali, et al., 2000; Bavelas, et al., 
2008; Cohen, 1977; Jacobs & Garnham, 2007; Özyürek, 2002). Speakers are 
able to adapt their gesturing to their knowledge of their addressee, rather than 
solely using their own perspective.  
This does not prove that speakers never make mistakes when they need to 
take into account the other interlocutors’ visual perspective, as has been found 
for speech production and interpretation (Keysar, et al., 2003; Wardow Lane, et 
al., 2006). In our studies, gesture production was used as a global measure of 
language production. This is different from the use of eye-tracking data as in the 
study by Keysar et al., which may be able to capture any mistake in language 
interpretation. It differs similarly from the use of reference production in the 
study by Wardow Lane et al., which reveals any overspecification. Gesture 
production thus shows a general trend, rather than capturing every individual 
mistake.  
We found some evidence that gesture frequency is reduced when the 
addressee seems less interested, as has also been found by Jacobs and Garnham 
(2007). In addition, we found that gesture size does not seem to be affected by 
this factor. Thus, although speakers produce fewer gestures when the addressee 
appears less interested, the gestures they do produce may compare well to 
gestures directed at addressees appearing more interested. In reality, there was no 
difference in how interested the addressee was between our conditions, since the 
addressee always was a confederate. Rather, the addressee was perceived as less 
interested in one condition, as a result of the costs and affordances offered by the 
mediated setting. When speakers could see the addressee, but the addressee 
could not see the speaker, speakers perceived the addressee as less interested. In 
this case it was not possible for the addressee to show natural gazing behavior. 
This effect is predicted by the grounding framework (Brennan & Lockridge, 
2006), which states that it is not mediation as such that causes interlocutors to 





perceive each other differently, but rather the fact that differences in the costs 
and affordances associated with mediation affect interlocutors’ behavior, which 
in turn leads to different perceptions of each other. 
The results we found are consistent with the idea that the more the costs and 
affordances of mediated and unmediated communication are alike, the more 
similar language use will be (Brennan & Lockridge, 2006). In our first study, in 
which we made use of communication through web cams, we saw that seeing the 
addressee led to a decrease in gesture production rather than an increase. In this 
case the affordance of seeing the addressee was more similar to face-to-face 
interaction, but the costs associated with interpreting the addressee’s gaze were 
not. Interpreting the others’ gaze is harder when communicating through web 
cams than when interacting face-to-face. Our second study showed that when 
this was compensated for by using the Eye-Catcher, seeing the addressee did 
increase gesture production, such that the gesture rate and size in mediated 
communication were now comparable to those in face-to-face interaction. The 
gesture rate was much higher when speaker and addressee could see each other, 
independent of whether they were in the same room. Therefore, it indeed seems 
that mediation as such does not have a large effect on language production, as 
predicted by the grounding framework. 
We further showed that observers were sensitive to the differences in 
speakers’ communicative behavior. When participants were asked to judge 
speakers’ expressivity, speakers from a setting with communication through web 
cams were rated as less expressive than speakers from a face-to-face setting, as 
well as speakers from a setting in which communication was mediated by Eye-
Catchers. This shows that speakers are more expressive when interlocutors can 
readily interpret each other’s gaze. It also confirms that communication through 
Eye-Catchers resembles face-to-face communication, more so than 
communication through web cams. 
Since narrations were equally long in each setting we used, both in time and 
in the number of words, and the variation in vocabulary did not differ, it is likely 
that the communicative setting affected gesture production, rather than the 
differences in gesture resulting from the narrations being much different. Our 
studies suggest that speakers may also adjust their speech rate to whether or not 
their addressee can see them, similar to adjusting their gesture rate and size. In 
this case too, speakers’ knowledge of the addressee seeing them was more 
important than whether or not they saw their addressee. Speakers spoke faster 
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when they knew they could be seen, which may indicate they had an intuition 
that visual information aids speech interpretation. Such an intuition would be 
consistent with actual findings (e.g. Sumby & Pollack, 1954). 
Despite dialogue being possible in the settings we used, the task we used in 
our studies was mostly a monologue task and the addressee never interrupted the 
speaker. This has the upside of settings being very similar to each speaker within 
a certain setting, such that we could get a clear picture of the factors of interest. 
It also strengthens our case that speakers can use their knowledge of their 
addressee’s perspective, rather than their own direct observation (including the 
addressee’s back-channeling behavior). Yet in future work, it is necessary to 
look at other factors that come into play when scaling up from monologue to 
dialogue. Does mediated communication with the Eye-Catcher still pass the test 
when more turn taking is involved? And what if there are more than two 
speakers? Our study implies that it is important for interlocutors in such 
situations to be able to make sense of each other’s gaze. Moreover, our studies 
suggest that when using video-conferencing, it may be important to choose the 
image such that the hands are visible, since speakers adapt their gesturing to their 
addressee and thus seem to intend it communicatively. 
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Adaptation in gesture: converging hands or 
converging minds? 
Abstract 
Interlocutors sometimes repeat each other’s co-speech hand gestures. In three 
experiments, we investigate to what extent the copying of such gestures' form is 
tied to their meaning in the linguistic context, as well as to interlocutors’ 
representations of this meaning at the conceptual level. We found that gestures 
were repeated only if they could be interpreted within the meaningful context 
provided by speech. We also found evidence that the copying of gesture forms is 
mediated by representations of meaning. That is, representations of meaning are 
also converging across interlocutors rather than just representations of gesture 
form. We conclude that the repetition across interlocutors of representational 
hand gestures may be driven by representations at the conceptual level, as has 
also been proposed for the repetition of referring expressions across interlocutors 
(lexical entrainment). That is, adaptation in gesture resembles adaptation in 
speech, rather than it being an instance of automated motor-mimicry.  
This chapter is based on: 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (In Press). Adaptation in gesture: 
Converging hands or converging minds? Journal of Memory and Language. 
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Suppose Mary and John are discussing a route through a city. Then if Mary 
refers to an alley as ‘the narrow street’, it is likely that John will also use this 
expression when subsequently referring to that alley, rather than using a 
completely different expression, such as ‘the alleyway’. In addition to saying 
‘the narrow street’, Mary may hold up her hand in front of her, with her fingers 
pointing toward the end of the alley, thereby indicating the direction that the 
alley runs in. This hand gesture may subsequently be repeated by John, when he 
talks about the alley again. Would such a repetition of a gesture be similar to a 
repetition of a referring expression? 
When people interact in dialogue, they adapt to each other in many ways (for 
an overview, see Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, & McLean, 2010). For example, 
Brennan and Clark (1996) showed that interlocutors tend to repeat each other’s 
referring expressions, a process known as lexical entrainment. Apart from verbal 
adaptation, interlocutors can also repeat each other’s nonverbal behaviors (e.g. 
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), among which are the hand gestures that many people 
produce spontaneously while talking. It has been found that people indeed repeat 
such hand gestures of each other (De Fornel, 1992; Holler & Wilkin, 2011; 
Kimbara, 2008; Tabensky, 2001). Yet how similar are these repetitions in 
gesture to repetitions in speech? Do similar processes underlie adaptation in both 
speech and gesture? And what is the role of meaning? Do interlocutors produce 
similar hand gestures because they construct similar representations of meaning, 
or are they merely copying each other’s movements?  
Mimicry and adaptation 
Mimicry and adaptation in interaction have been studied extensively. Chartrand 
and Bargh (1999) for instance, found that participants were more likely to shake 
their foot during a conversation if their confederate conversation partner did so 
as well, and similarly for rubbing one’s face with one’s hand. According to 
Chartrand and Bargh (1999), although such mimicry may act as a kind of ‘social 
glue’, intent or conscious effort are not required for it to occur. They state that 
“the mere perception of another’s behavior automatically increases the 
likelihood of engaging in that behavior oneself”, p. 893. This is known as the 
perception-behavior link. 
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Pickering and Garrod (2004) propose that similar automated priming may 
frequently underlie the repetition of linguistic forms across interlocutors, which 
they call alignment. They propose that at each linguistic level, “[t]he activation 
of a representation in one interlocutor leads to the activation of the matching 
representation in the other interlocutor directly”, p. 177. For example, after 
perceiving a sentence in the passive voice, people are more likely to produce a 
passive voice as well (Bock, 1986). In Pickering and Garrod’s interactive 
alignment account, this is explained as the speaker’s representation of the 
passive voice being more activated as a result of perception, and therefore being 
a more likely candidate for subsequent production. Thus, it is assumed that 
representations are shared between comprehension and production (parity of 
representation).  
In the interactive alignment account, the repetition across interlocutors of a 
linguistic form at any one level (e.g. the syntactic level) can happen without 
representations at other linguistic levels playing a critical role. For example, 
repetition of the same syntactic structure could happen when a similar, but also 
when a very different lexical form or meaning is being expressed than was 
perceived. Although stronger effects have repeatedly been found when the same 
word was repeated, syntactic alignment indeed also occurred when different 
words (with different meanings) were produced than were perceived (Cleland & 
Pickering, 2003; Pickering & Branigan, 1998). 
It thus seems that adaptation of syntactic structures can occur independently 
of representations at the lexical and the conceptual level. Yet it is sometimes 
hard to see how adaptation at the lexical level can occur without the conceptual 
level being involved. It is rare that speakers choose the same referring expression 
as their interlocutors, whereas they do not want to express the same meaning. 
Therefore, when looking at the repetition of forms that carry propositional 
meaning, we need to describe how meaning is involved in the repetition of form. 
In Pickering and Garrod’s view, even though alignment of form tends to be 
linked to alignment of meaning, it does not have to be. One way their model 
could account for such a link is that it also assumes connections between the 
representations at different linguistic levels within a speaker. This means that 
activation of a representation at the lexical level could lead to activation of a 
representation at the conceptual level, and vice versa. This way, when during 
perception the representation for the word form ‘alley’ is associated with a 
certain representation of meaning, the connection between those two 
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representations is strengthened.  When the same representation of meaning is 
subsequently activated in the production process, the representation of the word 
form for ‘alley’ receives activation through this connection, making the word 
‘alley’ a more likely candidate for production. Although the model can thus 
account for the link between alignment of meaning and form, its unique 
contribution lies in that it is also possible for alignment of form to occur without 
the alignment of meaning, as alignment at each linguistic level can happen 
independently of other levels. 
Brennan and Clark (1996) do propose that when interlocutors use the same 
words to refer to the same objects, this is because they use similar 
conceptualizations of those objects. For example, suppose a particular object 
could be thought of as a document, a picture, or a map. When a speaker refers to 
it as a ‘map’, she conceptualizes the object for the current purpose as such. If the 
addressee agrees with this conceptualization and a conceptual pact is formed, 
both interlocutors can subsequently use the utterance ‘map’ as a reference to 
both the object and the particular conceptualization of it. Thus, for both 
interlocutors a certain utterance is linked to a certain object, as well as to a 
certain representation of meaning at the conceptual level. In this view, 
representations of meaning are necessarily involved in the repetition of referring 
expressions across interlocutors, and for interlocutors to use similar expressions 
they need to have similar representations at the conceptual level. Before 
exploring what answers current models on gesture production and earlier studies 
on adaptation in gesture can provide to the question of whether or not the 
conceptual level is necessarily involved in the repetition of hand gesture forms 
across interlocutors, we first specify what we mean by gestures. 
Co-speech gestures 
When talking, many people move their hands and arms around without the 
objective of directly manipulating their environment. Rather, such movements 
seem to be part of their communicative effort (Kendon, 2004). For example, 
raising one’s arm while extending one’s index finger toward an object could 
disambiguate the question “Can you hand me that?”. Kendon (1988) recognizes 
different kinds of hand gestures, which McNeill (1992) put on a continuum of 
how conventional and language-like the hand gestures are. On one end of this 
continuum are sign languages, in which signs have a conventional meaning. At 
the far other end is gesticulation. This is the production along with speech of 
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gestures that are not embedded in the structure of speech. For example, moving 
the hands along the upper body as though running while saying: “He went 
away”. Gestures at this end of the continuum are the most idiosyncratic and their 
interpretation is highly dependent on the accompanying speech (Feyereisen, Van 
de Wiele, & Dubois, 1988). 
Gestures that fall into Kendon’s category of gesticulation are generally 
divided into several subcategories (e.g. McNeill, 1992). One broad distinction 
can be made based on whether a gesture depicts some of the content of the 
message a speaker is trying to convey, or whether it rather structures the 
conversation (e.g. Bavelas, Chovil, Lawrie, & Wade, 1992), or emphasizes 
certain parts of speech (e.g. Effron, 1941; Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Krahmer & 
Swerts, 2007).  In this paper we focus on gestures that express some of the 
content a speaker is conveying, which are known as illustrators (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1969), or representational gestures (McNeill, 1992). Elements of such a 
gesture’s physical form, like the shape and orientation of the hand, the direction 
and size of the movement, and where it is performed relative to the speaker 
(Müller, 1998), can be repeated in subsequent gestures by the same or another 
speaker. Yet importantly, since these gestures are among the least conventional 
on Kendon’s continuum, there are many different ways in which the same 
content could potentially be expressed in co-speech gesturing. 
Gesture and speech production and perception 
Gesture and speech have been found to be linked temporally (Chui, 2005), 
structurally (Kita, et al., 2007), pragmatically (Enfield, Kita, & De Ruiter, 2007), 
and semantically (McNeill, 1992). Therefore, gesture and speech production are 
somehow coordinated. McNeill’s Growth Point theory states that speech and 
gesture co-express idea units, which develop themselves into utterances 
(McNeill, 1992, 2005). That is, speech and gesture co-develop over time, into an 
utterance. Therefore, it is no surprise that current frameworks of gesture 
production are based on a framework of speech production, specifically the 
framework of Levelt (1989). 
Levelt’s blueprint for the speaker discriminates between a conceptualization, 
a formulation, and an articulation stage. Based on this model, De Ruiter (1998, 
2000, 2007) proposes that a communicative intention is formed in the 
conceptualization stage, which is then passed on to two parallel formulation 
stages: one for gesture and one for speech.  Each of these formulation stages 
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leads to its own articulation stage, either the articulation of gesture or the 
articulation of speech. This architecture is called the postcard architecture, 
because rather than assuming that gesture directly reflects thought, it assumes 
that a communicative intention underlies gesture production. Therefore, the 
metaphor of postcards from the mind may be more accurate than gesture being a 
window into the mind (McNeill, 1992). In a postcard model, gesture and speech 
production share the stages up until the formulation of a communicative 
intention, and then continue in parallel, but separately. 
This is different from models based on the interface architecture proposed by 
Kita and Özyürek (2003). In interface models, the processes of gesture and 
speech formulation interact with each other online. In the interface model they 
propose, the message to be communicated is not fully determined by one 
conceptualization module, but also by two separate generators: the action 
generator for gesture and the message generator for speech. The action generator 
has access to spatial and motoric components in working memory as well as to a 
model of the environment, while the message generator has access to 
propositional components in working memory and the discourse model. 
Importantly, there are bidirectional links between the action and message 
generator, as well as between the message generator and the speech formulator. 
This means that constraints on how a message can be expressed in speech, can 
also influence how it is expressed in gesture. Thus, the content of gesture is not 
fully specified by the communicative intention alone, but also by the features of 
imagined or real space, and online feedback from the speech formulator via the 
message generator. 
Both the postcard and the interface architecture focus on the production of 
speech and gesture, and thus model the speaker. It is not specified what 
representations are shared between production and comprehension or where the 
links between these processes are. When it comes to adaptation in gesture, both 
gesture production and perception are involved. Levelt assumes that lemmas and 
forms are shared between speech formulation and speech comprehension within 
a speaker. This assumption is also incorporated in the interactive alignment 
account proposed by Pickering and Garrod (2004). Their model includes 
multiple interlocutors, allowing it to explain adaptation of one interlocutor to 
another. It is however non-specific about gesture.  
We can apply the interactive alignment account to adaptation in gesture in 
two ways. Firstly, if we assume that gesture forms are represented at their own 
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linguistic level, that they are shared between perception and production, and that 
interlocutors can align to each other’s forms directly, adaptation in gesture could 
occur without the conceptual level playing a critical role. This would be a low-
level account of adaptation in gesture.  Secondly, if we assume that 
representations at the conceptual level are shared between speech and gesture 
comprehension and production, and that there are bidirectional links between the 
different linguistic levels within a speaker, then adaptation in gesture could also 
occur via the conceptual level. A conceptual representation that is activated as a 
result of the perception of speech and gesture can subsequently influence the 
production of speech and gesture. 
A postcard model can also provide such a higher-level account: A 
communicative intention that is activated through the perception of gesture and 
speech, could subsequently inform gesture and speech production. This route is 
also possible in Kita and Özyürek’s interface model, but this model would still 
allow for speech and gesture to be coordinated during the formulation stage of 
production as well. Additionally, the interface model may be able to account 
more readily for adaptation of gesture forms at lower levels than the conceptual 
level, since the action generator has access to information specifically relevant to 
gesture, and can coordinate the generation of a gesture with the generation of a 
spoken message directly. Since neither of these models includes another 
interlocutor or comprehension of speech and gesture explicitly, these accounts 
remain speculative.  
It seems that current models of gesture and speech production, combined 
with the interactive alignment account allow for both a low-level explanation 
(not involving representations of meaning) and a higher-level explanation 
(involving representations of meaning) of adaptation in gesture, depending on 
what representations are shared between perception and production, and at what 
levels these processes are linked. Can studies on adaptation in gesture tell us 
more about whether representations of meaning are necessarily involved when a 
perceived gesture form is subsequently produced? 
Repetitions of co-speech gestures across interlocutors 
Bergman and Kopp (2009) found that properties of a shape to be described 
influence what representation technique is chosen in gesture. This means that if 
two speakers are discussing the same objects, their gestures may look similar as 
a direct result of the content they are expressing, rather than because they adapt 
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their representations of meaning to each other, or because they mimic each 
other’s movement. So the first question to be answered is whether adaptation 
occurs in gesture at all. 
Compared to adaptation in speech, relatively few studies (e.g. De Fornel, 
1992; Holler & Wilkin, 2011; Kimbara, 2006, 2008; Parrill & Kimbara, 2006; 
Tabensky, 2001) have addressed adaptation in co-speech gesturing. Kimbara 
(2008), for example, studied dyads while they were jointly retelling an animated 
cartoon to a camera, narrating such that a third person could understand. She 
found that when the two speakers could see each other, their representational 
gestures looked more similar than when they were separated by an opaque 
screen. This shows that adaptation occurs in gesture: speakers adapted the form 
of their gestures to the form of another speaker’s gestures. This is an important 
finding. It shows that similarities in interlocutors’ gestures did not arise solely 
because their production tasks were similar, but that seeing each other was 
critical. However, this study does not reveal whether interlocutors adapted to 
each other’s gestures due to automated motor-mimicry following the perception-
behavior link, without intervention of the conceptual level, or whether certain 
gesture forms were linked to certain representations of meaning at the conceptual 
level, which caused the forms to be repeated when the same concepts were 
discussed. 
Parill and Kimbara (2006) found that gestures can also be repeated by an 
observer to a conversation, while subsequently addressing yet another person. In 
this study, participants were asked to watch a stimulus movie in which two 
women were discussing what route to take through a model city in front of them. 
They found that when participants watched a movie in which the women 
repeated more features of each other’s hand gestures, they were more likely to 
produce these features in their own gesturing later on, while retelling the 
stimulus movie to the experimenter, compared to when they had seen a movie in 
which the women repeated fewer of each other’s gesture features. A similar yet 
independent effect was found for verbal repetitions. Parill and Kimbara conclude 
that people are very sensitive to repetitions across interlocutors in both gesture 
and speech. This study also shows that the repetition of perceived gesture forms 
does not happen exclusively between conversation partners, but also when 
addressing a different person than the one who produced the original gesture. 
This suggests that adaptation of gesture forms in communication is not always 
part of an implicit negotiation process on meaning (Brennan & Clark, 1996). 
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However, the study does not reveal whether participants repeated the observed 
gesture forms simply because they have a tendency to repeat observed behaviors 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), or whether they repeated the relations between 
gestures, objects and representations of meaning used by the people they had 
observed.  
Some indication that the relation between a representation of gesture form 
and a representation of meaning may be involved in adaptation in gesture forms 
comes from a study by Tabensky (2001). She observed spontaneous 
conversation between two participants who were freely discussing a certain 
topic, and found that in analogy to how verbal information can be repeated 
literally or be paraphrased, the same information from gesture could be repeated 
by another interlocutor with either a similar or a very different gesture. This 
tentatively suggests that interlocutors’ representations were converging at the 
conceptual level, rather than at the level of gesture forms. Also, information 
contained in one interlocutor’s verbal description was found to end up in the 
other interlocutor’s gestures, and vice versa. This suggests that there are links 
between representations of speech forms and gesture forms, possibly through the 
conceptual level. Tabensky found that gesture rephrasing only occurred at places 
where speakers were creating their own meaningful expressions, and not when 
literally repeating the other person verbally, in which case no gestures were 
produced. She therefore concludes that gesturing may be intrinsically related to 
the creation of meaning. This goes well with the idea that similarities in peoples’ 
gestures result from similarities at the conceptual level, where communicative 
intentions are formed. However, in addition to these observational results, more 
empirical evidence is needed to support this causal claim. 
Cassell, McNeill, and McCullough (1998) studied the relation between 
representations of meaning and gesture experimentally. They propose that both 
the perception of gesture and the perception of speech contribute to the 
construction of an internal representation. This representation of meaning can in 
turn inform gesture and speech production. This theory is based on an analysis of 
speakers who retold a story that they had seen a speaker tell in a movie clip. The 
speaker in the stimulus movie sometimes conveyed different information in 
gesture than he did in speech. For example, he would say “lure” and gesture 
either a grabbing or a beckoning motion. The information from the speaker’s 
gestures was found to affect both participants’ gestures and their speech. Thus, it 
seems that information obtained from gesture can subsequently be expressed in 
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speech and in gesture, which suggests a representation of meaning being shared 
between gesture and speech interpretation and production. Yet are such 
representations key to the repetition of gesture forms across interlocutors? 
Holler and Wilkin (2011) propose that reproducing each other’s gestures in 
dialogue contributes to the creation of mutually shared understanding. For 
example, copying a gesture could signal the acceptance of an accompanying 
referring expression. This would mean that the reproduction of a gesture form 
signals that a similar representation of meaning has been created at the 
conceptual level. However, in this study the definition of a copied gesture 
included that the gesture had the same meaning as the original gesture. 
Therefore, this study gives a functional account of the copying of gestures 
assuming that meaning is involved, rather than questioning whether 
representations of meaning are necessarily involved in the reproduction of 
gesture forms across interlocutors. 
In sum 
On the one hand we see that interlocutors adapt to each other’s gesture forms 
less when interlocutors cannot see each other, and that people do not exclusively 
adapt their gestures to their conversation partner. This goes well with a model in 
which perceiving a certain gesture form activates a representation of that gesture 
form, which is subsequently more likely to be selected for production, analogous 
to Pickering and Garrod (2004). Adaptation in gesture would then be driven by 
representations of form converging across interlocutors, rather than 
representations of meaning.  
On the other hand, we see that information from one interlocutor’s speech 
can subsequently be expressed in another interlocutor’s gesturing, and also that 
information from one interlocutor’s gestures can subsequently be expressed 
verbally by another interlocutor. This suggests that the same representations of 
meaning may underlie the production of both speech and gesture, and that 
similarities in speech and gesture forms across interlocutors may result from 
them having constructed similar representations of meaning. This is consistent 
with the models of speech and gesture production proposed by De Ruiter (2000) 
and Kita and Özyürek (2003). But is this really the case? To what extent is the 
gesture form produced by one interlocutor determined by the mere perception of 
a gesture form produced by another interlocutor, and to what extent is it 
determined by the producer’s representation of meaning at the conceptual level?  




We use an experimental approach to address this question. First, we seek to 
confirm whether seeing a certain representational gesture while hearing certain 
content in speech, increases the likelihood of producing that same gesture later 
on, while expressing the same content. For this a speaker in a stimulus movie 
either does or does not perform certain gestures. These gestures were chosen 
such that they added very little meaning to the verbal description, for example 
the speaker moved his arms as though running while talking about running (as 
opposed to for example making this gesture while only mentioning ‘going’, in 
which case it would add much more information to the verbal description). This 
way, we can observe whether any similarity between the originally perceived 
gesture and a subsequently produced gesture results from expressing similar 
content, or whether it is necessary for the producer to actually observe the 
original gesture. 
Second, we address the question of whether hand gestures being meaningful 
is relevant for their repetition across speakers to occur. We do so by keeping the 
gesture forms constant across conditions, but varying whether a form matches 
the content of the co-occurring speech. For example, the speaker would produce 
the above-described running gesture while talking about looking through 
binoculars. We predict that if meaning is involved in the repetition of gesture 
forms, participants will repeat only those gestures whose form matches the 
content of the concurrent speech. Contrastingly, if the property of carrying 
meaning is not relevant for the copying of form to occur, or in other words, the 
conceptual level is not involved, gesture forms will be repeated equally often, 
independent of where in the narration they occur. Together, these first two 
experiments address the issue of whether hand gestures are similar to lexical 
forms when it comes to their repetition across interlocutors, or whether they are 
better compared to behavioral mimicry, such as the mimicking of each other’s 
foot shaking and the rubbing of one’s face. 
We then zoom in on the role of representations of meaning in the repetition 
of gesture forms across interlocutors. We test whether a perceived gesture form 
influences the construction of a representation of meaning, which subsequently 
influences gesture production. We do so by looking at different physical features 
of a gesture. Suppose that certain features of a perceived gesture form give rise 
to the construction of meaning. Then when this meaning is subsequently 
expressed in gesture, all features of the produced gesture will be consistent with 
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this meaning. So we would expect that features of the perceived gesture that 
were inconsistent with the meaning constructed would not be repeated. On the 
other hand, if the repetition of gesture forms is not mediated by a representation 
of meaning, each combination of perceived features could subsequently be 
produced. This means that we would expect a literal repetition of the perceived 
gesture, or any of its features, rather than all features being consistent with a 
certain meaning.  
Experiment 1A: Repetition of gesture form 
In this experiment we test whether perceiving certain gestures while hearing a 
story, increases the chance of performing those gestures later on, while retelling 
the same story.  
Method 
Participants Participants to this and the following experiments were all adult 
native speakers of Dutch and they only took part in one of the experiments. Most 
of them were students at Tilburg University. All of them gave informed written 
consent for the use of their data. Experiment 1A had 38 (28 female) participants. 
Stimuli Two movie clips were created, in which the same male speaker told the 
same story of an animated cartoon (‘Canary Row’ by Warner Brothers) as 
though he had just watched it. Each movie clip consisted of ten fragments. It 
started with a short introduction in which the speaker stated that the cartoon was 
a Tweety and Sylvester movie in which Sylvester (a cat) tries to capture Tweety 
(a pet bird). Then followed eight fragments in each of which the speaker 
described one episode of the cartoon, which corresponds to one attempt of 
Sylvester to catch Tweety. These fragments lasted about 15 seconds each. The 
final fragment consisted of a short closure. Blank video was inserted in between 
the fragments, allowing for the movie to be paused at appropriate times. The 
speaker was seated in a chair and looked straight into the camera. The image 
showed the upper-body of the speaker in front of a white wall, see Figure 1. 




Figure 1: Example of the repetition of a target gesture (left) by a participant (right). 
The two versions of the stimulus movie differed only in the number of 
representational hand gestures the speaker produced. In one version, he produced  
a representational gesture depicting an action for each episode of the cartoon. 
These gestures were based on retellings of participants in a previous study (Mol, 
Krahmer, Maes, & Swerts, 2009). They consisted of: 
Binoculars:  Two hands (cylinder shaped) are held in front of the 
eyes as the speaker looks through them, representing 
looking through binoculars. The hands are moved 
slightly toward the face and back, such that the fingers 
describe the cylindrical shape of the binocular tubes. 
Drainpipe:  Two hands/arms make climbing/grabbing motions 
while moving upward, depicting climbing up the 
drainpipe. 
Rolling ball:  Two hands spin around each other from the wrists, 
while held in front of the speaker, representing rolling. 
Money tin:  Right hand imitates the holding and shaking of a 
money tin. 
Creeping:  Hands (flat, palms down) and arms are moved forward 
one by one, imitating a creeping motion. 
Throwing the weight:  Two hands (fingers spread, palms facing each other) 
are held about 30 cm apart, while a motion is made 
starting at the head and moving forward in an arc, as 
though throwing something big away from oneself. 
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Swinging:  Two hands are held on top of each other and quickly 
make a grabbing motion above and to the side of the 
speaker’s head, representing the grabbing of a rope. 
Running:  Arms are moved as while running, close to the body 
of the speaker. 
The verbal descriptions of these events were rich, such that the additional 
information expressed in gesture was minimal. In the other version of the movie 
clip no representational gestures were produced. No other hand gestures were 
produced in any of the two versions and care was taken to make the verbal 
descriptions, body posture, facial expressions, intonation, voice quality, and 
other prosodic factors maximally similar across the two versions.  
In both versions, the speaker used eight target phrases. These were unusual 
wordings, for example “as a full-blown Tarzan” (Dutch: als een volleerde 
Tarzan) or “the yearly spring call of the canary” (Dutch: de jaarlijkse lenteroep 
van de kanarie). These target phrases were the same in both versions. Inclusion 
of these target phrases allows for comparison of adaptation in gesture and speech 
and serves as a control measure.  
Procedure Participants came to the lab and were assigned randomly to the 
‘Gestures’ or ‘No Gestures’ condition. They read the instructions, which 
explained the task as a memory task in which they had to watch video fragments 
of a speaker telling a story and were asked to subsequently retell these story 
fragments to the experimenter. Participants were instructed to take as much time 
as needed when retelling the stories. They were given the opportunity to ask 
further clarification and once all was clear the experiment started.  
Participants first watched the introductory fragment, which they did not have 
to retell. Then they watched the fragments describing the cartoon episodes, one 
at a time. After each fragment, participants paused the movie and turned ninety 
degrees such that they were facing the experimenter while they retold the story. 
The experimenter was blind to the experimental condition. A camera was placed 
to the side of the experimenter, recording the participant. Participants were told 
they were videotaped in order to facilitate our analyses afterward. The 
experimenter did not interrupt the participants and did not produce any hand 
gestures, but did show other nonverbal signs of listening to their story in a 
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natural way (such as by eye-gazing behavior and head movements). Finally, 
participants watched the last fragment, which they did not have to retell. Note 
that participants only saw one of the two stimulus movies of a speaker retelling 
the original cartoon movie and did not see the animated cartoon themselves. The 
entire experiment took place within twenty minutes. 
Coding Each gesture in the stimulus movie of the Gestures condition occurred 
with a given content unit in the verbal narration. We coded participants' 
representational gestures produced with those content units in their own 
narration. We refer to these points in the narration as target moments. For 
example, the binoculars gesture in the stimulus movie was produced while the 
speaker said that Sylvester was looking at Tweety through binoculars. In this 
case we looked at participants’ gestures while they were describing the event that 
Sylvester looked at Tweety (the target moment). Gestures from each condition 
that matched the corresponding gesture in the stimulus movie of the Gestures 
condition in the hand shape used, the location and movement of the hands, and 
the event expressed in the concurrent speech, were labeled as target gesture. For 
an example, see Figure 1. If a different gesture was produced with the content 
unit of the original target gesture this was labeled as a different gesture, and if no 
gesture was produced this was labeled as no gesture.  
Initially, all gestures were coded by a single coder. Reliability was assessed 
by having a second coder code a random sample of 20% of the retold fragments, 
N = 60. The two coders agreed on 88% of the labels. The inter coder reliability 
for the raters was Cohen’s Kappa  = .69, indicating substantial agreement 
(Landis & Koch, 1977). Given the observed marginal frequencies of the labels, 
the maximum value of Kappa was .79. In our analyses, we used the coding of the 
first coder. 
If a full target phrase was used by participants this was labeled as a verbal 
repetition. If participants repeated one or more (yet not all) content words of the 
target phrase this was labeled as partial verbal repetition. A (partial) verbal 
repetition was counted as such regardless of when in the participants’ retelling it 
occurred, yet unsurprisingly they occurred only during retellings of the matching 
episode in the stimulus movie. 
Statistical analysis We compared the means across conditions for all dependent 
variables in this and the following experiment. When Levene’s test for equality 
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of variances was significant, we used the unequal variance t-test. We report 
mean differences between the compared conditions (MD), 95% confidence 
intervals (CI) and we report !2 as a measure of effect size. 
Results 
Gesture The number of target gestures produced at target moments was higher 
in the Gestures condition (M = 1.28, SD = 1.84) than in the No Gestures 
condition (M = .11, SD = .32) (MD = 1.17, 95% CI = .24, 2.09), t(18.05) = 2.65, 
p < .02, !2 = .14. We did not find an effect of condition on the number of 
different gestures produced at target moments (Gestures: M = .94, SD = 1.11, No 
Gestures: M = 1.00, SD = 1.65), t(34) = .12, p = .91. There was a trend toward 
significance for the number of target moments at which no gesture was 
produced, which tended to be higher in the No Gestures condition (M = 6.89, SD 
= 1.64) than in the Gestures condition (M = 5.78, SD = 2.10) (MD = 1.17, 95% 
CI = .24, 2.09), t(34) = 1.77, p = .09, !2 = .06. 
Speech We did not find a significant difference in the number of verbal 
repetitions between the Gestures (M = 1.61, SD = .99) and No Gestures condition 
(M = 1.50, SD = .92) (MD = .11, 95% CI = -.53, .76), t(34) = .35, p= .73, nor in 
the number of partial verbal repetitions across the two conditions (Gestures: M = 
1.83, SD = 1.34, No Gestures: M = 1.56, SD = 1.38) (MD = .45, 95% CI = -1.20, 
.64), t(34) = .61, p = .54.  
Discussion 
Participants produced certain representational gestures more often if they had 
seen these gestures in the stimulus movie. Like Kimbara (2008), we found that 
expressing the same content was not sufficient for these repetitions to occur. 
Neither was seeing the speaker or an addressee, which participants did in both of 
our conditions. Rather, seeing the target gestures performed by the speaker in the 
stimulus movie increased the likelihood of participants producing the same 
gestures during their own narration to a different addressee. The facts that 
participants repeated some target phrases and that there was no difference 
between the two conditions in the number of verbal repetitions show that 
participants did adapt to the speaker, regardless of whether he gestured. 
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The fact that participants reproduced gesture forms even though the 
addressee was different from the speaker in the stimulus movies, suggests that 
low-level processes, such as priming, may underlie these repetitions, rather than 
the construction of shared meaning across interlocutors. Seeing a certain form 
increased the likelihood of producing that form later on. Yet we do not know to 
what extent a representation of meaning was involved as well. How important 
was it that these gestures carried meaning for the repetition of their form to 
occur?   
Experiment 1B: Repetition of gesture form and the semantic context 
In this experiment we test whether the repetition of a gesture’s form across 
speakers depends on the gesture’s meaning in relation to the meaning of the 
concurrent speech.  
Method 
Participants Forty-seven participants (33 female) volunteered for this study. 
Stimuli Again two stimulus movies were produced, which were similar to the 
clips in the previous experiment. The first stimulus movie was made in the same 
way as the one containing representational gestures in the previous experiment 
(1A). In the second stimulus movie, the speaker produced one representational 
gesture per episode as well, however this time the gesture did not match the 
speaker's verbal description. A gesture from another episode was produced 
instead of the original gesture, along with the original content unit in the verbal 
description. For example, instead of the ‘binoculars’ gesture, the speaker 
produced the ‘running’ gesture while verbally referring to the event involving 
binoculars, see Figure 2. The same speaker and the same target phrases were 
used as in the previous experiment and again care was taken to make the verbal 
descriptions, body posture, facial expressions, intonation, voice quality, and 
other prosodic factors maximally similar. 
Procedure The procedure was the same as in the previous experiment. In the 
Congruent condition, 24 participants saw and retold the stimulus movie in which   




Figure 2: Congruent (left) and Incongruent (right) gesture for the content unit ‘Sylvester 
looks through binoculars’. 
the gestures matched the content of the concurrent speech. In the Incongruent 
condition, 23 participants saw and retold the stimulus movie in which the gesture 
forms were mixed up and did not match the content of the concurrent speech. 
When asked by the experimenter, none of the participants showed any indication 
of suspecting that the experiment was about the repetition of hand gestures. 
Coding In the stimulus movies, gestures occurred at a certain content unit in the 
verbal narration. Initially, we coded participants' representational gestures 
produced with those content units in their own narration, that is, at the target 
moments. We coded gestures that matched the corresponding gesture in the 
movie that the participant had seen in the hand shape used, the location of the 
gesture and the movement involved in the gesture as target gesture, similar as 
before. We added the label partial target gesture, for gestures that matched the 
gesture in the stimulus movie in two out of these three features (hand shape, 
location, movement). This time, it was also possible that a participant 
spontaneously produced the target gesture shown in the other condition. For 
example, if a participant was shown the running gesture with a description of the 
event in which Sylvester looks at Tweety through binoculars, this participant 
could still produce the binoculars gesture while narrating that Sylvester looked at 
Tweety. Such cases were labeled as target gesture other condition.  
If a different gesture was produced at a target moment this was labeled as 
different gesture, and if no gesture was produced this was labeled as no gesture. 
If one thinks of gesture and speech as fully separate behaviors, a theory of 
motor-mimicry is non-specific about the moment at which a target gesture will 
be reproduced. Therefore, we also looked for target gestures from the moment a 
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gesture was presented to a participant till the end of the experiment, rather than 
at target moments only. Verbal repetitions were coded in the same way as 
before.  
Initially all gestures were coded by a single coder. Reliability was assessed 
by having a second coder code a random sample of 20% of the retold fragments, 
N = 75. The two coders agreed on 91% of the labels, Cohen’s Kappa = .82, 
indicating almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). Given the observed 
marginal frequencies of the labels, the maximum value of Kappa was .87. In our 
analyses, we used the coding of the first coder 
Results 
Gesture The number of target gestures produced at target moments was higher 
in the Congruent condition (M = .79, SD = 1.10), than in the Incongruent 
condition (M = .04, SD = .21) (MD = .75, 95% CI = .28, 1.22), t(24.71) = 3.26, p 
< .01, !2 = .17. This was also the case for target gestures that were produced at 
any time from the presentation of the gesture till the end of the experiment 
(Congruent: M = .79, SD = 1.10, Incongruent: M = .09, SD = .29) (MD = .71, 
95% CI = .23, 1.18), t(26.26) = 3.03, p < .01, !2 = .15. We found no effect on 
the number of partial target gestures produced at target moments (Congruent: M 
= .96, SD = 1.23, Incongruent: M = .57, SD = .73), t(45) = 1.32, p = .19. 
At target moments, participants in the Congruent condition never produced 
target gestures from the Incongruent condition. Yet participants from the 
Incongruent condition sometimes produced target gestures from the Congruent 
condition at the target moment of those gestures. Thus, the number of target 
gestures from the other condition was higher in the Incongruent (M = .17, SD = 
.39) than in the Congruent condition (M = .00, SD = .00) (MD = 1.74, 95% CI = 
.01, .33), t(22) = 2.15, p < .05, !2 = .07. These included both gestures that had 
been presented to participants from the Incongruent condition with earlier 
episodes in their stimulus movie and gestures that these participants had not yet 
seen. Thus, as in the previous study, participants sometimes spontaneously 
produced target gestures that they had not seen. Therefore, we compare the 
number of target gestures from the Congruent condition that were spontaneously 
produced in the Incongruent condition (target gesture other condition) to those 
produced in the Congruent condition (target gesture). The number of target 
gestures from the Congruent condition produced at their target moments was 
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lower in the Incongruent condition (M = .17, SD = .44) than in the Congruent 
condition (M = .79, SD = 1.10) (MD = .62, 95% CI = .13, 1.11), t(45) = 2.58, p < 
.02, !2 = .11. See Figure 3 for an overview of these results.  
Participants in the Incongruent condition more often produced no gesture at 
the target moments (M = 6.87, SD = 1.10) than participants in the Congruent 
condition (M = 6.00, SD = 1.38) (MD = .87, 95% CI = .04, .14), t(45) = 2.38, p < 
.05, !2 = .09. We did not find an effect on the number of different gestures 
produced at target moments (Congruent: M = .35, SD = 1.15, Incongruent: M 
=.25, SD = 1.45), t(45) = 2.38, p = .80. 
Speech Partial verbal repetitions occurred more often in the Congruent condition 
(M = 1.92, SD = 1.06), than in the Incongruent condition (M = 1.26, SD = .92) 
(MD = .66, 95% CI = .07, 1.24), t(45) = 2.27, p < .05, !2 = .08. We did not find a 
significant effect for full repetitions across the two conditions (Congruent: M = 
1.13, SD = .34, Incongruent: M = 1.09, SD = .60) (MD = .04, 95% CI = -.25, 
.32), t(45) = .27, p = .79. 
 
Figure 3: Mean number of target gestures from the participant’s own and the other 
condition (re)produced by participants in the Congruent and Incongruent condition.  







































Participants repeated gesture forms more frequently if they had been presented to 
them in a linguistic context in which they were meaningful. Only one target 
gesture was repeated in the Incongruent condition. In this case the verbal 
retelling was adjusted such that it matched the gesture. Instead of telling that 
Sylvester climbed up the drainpipe as had been told in the stimulus movie, the 
participant said that Sylvester moved past Tweety while producing the gesture, 
which was a reproduction of the gesture depicting the swinging event. (This was 
still counted as a repetition of the target gesture at a target moment, since it 
occurred with the content unit of Sylvester’s movement toward Tweety.) These 
results suggest that representations of meaning do play a role in the repetition of 
meaningful gestures across speakers. If observing a form would lead to the 
repetition of that form directly and automatically, or if seeing hand movements 
alone would cause participants to produce more target gestures, then there would 
be no reason why gestures that were not meaningful in the linguistic context 
were less likely to be repeated. This sets the repetition of representational hand 
gestures across interlocutors aside from the mimicking of behaviors that do not 
carry propositional meaning, such as the shaking of one’s foot or other hand 
movements.  
However, there is a possible confound. It may have been the case that 
participants were just less likely to adapt to a speaker who came across as 
somewhat incoherent, due to his non-matching gestures. The result that 
participants also repeated the target phrases a bit less when they saw the non-
matching gestures is consistent with this explanation. In experiment 2 we 
examine the relation between the repetition of gesture forms and representations 
of meaning in more detail, this time with a more subtle manipulation of form-
meaning correspondence.  
Experiment 2: Repetition of gesture form and the underlying 
representations 
In this experiment we investigate whether a perceived gesture form can influence 
the construction of meaning (whether it be any semantic representation or a 
conceptual pact), which subsequently influences gesture production. To test this, 
we have used a route description task. By asking a participant and a confederate 
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to give each other directions repeatedly, a situation was created in which it is 
quite natural to repeat each other’s gesture forms, without drawing much 
attention to this process. Because of the more interactive setting, both low-level 
and high-level processes (e.g. audience design) that may be involved in the 
repetition of gesture forms across interlocutors can come into play. 
Giving directions allows for different conceptualizations of the task at hand. 
We presented participants with bird’s view drawings of a city scene, which had a 
short route indicated on them (see Figure 4 for an example). These scenes were 
neither presented vertically nor horizontally, but at an angle. Therefore, the 
production task could be thought of as either describing a route on a vertically 
oriented map, or as describing a route through an actual (horizontal) city.  
The confederate always was first to give a route description. Although her 
verbal descriptions were the same across conditions, her gestures differed. The 
movement of her gestures was either in accordance with the conceptualization of 
indicating the route on a vertically oriented map, which we call Vertical Map 
perspective, or with the conceptualization of a route through a city, which we 
call Route perspective. Thus, two different conceptualizations were suggested in 
gesture.  
It is interesting in itself to see whether participants adapt to the confederate’s 
perspective in gesture. Yet this alone would not tell us whether this is based on a 
direct repetition of gesture form, or on the convergence of representations of 
meaning. Therefore, apart from manipulating perspective, we manipulated hand  
 
Figure 4: Part of a city scene used in the experiment,  
note the route starting at the bottom-center. 
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shape independently. Our intuition was that when describing a route through a 
city, hand points, where all fingers are extended as an index, as well as finger 
points, where only one finger is extended as an index can be used, whereas when 
pointing on a map it is more common to point with one finger than with all 
fingers extended.  
We tested this intuition in two ways: by analyzing pictures on the Internet 
and by asking people in the streets for directions. First, we did a Google search 
for pictures on the bigram “getting directions” on December 14th 2010 in the 
Netherlands. We selected those photographs in which a person was pointing, 
seemingly to communicate to another person, and whose pointing hand was 
clearly visible. We scored photographs on the first five pages of search results 
for whether the person in the picture was pointing at a map or not and whether 
they were pointing with their hand or with their finger. Duplicate search results 
were counted only once. We found 6 finger points at a map, 0 hand points at a 
map, 10 finger points that were not on a map, and 8 hand points not on a map, in 
line with our hypothesis. Next, we searched for more gestures pointing at a map 
with the term “pointing at a map”. We found 50 finger points at a map, 1 hand 
point at a map, and 7 points at a map with another index, such as a pen or a stick. 
These data support our hypothesis that finger pointing is the most common way 
of pointing at a map.  
Additionally, we asked 20 Dutch-speaking adults in the city center of Tilburg 
for directions, while holding a paper map in hand. Out of the gestures that were 
pointing at the map, 29 were produced with one finger as an index, while 1 was 
produced with the tip of a key. Out of the gestures that were pointing into the 
streets, 18 were produced with one finger as an index and 20 were produced with 
all fingers extended. We excluded the ‘key-gesture’ from our analysis and found 
that this distribution is unlikely to be accidental, Yates !2(1) = 19.32, p < .0001. 
Thus, our hypothesis that people are less likely to point with all fingers extended 
when pointing at a map was supported by the data. 
We use this difference in common hand shapes between the domain of giving 
directions using a map and the domain of giving directions in the streets to 
address our research question. If it is the case that gesture form is perceived and 
reproduced directly, without the conceptual level being involved, participants 
may adapt to any of the gesture features produced by the confederate. That is, 
they may adapt to the confederate’s hand shape and to the confederate’s 
perspective. One of these may be perceived more easily than the other, so there 
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could be a difference in the extent to which each of the features is adapted to, but 
what we would not expect based on this view, is for the confederate’s 
perspective to influence a participant’s hand shape or for the confederate’s hand 
shape to influence the participant’s perspective. 
On the other hand, if meaning does form an intermediate stage between the 
perception and production of a gesture form, we do expect such cross-effects to 
occur. For example, our pre-test showed that it is more common to point at a 
map using a single finger, than it is to point at a map using four fingers at once. 
Therefore, if the confederate’s vertical movements would lead participants to 
think of this task as describing a route on a map, their gestures may be more 
frequently produced with one finger as an index as opposed to four. This would 
mean there is an effect of the perspective of the confederate’s gestures on the 
hand shape of participants’ gestures. This effect may also be found in the reverse 
direction: the use of all fingers as an index may lead participants to more readily 
think of the route as through a city than on a map, causing them to gesture in the 
Route perspective rather than the Vertical Map perspective. 
Method 
Participants Forty-eight participants took part in this experiment, out of which 
we excluded 6 from our analysis because they did not produce any of the 
gestures we were interested in (path gestures) and 2 because they indicated some 
suspicion about the experiment (see Procedure and Statistical analysis below). 
We used the data of 40 (33 female) participants in our analysis. 
Procedure The participant and the confederate came to the lab and were 
introduced by the experimenter. They each received a written instruction and 
were seated across from each other. The instruction explained a communication 
task, and stated that the couple with most correct responses could win a book 
voucher (in reality there was a random draw). To their side (right to the 
participant) was a table, on which sat a flip chart for each interlocutor. In 
between these flip charts was a screen, such as to keep information private. The 
screen did not keep the interlocutors from seeing each other.  Both behind the 
confederate and behind the participant was a camera capturing the other 
interlocutor. After reading the instruction, both ‘participants’ were allowed to 
ask questions. The confederate always asked one question, after which the 
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experimenter quickly went over the task again. Then the experimenter turned on 
the cameras and left the room.  
The confederate started by studying a little map and memorizing the route on 
it. Each route had one turn, see Figure 4 for an example. She then turned the 
page of her flip chart (rendering a blank page) and described the route to the 
participant, for example: “Je begint bij de rondvaartboot, dan ga je langs het 
voetbalstadion en dan rechts een winkelstraat in tot ongeveer halverwege.” 
(“You start at the tour boat, then you go along the soccer stadium and then into a 
shopping street on the right until about halfway.”) The confederate’s speech 
followed a script and was the same in each condition. The terms used to describe 
the directions were consistent with a horizontal perspective such as ‘rechtdoor’ 
(straight ahead) and ‘steekt over’ (cross), or were neutral for perspective ‘tot 
ongeveer halverwege’ (until about halfway). Gestures were timed naturally with 
speech and gazed at by the confederate. The confederate gestured with her right 
hand. The first direction of a route was always straight, which was depicted with 
either a forward or an upward movement. These movements were of comparable 
size. The gesture for the second direction (to the side) was placed relative to the 
first gesture; it started where the first gesture had ended.  
After the confederate’s description, the participant turned a page and was to 
choose which route had just been described, selecting from four alternatives by 
pronouncing the corresponding letter, see Figure 5. No feedback was provided. 
Then it was the participant’s turn to study a route. This route was always on the 
same scene that the confederate’s route had been on. After turning the page 
(rendering a blank page) the participant described the route to the confederate, 
who then turned a page and selected one of the four alternatives. This ended one 
cycle of the experiment. In total each participant perceived and produced five 
route descriptions, which took between six and eleven minutes. The 
confederate’s descriptions took about twelve seconds each. On average, 
participants took about equally long for their descriptions, ranging from seven to 
nineteen seconds. (Most time of the experiment was filled with studying the 
maps and selecting answers.) 
Afterward, both the confederate and the participant filled out a questionnaire, 
which included questions on the presumed purpose of the experiment and 
whether the participant noticed anything peculiar. Participants were also asked if 
they had recognized the city in the pictures, which none of them had (the 
drawings were loosely based on St. Petersburg). When the participant was done  





Figure 5: Example of the routes to choose from. Each map has a slightly different route 
depicted on it. Participants selected a route by calling out the corresponding letter. 
filling out the forms, the confederate revealed her role and asked the participant’s 
consent for the use of their data. Participants were asked if they had suspected 
any deception. The data of two participants was excluded from our analysis, 
because they indicated having been suspicious about either the goal of the 
experiment or the role of the confederate. 
Design We have used a 2 x 2 between subjects design. The independent 
variables were the perspective (Route or Vertical Map) and hand shape (one or 
four fingers extended) of the confederate’s path gestures. In the Route 
perspective, gestures were performed in the horizontal plane, with the index in 
the direction of the hand movement, as though following a virtual route (Figure 
6a, 6b). In the Vertical Map perspective, gestures were performed in the vertical 
plane and the index was always pointing forward, as though pointing on a virtual 
map (Figure 6c, 6d).  
Coding We coded all path gestures that participants produced, that is, all 
gestures in which one or more fingers were extended as an index, there was hand 
movement along some virtual path, and the co-occurring speech mentioned a 
direction to take. Within the stroke phase of each path gesture, we coded hand 
shape and perspective. The labels for hand shape were Finger, when one finger  




Figure 6: The confederate’s path gestures. a: Hand/ Route; b: Finger/ Route;  
c: Hand/ Vertical Map; d: Finger/ Vertical Map. 
was extended as an index, and Hand, if more than one finger was extended. The 
label for perspective was based on the following features of participants’ 
gestures: location in the gesture space, hand orientation, and movement 
(direction and size). The label that could explain most features was assigned to 
each gesture. It turned out that in addition to the two perspectives that the 
confederate had used, participants occasionally used an alternative one, as 
though pointing on a horizontal map. Therefore, we chose from three labels: 
Vertical Map, Route, and Horizontal Map. A gesture in the Vertical Map 
perspective typically has vertical movement, with relative sizes mapping onto 
distances on the map, fingers pointing forward and the location in the gesture 
space corresponding to the location on the map (Figure 7a, 7b). Route gestures 
on the other hand have horizontal movement in front of and to the side of the 
speaker, with the fingers pointing in the direction of the hand movement (Figure 
7c). Horizontal Map gestures (Figure 7d) differ from Route gestures in their 
hand orientation (fingers pointing down), and their relative size and location. 
Figure 7 shows some examples of participants’ path gestures and our coding.  
Initially all gestures were coded by a single coder. Reliability was assessed 
by having a second coder code a random sample of 20% of the path gestures in 
each condition for hand shape and perspective, N = 58. The two coders agreed 
on the label for hand shape in 95% of the cases, Cohen’s Kappa = .89, indicating 
almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). Given the observed marginal 
frequencies of the labels, the maximum value of Kappa was .96. The two coders 
agreed on the label for perspective in 79% of the cases, Cohen’s Kappa = .66,  




Figure 7: Examples of participants’ path gestures and our coding. a: Hand/ Vertical Map;  
b: Finger/ Vertical Map; c: Hand/ Route; d: Finger/ Horizontal Map. 
indicating substantial agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). The maximum value of 
kappa was .86 in this case. In our analyses, we used the coding of the first coder. 
Statistical analysis Analyses were done using ANOVA, with factors perspective 
(levels: Vertical Map, Route) and hand shape (levels: Hand, Finger) of the 
confederate’s gestures. There were 40 participants, 10 in each cell. As a measure 
of participants’ perspective, we report the number of path gestures that a 
participant produced in the Vertical Map perspective divided by all path gestures 
produced by that participant. As a measure participants’ hand shape, we report 
the number of gestures that a participants produced with one finger extended, 
divided by the total number of path gestures produced by that participant. The 
significance threshold was .05 and we report partial eta squared as a measure of 
effect size.  
Results  
Participants’ perspective Analyses of the perspective of participants’ gestures, 
shown in Figure 8, revealed a main effect of the confederate’s perspective, such 
that participants produced a larger proportion of Vertical Map gestures when the  




Figure 8: Mean proportion of gestures that participants produced in the Vertical Map 
perspective for each perspective and hand shape used by the confederate.  
Bars represent standard errors. 
confederate gestured in the Vertical Map perspective (M = .46, SD = .35) than 
when the confederate gestured in the Route perspective (M = .11, SD = .20) (MD 
= .35, 95% CI =  .17, .54), F(1, 36) = 14.88 p < .001, "2p  = .29. The 
confederate’s hand shape did not exert a main effect on the perspective of 
participants’ gestures, as they produced about equal proportions of Vertical Map 
gestures when the confederate gestured with all fingers extended (M = .26, SD = 
.34) and when she gestured with one finger extended (M = .31, SD = .33) (MD = 
-.06, 95% CI = -.24, .13), F(1, 36) = .38, p = .54. These two factors did not 
interact, F(1, 36) = .71, p = .41.  
Participants produced Horizontal Map gestures in about equal proportions 
across conditions. Therefore, the results for participants’ gestures in the Route 
perspective mirror the results reported above. 
Participants’ hand shape Analyses of the hand shape of participants’ gestures, 
shown in Figure 9, revealed a main effect of the confederate’s perspective, such 
that participants produced a larger proportion of gestures with one finger 
extended when the confederate gestured in the Vertical Map perspective (M 
=.48, SD = .43) than when the confederate gestured in the Route perspective (M 
= .22 , SD = .37), F(1, 36) = 5.00, p < .05, "2p  = .12. The confederate’s hand 




















































Figure 9: Mean proportion of gestures that participants produced with one finger extended 
(hand shape Finger) for each perspective and hand shape used by the confederate.  
Bars represent standard errors. 
produced about equal proportions of gestures with one finger extended when the 
confederate gestured with all fingers extended (M = .34, SD = .39) and when the 
confederate gestured with one finger extended (M = .36, SD = .45) (MD = -.02, 
95% CI =  -.26, .21), F(1, 36) = .04, p = .85. These two factors interacted, F(1, 
36) = 9.40, p < .01, "2p = .20: When the confederate gestured in the Route 
perspective, participants adapted to her hand shape, as they produced a larger 
proportion of gestures with one finger extended when the confederate gestured 
with one finger extended (M = .41, SD =.45) than when she gestured with all 
fingers extended (M = .03 , SD = .07) (MD = .38, 95% CI = .08, .68), F(1, 18) = 
6.94, p < .02, "2p = .28. Yet when the confederate gestured in the Vertical Map 
perspective, participants did not adapt to her hand shape, as they produced a 
larger proportion of gestures with one finger extended when the confederate 
gestured with all fingers extended (M = .64, SD = .32) than when she gestured 
with one finger extended (M = .31, SD = .48), F(1, 18) = 2.24, p = .16. 
Discussion  
As predicted by both the theory that gesture form is copied directly and theories 
that representations of meaning are involved, participants adapted to the 
perspective used by the confederate. When the confederate gestured in the 
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similarly for the Route perspective. But was this merely a copying of form, or 
were they adapting to the conceptualization expressed in the confederate’s 
gestures?  
Importantly, we found some of the cross-effects we expected if perceiving 
certain gestures would cause participants to think of the task in a certain 
perspective, which in turn would influence their own gesture production. The 
perspective of the confederate’s gestures influenced the hand shape of 
participants’ gestures: participants more frequently pointed with one finger if the 
confederate gestured as though on a vertical map. This can be explained as the 
confederate’s vertical gestures leading participants to think of the route as on a 
map, which caused them to point with their finger. If this is so, we would expect 
this increase in the use of one finger being caused by gestures that participants 
produced with the Vertical Map perspective, rather than in the Route 
perspective. This was indeed the case. Participants produced fewer gestures with 
one finger in the Route perspective when the confederate gestured in the Vertical 
Map perspective, than when she gestured in the Route perspective. It thus seems 
that participants were not merely repeating the individual features of the 
confederate’s gestures, but rather the meaning that they expressed. 
A theory that only takes into account the alignment of gesture forms can also 
explain that participants adapted to the confederate’s perspective. Yet such a 
theory would not predict participants to gesture with one finger as an index more 
frequently when the confederate gestured in the Vertical Map perspective, 
particularly not when the confederate gestured with all fingers extended. 
However, it is possible to explain this effect in terms of biomechanics. For 
example, it may be the case that vertical hand movements lead people to extend 
their index finger, rather than all fingers, simply because it is easier, without 
them associating this with pointing at a map at any level of processing (our 
theory is neutral as to whether conceptual representations are more embodied or 
more symbolic in nature). This would be an explanation without conceptual 
mediation. However, we do not know of any data that support a theory that it is 
easier to extend one finger instead of all fingers when lifting an arm. An 
informal pilot study showed that when people were asked to copy the 
confederate’s gestural movements, without any meaning being ascribed to them, 
people could do so effortlessly, both in terms of movement and hand shape. In 
our view, this makes an explanation in terms of biomechanics less likely. Also, 
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rather than explaining the data post hoc, our theory predicts the effect we found, 
making it more powerful.  
Overall, perspective was adapted to more than hand shape. This may be 
because perspective was expressed in two features (movement and hand 
orientation), whereas hand shape is only one feature. Thus, the one non-matching 
feature may have been adapted to the two matching ones. It may also be because 
in this task, perspective carried a more critical meaning than did hand shape. A 
vertical gesture cannot possibly depict a route one could walk (at least not in the 
Netherlands), whereas the distinctions between the different hand shapes seem 
far subtler. In other words, in this task, the perspective of gestures may have 
given rise to (shared) conceptualizations more readily than the hand shape with 
which they were produced.  
Although we did not find an overall effect of hand shape, participants did 
adapt to the confederate’s hand shape in the conditions in which she gestured 
horizontally in the Route perspective, whereas there was no adaptation to the 
confederate’s hand shape in the Vertical Map conditions. A possible explanation 
for this is again one in terms of meaning. The different hand shapes may be more 
readily interpreted in a meaningful way when gesturing as though along a 
horizontal route than when gesturing as though on a vertical map, better allowing 
participants to construct concepts that were consistent with the confederate’s 
hand shape.  
General discussion and conclusion 
Our experiments have shown that adaptation in representational gestures 
resembles adaptation in verbal references in various ways. First, certain gesture 
forms were more likely to be used after they had been perceived. Participants 
who saw a speaker in a stimulus movie produce certain representational gestures 
were more likely to produce these gestures later on, while retelling the speaker’s 
story. Second, gesture forms were only repeated across speakers if they had 
occurred in a meaningful context. That is, if the gesture form could be 
interpreted in light of the meaning expressed in the concurrent speech. Lastly, 
there were instances where gesture form was not copied in a low-level automated 
way, but rather similar forms were used to express similar meanings, and aspects 
of a form that did not match a meaning were not copied but rather adapted to the 
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meaning. These findings go well with theories and models in which gesture and 
speech both stem from a single concept, idea, or communicative intention (e.g. 
Cassell, et al., 1998; De Ruiter, 2000, 2007; Kendon, 2004; Kita & Özyürek, 
2003; McNeill, 1992).  
In experiment 1B, when a perceived gesture was incongruent with the 
content of the accompanying speech, the gesture was not repeated when the 
speech content was. In terms of the interactive alignment account, this may be 
because the incongruent gesture form that was perceived did not match the 
representation of meaning that was formed in the interpretation process, and thus 
no link was established between the representation of meaning and a 
representation of gesture form. Therefore, when this representation of meaning 
was subsequently activated by the production process, the gesture form was not. 
This explanation also fits the one exception we found, where an incongruent 
gesture was repeated, but the content of speech in the retelling differed markedly 
from the original story. In this case, the interpretation formed during perception 
seems to have incorporated the incongruent gesture. Therefore, the 
representation of meaning activated during production could activate the gesture 
form that had been perceived, but not the by then incongruent lexical forms that 
were perceived. This one case is very similar to the results found by Cassell et al. 
(1998), who accounted for their results similarly.  
Interestingly, participants were less likely to produce any gesture at all while 
expressing content that had been presented to them with an incongruent gesture. 
It may be that the perception of an incongruent gesture disturbed the activation 
of representations of the spatial and motor aspects of the event described, 
thereby making it less likely that a gesture was produced while retelling this 
event (also see Kelly, Özyürek, & Maris, 2010). In terms of the interface model 
(Kita & Özyürek, 2003), this can be explained as the gesture generator not being 
able to retrieve relevant data from working memory, and thus not being able to 
generate a gesture form.  
Consistently, the gesture as simulated action framework (Hostetter & Alibali, 
2010) would also predict that speakers are less likely to gesture when describing 
an event that does not involve the perception or performance of a particular 
action. This framework explains the production of representational gestures as 
simulating action as part of thinking for speaking. Therefore, it might predict that 
not having perceived a gesture congruent with the upcoming speech would cause 
participants to be less likely to produce a representational gesture. Alternatively, 
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it may also be that participants omitted the gesture for social reasons. It is known 
that adaptation has positive social consequences (e.g. Van Baaren, Holland, 
Steenaert, & Van Knippenberg, 2003), thus it may also be that producing a 
completely different gesture sends a negative social message, which participants 
may have wanted to avoid. 
In addition to the first two experiments, the results of our route directions 
experiment also suggest that concepts underlie the repetition of gesture forms 
across interlocutors. Participants readily adapted to those features of a 
confederate’s gestures that could be interpreted meaningfully, such as whether 
the gestures were produced horizontally, as though walking through a city, or 
vertically, as though pointing on a vertically oriented map. However, features 
that were inconsistent with these conceptualizations, notably the use of four 
fingers while gesturing as though pointing on a map, were not adapted to. 
Instead, we saw an effect of the confederate’s perspective in gesture on the hand 
shape used by participants: if the confederate gestured as though on a map, 
participants more frequently used one finger as an index, which is consistent 
with the conceptualization of pointing out the route on a map.  
Both the theory that interlocutors form conceptual pacts (Brennan & Clark, 
1996) and the interactive alignment account (Pickering & Garrod, 2004) can 
account for these findings. In the account by Brennan and Clark, speakers adapt 
to each other’s gestures with the aim of arriving at a shared conceptual 
understanding (also see Holler & Wilkin, 2011). Although plausible, such a 
functional account is not required to explain our data. The interactive alignment 
account can do so as well. Yet adaptation at one linguistic level alone cannot 
explain why specifically those aspects of a perceived gesture that could not 
readily be interpreted meaningfully were not reproduced. Instead, these features 
tended to be produced such that they fitted an interpretation consistent with most 
aspects of the perceived gesture. This can be explained using the links between 
different levels within a speaker, that is, between representations of meaning and 
representations of form. Only those features of a form that can be linked to a 
representation of meaning during interpretation are activated through this same 
representation of meaning once it is activated for production.  
Regarding proposed models of speech and gesture production, such as 
models following the postcard architecture (De Ruiter, 2007) and the interface 
architecture (Kita & Özyürek, 2003), our results seem to emphasize that it is 
important for such models to have gesture and speech production and 
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interpretation share representations of meaning at some level. Both types of 
models allow for this at the conceptual level. Currently, these architectures do 
not provide an explicit account of adaptation in either gesture or speech, because 
they do not specify how production and perception are linked, or at what level 
representations are shared between these processes. In future work we intend to 
further study adaptation in gesture, adaptation in speech, and their possible 
influence on each other to shed more light on this issue. A model that can 
account for our current findings will need to allow for the conceptual level to 
influence what features of a perceived gesture form will be more likely 
candidates for gesture production. 
As explained above, our results fit well with the theory that when 
communication partners interact, the concepts of both interlocutors converge and 
certain forms are used to refer to these shared concepts (Brennan & Clark, 1996; 
Garrod & Anderson, 1987). However, our results do not provide evidence that 
this is a deliberate process, or that it is part of audience design. Especially in our 
first two studies, audience design does not seem the most likely explanation, 
since even though the addressee was not the person who produced the original 
gestures, some of the original gesture forms were repeated when narrating to this 
new addressee. The convergence of representations of meaning may also happen 
automatically (Pickering & Garrod, 2004), without conscious effort or intent (but 
see Brennan & Hanna, 2009). This issue needs to be addressed in future 
research. Additionally, we have not yet studied gesture in a setting in which 
conceptual pacts can be arrived at incrementally. Rather, we have made use of a 
stimulus movie or a confederate whose gesturing followed a script, such that 
adaptation could only happen one way. Despite these limitations, our results 
suggest that the perception of meaningful forms in gesture can contribute to the 
convergence of concepts across interlocutors, which in turn informs gesture 
production.  
Our results do not imply that features of gesture forms are never repeated 
without representations of meaning being involved. So far, we have only studied 
certain representational gestures. Our results may not generalize to other types of 
gestures, especially non-representational gestures, whose repetition across 
interlocutors may be more similar to that of other behaviors not carrying 
propositional meaning. Yet we have shown that certain representational gestures 
are only repeated if they make sense in the linguistic context and that one aspect 
of a perceived gesture form (perspective) can influence another aspect (hand 
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shape) of a gesture form produced. These results suggest that it is sometimes 
fruitful to include representations of meaning in an explanation of adaptation in 
non-verbal language use, especially when these behaviors carry propositional 
meaning. Rather than perceiving a form leading to the production of that form 
directly, we have shown that for representational gestures, meaning can play a 
mediating role. That is, representations of meaning are also converging across 
interlocutors rather than just representations of form, and this convergence of 
meaningful representations may be driving adaptation in gesture. 
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Gesturing by aphasic speakers: How does it 
compare? 
Abstract 
We compared gesturing by aphasic speakers to that of healthy controls, who 
either were or were not allowed to speak, to see whether gestures’ intelligibility 
increases or decreases in aphasia, and to assess whether the techniques employed 
by aphasic speakers for depicting in gesture resemble those of healthy controls. 
We used video clips of 25 aphasic speakers and 17 healthy controls performing 
two communication tasks on a clinical test (Scenario Test). We conducted a 
perception study (15 raters per cell) to assess the intelligibility of their gestures 
and we studied their gestural representation techniques by means of coding and 
analysis. We found that gestures by aphasic speakers were less informative than 
those of healthy controls, and that gestures by people with severe aphasia were 
less informative than those by people with moderate aphasia. Aphasic speakers 
also tended to use fewer gestural representation techniques (mostly relying on 
outlining and deictic gestures) than did healthy controls who were asked to use 
gesture instead of speech. Our results suggest that in aphasia, gesture tends to 
degrade with speech. This implies that the processes underlying speech and co-
speech gesture production may be tightly linked or shared.  
This chapter is based on: 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Van de Sandt-Koenderman, M. (submitted). Gesturing by 
aphasic speakers, how does it compare? Journal of Speech Language and 
Hearing Research. 








Gesture and speech production 
When speaking, people oftentimes produce hand gestures that are closely linked 
to their speech temporally (Chui, 2005), structurally (Kita & Özyürek, 2003), 
and semantically (e.g. McNeill, 2005). Some of these co-speech gestures depict 
things in an iconic or deictic way. For example, when asking a sales clerk for a 
sweater, gestures may indicate that we prefer a V-neck (e.g. by outlining its 
shape), a large front pocket (e.g. by putting our hands into an imaginary 
sweater), or one just like the one we see on the mannequin (e.g. by pointing at 
it). Both the production of speech and the concurrent production of hand gestures 
seem to be part of a speaker’s communicative effort (Kendon, 2004).  
Although different functions of co-speech gesture have also been recognized, 
such as facilitating speech production (Krauss, 1998; Krauss, Chen, & 
Gottesman, 2000) and supporting cognition (Melinger & Kita, 2007), much 
empirical evidence has been gathered for the idea that co-speech gestures are 
communicative and are intended as such (e.g. Alibali, Heath, & Myers, 2001; 
Beattie & Shovelton, 1999). This may mean that people with impaired verbal 
communication skills, like aphasic speakers, can use gesture to compensate for 
their speech impairment. On the other hand, since speech and co-speech gesture 
production seem to be closely related, it may also be the case that co-speech 
gesturing breaks down with speech in aphasia. In this chapter, we address the 
question of whether speech and gesture are two sides of the same coin (McNeill, 
2005), or whether they can compensate for one another (e.g. Butterworth & 
Hadar, 1989). We do so by assessing whether co-speech gesturing tends to be 
impaired in aphasic speakers. 
Not all gestures are coordinated with speech. There are also gestures that are 
produced and understood without concurrent speech. One category of such 
gestures is formed by pantomimes (Kendon, 1988). Pantomimes are gestures 
whose form does not carry a conventionalized meaning. In this sense, they are 
similar to co-speech gestures, rather than to signs in languages of the deaf and 
emblems (e.g. the thumbs-up gesture in English), which do carry a 
conventionalized meaning. Yet similar to signs and emblems, pantomimes 
replace speech rather than accompanying it. Since pantomimes are not 
accompanied by speech, the process underlying pantomime production may not 
be linked as tightly to the process of speech production as may be the case for 
Language in the hands 
 
 134 
co-speech gesture production. There is some evidence that the production of 
pantomimes relies on different resources than the production of co-speech 
gestures (e.g. Bartolo, Cubelli, Della Sala, & Drie, 2003; Goldin-Meadow, So, 
Özyürek, & Mylander, 2008; Rose & Douglas, 2003). For example, Goldin-
Meadow et. al found that the predominant order in which agent, patient and 
action are mentioned in a speaker’s native language while describing a motion 
event influences the order of expression in co-speech gestures, but not in 
pantomimes. 
Because of the synchrony in time and meaning between speech and co-
speech gestures, theories have been proposed on how speech and co-speech 
gesture production are interrelated. McNeill (2005) argues that speech and 
gesture co-express idea units, which develop themselves into utterances. That is, 
in the process of thinking-for-speaking, ideas are developed from their origin, 
which McNeill refers to as the growth point, into an utterance that consists of 
both speech and gesture. In this view, speech and gesture are two sides of the 
same coin. In support of this idea, So, Kita, and Goldin-Meadow (2009), for 
example, found that if information was lacking in speech, it tended to be missing 
in gesture as well.  
Melinger and Levelt (2004) on the other hand, found that speakers sometimes 
divide the content of their message across gesture and speech. They found that if 
critical spatial information was expressed in gesture, it was more likely to be 
omitted in speech. This goes well with the idea that gesture and speech 
production are complementary and can compensate one another, which also 
underlies the Tradeoff Hypothesis. This hypothesis states that “when speaking 
gets harder, speakers will rely relatively more on gestures”, and vice versa (De 
Ruiter, Bangerter, & Dings, In Press). However, De Ruiter et al. found only little 
evidence that people gesture more when speech is harder. Rather, they found that 
gesture and speech tended to express similar types of information, consistent 
with the idea that gesture and speech are two sides of a coin.  
Gesture production and aphasia 
In light of the question of whether gesture and speech can compensate for one 
another, it is interesting to study what happens to gesture when speech breaks 
down, such as in aphasia. Aphasia is an acquired language disorder caused by 
brain damage, affecting all language modalities. The severity of the language 
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disorder may vary considerably. In our current study we focus on aphasic people 
who have severe to moderate problems expressing themselves verbally. 
Numerous studies have shown that aphasic people still gesture spontaneously 
and frequently (Rose, 2006). People with fluent aphasia may even produce more 
gestures that convey information than non-aphasic speakers (Carlomagno, 
Pandolfi, Marini, Di Iasi, & Cristilli, 2005). Case studies and clinical experience 
confirm that some aphasic speakers use gesture effectively to communicate (e.g. 
Goodwin, 2002). This suggests that people with aphasia may be able to partly 
compensate for their speech impairment with gesture. Yet does this mean their 
gesturing is unimpaired? 
When producing a content-bearing gesture, there are different ways in which 
we can depict (Cienki & Müller, 2008). For example, if we want to depict a 
sweater, we can outline its shape, or we can pretend to put it on. And if we are 
talking about a car, we can move our hands as though steering it, or we can let 
our hand represent the car, depicting its path with our hand movement. When 
produced along with speech, each of these gestures would fall into the category 
of iconic gestures, which are gestures that mostly depict entities or movements 
(McNeill, 2005). Being able to produce a meaningful iconic gesture does not 
mean that all these different representation techniques are intact. Therefore, to 
know whether gesture is impaired in aphasia, we need to study both its meaning 
and its form, and we need to compare aphasic speakers to non-aphasic speakers. 
Carlomagno and Cristili (2006) compared five speakers with fluent aphasia, 
five speakers with non-fluent aphasia and ten control participants for how well 
they could convey two pieces of news verbally and how they gestured. They 
found no evidence for a difference between the three groups in what features of 
objects and actions were depicted in iconic gestures. They did find that speakers 
with fluent aphasia produced more iconic gestures than the other groups, while 
the speakers with non-fluent aphasia produced more deictic and metalinguistic 
gestures than the other groups. Deictic gestures are for example pointing 
gestures. Metalinguistic gestures are gestures that do not refer to the same 
content as the concurrent speech, but rather show the structure of the spoken 
message or comment on it, for example expressing uncertainty. Carlomagno and 
Cristili conclude that for people with fluent aphasia, there can be a mismatch 
between their speech content, which results from their impaired processing of 
verbal semantics, and their gesture forms, whose production may be unimpaired. 
This was suggested earlier by Butterworth and Hadar (1989), and it is in line 
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with the view that gesture and speech can compensate for one another and thus 
are relatively independent. 
Studying the relation between speech impairment and gesture, Cocks, 
Dipper, Middleton and Morgan (2011) drew a detailed comparison between 
gestures produced by a speaker (LT) with conduction aphasia and those of non-
aphasic speakers. They found that LT’s gestures during tip-of-the-tongue states 
(co-ToT gestures) differed from those accompanied with fluent speech by herself 
and the control speakers. For example, most of the co-ToT gestures outlined 
shapes, whereas this was rarely the case for co-speech gestures. Cocks et al. 
explained this result by the fact that the co-ToT gestures mostly seemed to refer 
to objects and animals, which may be easily depicted that way, whereas the co-
speech gestures depicted events. Although this is a plausible explanation, there is 
an alternative account as well. McNeil and Duncan (2010), explain aphasia as a 
problem in translating intact conceptual knowledge into an utterance (consisting 
of speech and gesture). Therefore, when aphasic speakers have trouble 
verbalizing their idea, it may be foremost the conceptual knowledge that is hard 
to access, or to translate into an utterance. Producing shape-outlining gestures 
requires relatively little use of conceptual knowledge, as it is grounded in the 
perceptual features of the referent. Therefore, one does not need to know how to 
use the referent, or how the referent typically behaves in order to perform the 
gesture. Thus, producing shape-outlining gestures may largely surpass the 
processes of retrieving conceptual knowledge and of translating conceptual 
knowledge into an utterance. This may also explain in part why especially shape-
outlining gestures were used during word finding problems.  
Cocks et al. also found that the differences in LT’s gesturing paralleled the 
differences in her speech, suggesting that although LT could still use gesture 
effectively, her gesture production was impaired, much like her speech 
production. They call for a study in which iconic co-speech and co-ToT gestures 
of a larger number of aphasic and non-aphasic speakers are compared in various 
types of discourse. 
Present study 
In our present study we compare the iconic and deictic gestures of a larger 
number of aphasic speakers to those of non-aphasic speakers. However, because 
of the scale of our study, our approach differs from the approach by Cocks et al. 
(2011). We look at co-speech gestures, that is, any gestures accompanied by 
Chapter 5: Gesturing by aphasic speakers 
 
 137 
speech, without discriminating between co-speech and co-ToT gestures. Doing 
so, we address our research question accurately, because all gestures that are 
accompanied by speech sounds are likely to stem from the process of co-speech 
gesture production, this as opposed to gestures that are not accompanied by 
speech, some of which may result from a separate process for producing 
pantomimes. Therefore, we look at co-silence gestures separately. 
To assess whether or not co-speech gesture production tends to be impaired 
in aphasic speakers, we compare both the meaning and the form of gestures 
produced by speakers with severe aphasia, speakers with moderate aphasia, and 
healthy control participants. We also asked the healthy control participants to 
communicate without using speech, using gesture instead. This gives us insight 
into how people with an unimpaired gesture production system would 
compensate for speech with gesture, which informs us on whether aphasic 
speakers can use gesture to compensate for their speech impairment as freely as 
people without aphasia. 
First, we look at the intelligibility of gestures. If aphasic speakers compensate 
for speech with gesture, we expect their gestures will be more informative than 
those of non-aphasic speakers, who can rely on speech more. Also, the more 
speech is impaired, the more informative gesture will be. Alternatively, if speech 
and gesture are two sides of a coin, and therefore also break down together, the 
opposite is expected. That is, gestures of aphasic speakers will be less 
informative than those of healthy speakers, and the more impaired speech is, the 
more impaired gesture will be. We test this by means of three perception 
experiments, in which we separately assess the informativeness of the verbal and 
nonverbal communication of people with moderate and more severe aphasia and 
healthy control participants. For this purpose, the speakers perform two 
communication tasks, which differ in how difficult it is to express the 
information that needs to be conveyed verbally.  
Second, we present a detailed analysis of the form of iconic and deictic 
gestures produced by aphasic speakers and control participants, zooming in on 
their representation techniques. If their gesturing is unimpaired, the techniques 
used by aphasic speakers may resemble the techniques used by non-aphasic 
speakers. If aphasic speakers compensate for speech with gesture, the techniques 
they employ may also be more similar to those of non-aphasics who are asked to 
communicate without speech. On the other hand, if their gesturing is impaired, 
this may affect some techniques more than others, and therefore aphasic speakers 
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may prefer different techniques than non-aphasic speakers or gesturers, and there 
may be differences in the techniques used by people with moderate and more 
severe aphasia. Specifically, the more severe aphasia, the more speakers may 
rely on techniques that do not require much use of conceptual knowledge, such 
as outlining shapes. 
Perception experiments 
Method 
Material We used video clips of 25 native Dutch stroke patients with aphasia (16 
male). Types of aphasia included: Global (7), Broca (3), Wernicke (3), Anomic 
(1), Conduction (1), and non-classifiable (6). For four patients the type of 
aphasia was not known. The mean age was 56.92 years, SD = 10.86, Range 37 – 
71. The mean time post-onset was 25.56 months, SD = 40.16, Range 1 – 152. 
Details for each speaker can be found in Table 1. All patients gave their 
informed consent for the use of their data for research purposes.  
The patients were performing an experimental version of the Scenario Test 
(Van der Meulen, Van de Sandt-Koenderman, Duivenvoorden, & Ribbers, 
2009). This test measures a person’s ability to functionally communicate. To 
compensate for their impaired verbal expressiveness, patients may use any 
alternative and augmentative means of communication, including gesture, to get 
their message across.  We used data from two subtasks. In the sweater task, the 
patient is explained a scenario in which they are in a store and want to buy a 
sweater. The clinician talks about a sales clerk approaching and asking: “How 
may I help you?”. The patient is then to communicate as though addressing the 
sales clerk, for example by saying: “I would like to buy a sweater”. In the 
accident task, the information to be conveyed is more complex. The clinician 
explains a scenario in which the patient witnessed an accident, in which a car hit 
a biker. A police officer then approaches the patient asking: “What happened?”. 
The patient is then to explain what took place, as though addressing the officer.  
Apart from the videos of aphasic speakers, we also used video data of non-
aphasic control participants, who were matched for age and performed  the same 
test items with a trained tester. Their mean age was 54.06 years, SD = 11.09, 
Range 33 - 77. They were allowed to speak on one subtask (verbal control 
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participants) and were asked to communicate using gesture exclusively on the 
other (nonverbal control participants).  
We cut out fragments of the videos of all people performing the two 
subtasks, starting right after the final question posed by the clinician, and 
stopping right after the speaker’s first attempt at communicating the required 
information. Out of these fragments, we made three stimulus movies for our 
perception studies: one containing all fragments of aphasic speakers, one 
containing all fragments of the verbal control participants, and one with all 
fragments of the nonverbal control participants. For the aphasic speakers and the  




(years) Type of aphasia  





1 F 43 Global 2 10 Severe 
2 M 68 Global 86 10 Severe 
3 M 71 Global 67 10 Severe 
4 M 52 Global 4 10 Severe 
5 M 67 Global 1 10 Severe 
6 F 37 Wernicke 2 10 Severe 
7 F 68 Unknown 3 10 Severe 
8 M 56 Global 4 10 Severe 
9 M 59 Wernicke 49 11 Severe 
10 M 67 Global 3 13 Severe 
11 M 64 Non classifiable 1 19 Severe 
12 M 69 Non classifiable 73 19 Severe 
13 F 44 Non classifiable 6 22 Moderate 
14 F 51 Unknown 1 23 Moderate 
15 F 40 Broca 97 28 Moderate 
16 M 68 Non classifiable 4 29 Moderate 
17 F 66 Wernicke 1 29 Moderate 
18 F 50 Broca 47 31 Moderate 
19 M 70 Non classifiable 1 31 Moderate 
20 M 57 Unknown 3 34 Moderate 
21 F 41 Unknown 23 34 Moderate 
22 M 63 Non classifiable 1 38 Moderate 
23 F 49 Conduction 1 39 Moderate 
24 M 47 Broca 152 40 Moderate 
25 M 56 Anomic 7 43 Moderate 
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verbal control participants, we created three versions of these stimulus movies: 
one with just the video image and no sound, one with sound and blank video, 
and one with both image and sound. The clips of the nonverbal control 
participants were video image only, that is, without sound. 
Raters and task Raters were native Dutch students from Tilburg University, who 
had no expertise in gesture or aphasiology. They performed a forced choice task, 
in which they were asked to judge whether the person in each clip of the 
stimulus movie was communicating that they wanted to buy a sweater, or that 
they had witnessed a car accident. When applicable, their instructions stated that 
the speakers they were about to see had a speech disorder. We did three separate 
perception studies, with different groups of raters. In the first study, we used the 
stimulus movies of the aphasic speakers only. Raters saw the video clips without 
sound, heard the audio clips without video, or saw and heard the video clips with 
sound. The second perception study was similar, but with the stimulus movies of 
the verbal control participants instead. Finally, we also did a perception test with 
the stimulus movie of the nonverbal control participants.  
Statistical analysis Based on the severity of their verbal communication disorder, 
the aphasic speakers were divided into two groups. For this purpose, we used 
their score on the Amsterdam Nijmegen Everyday Language Test (ANELT) 
(Blomert, Kean, Koster, & Schokker, 1994). The ANELT is similar to the 
Scenario Test, except that only verbal communication contributes to a speaker’s 
score. In line with the ANELT and the Scenario Test, we chose 20 as the cut off 
point. The ANELT labels patients with scores lower than 20 as the most severe 
group, whereas the Scenario Test discriminates between speakers with an 
ANELT score above and equal to 20 and those below, providing separate norms 
for the latter. Thus, speakers with a score below 20 (out of 10 – 50) were labeled 
as speakers with severe aphasia and speakers with a score above 20 were labeled 
as speakers with moderate aphasia. There were 13 speakers in the moderate 
aphasia group and 12 in the severe aphasia group. Since we ran our perception 
experiments separately, we present three separate analyses of variance. For 
pairwise comparisons we used the LSD method, with a significance threshold of 
.05. Our dependent variable in each analysis is the ratio of correct answers to all 
answers, averaged over raters. 
 




Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of the ratio of correct answers 
to all answers, for clips from each group of ‘speakers’, for either task, and for 
each modality in which they were shown to the raters. Performance at chance 
level would render a score of .5. We first present an analysis of the study with 
clips from the two groups of aphasic speakers. We performed an ANOVA with 
Group (levels: Severe aphasia, Moderate aphasia) and Task (levels: Sweater, 
Accident) as within factors and Modality of presentation (levels: Visual, Audio, 
Audiovisual) as a between factor. There were 15 raters in each cell, 45 in total.  
All factors showed a main effect. There were more correct answers when 
judging speakers with moderate aphasia (M = .87, SE = .01) compared to 
speakers with severe aphasia (M = .68, SE = .01), F(1, 42) = 240.63, p < .001, 
!2p = .85. There were also more correct answers when judging clips from the 
accident task (M = .81, SE = .01) than from the sweater task (M = .75 SE = 01), 
F(1, 42) = 8.83, p < .01, !2p = .17. There were fewer correct answers with the 
visual presentation (M = .64, SE = .02), compared to the audio (M = .83, SE = 
.02) and audio-visual (M = .86, SE = .02) presentation, F(2, 42) = 66.48, p < 
.001, !2p = .76. The difference between the latter two showed a trend toward 
significance, p = .07.  
Table 2: Means and standard deviations of the ratio of correct answers to all answers. 
  Mean ratio correct per modality 
Group Task Visual Audio Audiovisual 
Sweater .53 (.16) .68 (.12) .67 (.14) 
Severe aphasia 
Accident .68 (.13) .70 (.12) .84 (.10) 
Sweater .69 (.13) .94 (.04) .98 (.03) 
Moderate aphasia 
Accident .66 (.13) .98 (.03) .96 (.03) 
Sweater .78 (.14) 1.0 (.00) 1.0 (.00) 
Verbal control 
Accident .74 (.11) .99 (.03) 1.0 (.00) 
Sweater .95 (.06) - - 
Nonverbal control 
Accident .90 (.06) - - 
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There was a two-way interaction between Group and Modality, F(2, 42) = 25.62, 
p < .001, !2p = .55, and between Group and Task, F(1, 42) = 15.84, p < .001, !2p 
= .27. The three-way interaction between Group, Task and Modality was 
significant as well, F(2, 42) = 5.70, p < .01, !2p = .21. Posthoc analysis revealed 
that in the visual modality, speakers with moderate aphasia were judged 
correctly more often than speakers with severe aphasia on the sweater task, F(1, 
14) = 36.63, p < .001, !2p = .72, but not on the accident task, F < 1, n.s. In the 
audio modality, speakers with moderate aphasia were judged correctly more 
often than speakers with severe aphasia on both tasks. 
Our next analysis compares the judgment of clips from speakers with 
moderate aphasia to that of clips from the control participants when they were 
allowed to speak (verbal control group). We used an ANOVA with Task as a 
within factor and Group and Modality as between factors. For clips from aphasic 
speakers, there were 15 raters per cell, and for clips from non-aphasic speakers 
there were 16 raters per cell, summing up to 93 raters in total. 
There was a main effect of Group, F(1, 87) = 12.14 p < .001, !2p = .12. There 
were more correct answers when judging clips from the verbal control 
participants (M = .92, SE = .01) compared to those of speakers with moderate 
aphasia (M = .87, SE = .01). There also was a main effect of Modality, F(2, 87) = 
162.30, p < .001, !2p = .79. Fewer speakers were judged correctly in the visual 
modality (M = .72, SE = .01), compared to the audio (M = .98, SE = .01) and 
audiovisual modality (M = .99, SE = .01). The interaction between Group and 
Modality was not significant, F = 1.75, p = .18, !2p = .04. There was a two-way 
interaction between Modality and Task, F(2, 87) = 3.91, p < .05, !2p =.08. In the 
visual modality, speakers were judged correctly slightly more often on the 
sweater task, whereas in the audio modality they were judged correctly more 
often on the accident task. Posthoc analysis confirmed that in the visual 
modality, the difference between the two groups of speakers was significant on 
both tasks, with the verbal control participants being judged correctly more often 
than the speakers with moderate aphasia. 
Lastly, we present an analysis comparing the judgment of visually presented 
clips of the control participants when they could speak and when they could not 
speak (nonverbal control group). There were 16 raters in each cell, 32 in total. 
Task was again the only within factor.  
There was a main effect of Group, F(1, 30) = 24.84, p < .001, !2p = .45. 
There were more correct answers when judging clips of nonverbal control 
Chapter 5: Gesturing by aphasic speakers 
 
 143 
participants (M = .93, SE = .02) compared to clips of verbal control participants 
(M = .77, SE = .02). We did not find a main effect of Task, F < 1, n.s., but there 
was an interaction between Group and Task, F(1, 30) = 8.85, p < .01, !2p = .23. 
For verbal control participants, more speakers were judged correctly on the 
sweater task whereas for nonverbal control participants more speakers were 
judged correctly on the accident task. 
Discussion  
Overall, clips from speakers with severe aphasia were judged less accurately 
than those of speakers with moderate aphasia, which in turn were judged less 
accurately than clips from the verbal control participants. This is not surprising 
when it comes to the audio modality. Yet we see the same trend for the visual 
modality. The verbal control participants were judged more accurately than the 
aphasic speakers on both tasks. Especially on the sweater task, clips from 
speakers with moderate aphasia were judged more accurately than clips from 
speakers with severe aphasia. Therefore, it seems that the aphasic speakers were 
not able to compensate for their verbal impairment nonverbally. This indicates 
that nonverbal communication breaks down with verbal communication, rather 
than it taking on the role of verbal communication.  
The almost perfect scores on the clips of nonverbal control participants show 
that, in principle, nonverbal communication can largely compensate for speech 
on this simple judgment task. Seeing a speaker of course provides more 
information than just gestures. We think however that gesture was the most 
important nonverbal cue in our clips. It therefore seems that people with aphasia 
cannot use gesture as freely as people without aphasia to compensate for speech. 
Yet was their gesturing informative at all? On the sweater task, raters were 
performing at chance level when only seeing the severe aphasic speakers, 
indicating that their gesturing was not informative. Yet on the accident task, the 
gestures of speakers with severe aphasia did seem to provide some information, 
even when added to the audio modality, as can be seen from the higher score on 
the audiovisual than on the audio only modality. This shows that information in 
gesture and speech was not fully redundant. For some severe aphasic speakers, 
seeing them too was apparently more informative than just hearing them. This 
indicates that gesture did take on some of the communicative burden, especially 
for the severe aphasic speakers on the accident task. Like their speech, their 
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gestures still contained some information, even though their ability to gesture 
seems impaired. 
Our results show that the gestures produced by aphasic speakers were less 
informative than those produced by healthy control participants, both when the 
controls were speaking and when they were not. Next, we take a closer look at 
the form of the gestures produced by aphasic and non-aphasic speakers. Would 
impairment in gesture lead to the use of different gesture forms? 
Gesture analysis 
Method 
Gesture coding We coded all hand movements that seemed relevant to the 
communication task in each of the clips used in our perception studies. We 
currently focus on iconic and deictic gestures (McNeill, 2005). Deictic gestures 
included gestures locating objects in the gesture space and pointing gestures. 
Based on work by Müller (2008), we further coded all iconic gestures into three 
categories, based on the representation technique used to depict. Gestures that 
outlined something in the gestures space, either by showing its contour (2D) or 
molding its shape (3D) were labeled as outlining/molding, for example, drawing 
the outline of a sweater in the air. Gestures that depicted the handling of a virtual 
object, such as holding the hands up as if using a steering wheel to depict a car, 
were labeled as handling. Gestures in which the hands represented an object, or 
in which the entire body depicted the body of another person were labeled as 
object/enacting. Examples are moving an upright hand forward and then flipping 
it horizontally, to depict that a biker fell. Although theoretically possible, we 
found it too opaque to code deictic gestures into these categories. Therefore, 
such gestures were only labeled as deictic.  
To assess reliability, a second coder examined 58 randomly selected gestures 
(15%) and coded for which of the four representation techniques was used in 
each gesture. Agreement between the two coders was 93%, Cohen’s Kappa = 
.90, indicating almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). Given the 
relative distribution of the labels, the maximum value for Kappa that could have 
been obtained was .94. In case of disagreement, we used the coding of the first 
coder, to ensure consistent coding throughout the entire data set. 
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It is important to note that the applied coding scheme does not start from the 
interpretation of a gesture, but rather from its form. In most cases, it is possible 
to determine the technique used entirely from the form of a gesture, without 
knowing its meaning. For example, one can usually see whether a hand is 
drawing, grasping or representing, even if what it is drawing, grasping or 
representing remains subjective. If two speakers are both using outlining, and 
both these speakers intend to gesture about the shape of a sweater, this does not 
mean that they are equally successful in conveying this meaning, but rather that 
they choose the same technique to depict the sweater. Therefore, in the following 
section, when we speak of similarity we are talking about similarity in the 
techniques used to depict, not in the appearance or the effectiveness of the 
gestures. 
We also coded whether or not each gesture co-occurred with speech. 
Gestures that were accompanied by speech or speech-like sounds were labeled as 
co-speech gestures, whereas gestures that were performed during silence were 
labeled as co-silence gestures. For the aphasic speakers and verbal control 
participants, even though some gestures did not co-occur with speech, they are 
not necessarily pantomimes. Pantomimes are likely to originate from a different 
production system than co-speech gestures. In some cases of the aphasic 
speakers, it seemed that the gesture had been intended as a co-speech gesture, but 
then suddenly speech stopped due to a word finding problem while the gesture 
was still executed. Thus, we cannot be sure whether these co-silence gestures 
resulted from the co-speech gesture production process or from the pantomime 
production process. Therefore, we analyze them separately from the co-speech 
gestures.  
Statistical analysis We are interested in the extent to which the different 
representation techniques are used by each group. Since there may be differences 
in the number of gestures produced by each participant and each group, we look 
at the proportions of gestures of each type, rather than at the number of gestures 
of each type. Thus, we calculate the number of gestures a participant produced of 
a certain type, divided by the total number of representational gestures produced 
by that participant. To put these proportions into perspective, we first report the 
mean number of gestures that each group produced with and without speech. 
Next, we report the mean proportions of each gesture type for co-speech 
gestures. The nonverbal control participants only produced co-silence gestures. 
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Still, it is interesting to compare aphasic speakers’ co-speech gestures to gestures 
of healthy speakers who compensate for speech with gesture, to see to what 
extent aphasic speakers are using the representation techniques that healthy 
control participants would choose if they had to express themselves through 
gesture instead of speech. The pantomimes of the nonverbal controls are 
therefore included in our analyses of co-speech gestures. Since the number of co-
silence gestures produced by the other groups was very small, we only report 
descriptive statistics for the types of co-silence gestures they produced. 
To assess whether there were differences between the groups in the 
representation techniques used in their co-speech gesturing, we conducted 4x2 
ANOVAs with Group (levels: Severe aphasia, Moderate aphasia, Verbal control, 
Nonverbal control) and Task (levels: Sweater, Accident) as fixed factors. 
However, the two different tasks, with different information to be expressed, 
may inherently call for different representation techniques. Therefore, we also 
performed separate analyses for each task, independent of whether the 
interaction between Group and Task was significant. Pairwise comparisons were 
done using the LSD method, with a significance threshold of .05.  
Results 
Before looking at the different gesture types produced, we first present data on 
the total number of gestures produced. Table 3 shows the mean number of co-
speech gestures and co-silence gestures/ pantomimes produced by each group on 
either task, using any of the four representation techniques. Since the nonverbal 
control participants produced far more gestures than any other group, we report a 
comparison of the other three groups (Severe Aphasia, Moderate Aphasia, 
Verbal Control) for the number of co-speech and co-silence gestures produced. 
In total, these three groups produced 217 co-speech and 27 co-silence gestures. 
The nonverbal controls produced 133 gestures. 
There was a main effect of Group on the total number of co-speech gestures 
produced, F(2, 61) = 3.48, p < .05, !2p = .10. Pairwise comparisons showed that 
verbal control participants produced fewer gestures than speakers with severe or 
moderate aphasia. There also was a main effect of Task on the total number of 
representational co-speech gestures, F(1, 61) = 7.02, p < .01, !2p = .10. More 
gestures were produced on the accident task. There was no significant interaction 
between Group and Task, F < 1, n.s. When normalizing the total number of 
representational co-speech gestures with the duration of the clip in seconds, there 
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was no significant difference in the gesture rate of severe aphasic speakers (M = 
.19, SD = .17), moderate aphasic speakers (M = .15, SD = .13) and verbal control 
participants (M = .17, SD = .15), F < 1, n.s. Neither did we find a significant 
difference in the gesture rate between the sweater task (M = .15, SD = .16) and 
the accident task (M = .19, SD = .13), F(1, 60) = 1.90, p = .17. 
For the number of co-silence gestures, there was a main effect of Group, F(2, 
61) = 3.96, p < .05, !2p = .12. There was no effect of Task, F < 1, n.s., and no 
significant interaction between the two factors, F < 1, n.s. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that severe aphasic speakers produced more gestures without speech 
than moderate aphasic speakers and verbal control participants. The latter two 
groups did not differ significantly in the total number of co-silence gestures 
produced. The observed pattern was similar for the rate of co-silence gestures per 
second, except that the differences showed a trend toward significance, rather 
than reaching significance (p-values < .10). 
Next we look at the relative number of gestures produced of each type. We 
will first present data on co-speech gestures by aphasic speakers and verbal 
control participants and pantomimes by nonverbal control participants. Table 4 
provides an overview of the proportion of gestures produced by these groups 
with each technique, on either task.  
Outlining/molding gestures tended to be produced more on the sweater task (M = 
.26, SD = .32) than on the accident task (M = .15, SD = .29), F(1, 62) = 3.39, p = 
.07, !2p = .05. There was a main effect of Group for the proportion of  
Table 3: Means and standard deviations of the number of gestures produced with and 
without speech, by each group on either task (Sw. = sweater, Acc. = accident). 
  Mean number of gestures per Group and Task 
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outlining/molding gestures, F(3, 62) = 2.87, p < .05, !2p = .12 (see Table 4). We 
did not find a significant interaction between Group and Task, F(3, 62) = 1.60, p 
= .20. Post hoc analyses showed that there were no significant differences 
between the groups on the sweater task in the proportion of outlining/molding 
gestures used, F < 1, n.s. On the accident task, there was a main effect of Group, 
F(3, 36) = 4.64, p < .01, !2p = .28. Pairwise comparisons showed that on the 
accident task speakers with severe aphasia produced a larger proportion of 
outlining/molding gestures than any other group. 
Handling gestures were produced more on the sweater task (M = .18, SD = .30) 
than on the accident task (M = .03, SD = .08), F(1, 62) = 9.69, p < .01, !2p = .14. 
The main effect of Group was not significant, F(3, 62) = 1.34, p = .27 (see Table 
4), and we did not find a significant interaction between Group and Task, F < 1, 
n.s. Post hoc analysis showed that on the accident task, there was a main effect 
of Group, F(3, 36) = 5.09, p < .01, !2p = .30. The nonverbal control participants 
were the only participants who made considerable use of these gestures on the 
accident task, significantly more so than any other group, as revealed by pairwise  
Table 4: Means and standard deviations of the proportion of co-speech gestures (aphasic 
speakers and verbal control participants) and pantomimes (nonverbal control participants) 
with each representation technique, by each group on either task  
(Sw. = Sweater, Acc. = Accident). 
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comparisons. For the sweater task, there were no significant differences in the 
proportion of handling gestures between the groups, F < 1, n.s.  
Object/enacting gestures were produced more on the accident task (M = .13, SD 
= .22) than on the sweater task (M = .02, SD = .06), F(1, 62) = 26.42, p < .001, 
!2p = .30. There also was a main effect of Group, F(3, 62) = 21.34, p < .001, !2p 
= .51 (see Table 4), and a significant interaction between Group and Task, F(3, 
62) = 13.44, p < .001, !2p = .39. On the accident task, there was a main effect of 
Group, F(3, 36) = 23.11, p < .001, !2p = .66. Pairwise comparisons showed that 
on this task, nonverbal control participants produced a larger proportion of 
object/enacting gestures than any other group. Post hoc analyses showed that on 
the sweater task, the main effect of group was not significant. In the pairwise 
comparisons, the differences between nonverbal control participants and either 
group of aphasic speakers showed a trend toward significance. 
Deictic gestures were produced more on the accident task (M = .68, SD = .36) 
than on the sweater task (M = .55, SD = .37), F(1, 62) = 4.02, p < .05, !2p = .06. 
There also was a main effect of Group, F(3, 62) = 6.45, p < .001, !2p = .24 (see 
Table 4), and the interaction between Group and Task was significant, F(3, 62) = 
4.07, p < .01, !2p = .17. Post hoc analyses showed that on the accident task, there 
was a main effect of Group, F(3, 36) = 11.65, p < .001, !2p = .49. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that moderate aphasic speakers and verbal control 
participants produced a larger proportion of deictic gestures than severe aphasic 
speakers and nonverbal control participants. On the sweater task, the main effect 
of Group was not significant, F(3, 26) = 1.90, p = .16. However, pairwise 
comparisons showed that moderate aphasic speakers tended to produce more 
deictics than verbal control participants (p = .05) and nonverbal control 
participants (p = .06). 
Since the number of co-silence gestures produced was very small for the aphasic 
speakers and the verbal control participants, it would not be sensible to carry out 
a similar analysis on these gestures. Instead, Table 5 shows the total number of 
co-silence gestures produced with each representation technique, by each group 
on either task. Some of these numbers are based on only very few speakers. We 
describe some special cases in the following section. 
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Table 5: Total number of co-silence gestures produced with each representation 
technique, by each group on either task (Sw. = Sweater, Acc. = Accident). 


























Outlining/Molding 6 5 2 0 0 0 13 6 
Handling 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 17 
Object/Enacting 0 1 0 5 0 0 2 41 
Deictic 4 2 0 0 0 1 19 25 
Total 11 8 2 5 0 1 44 89 
Discussion 
Although the patterns of what representation techniques were used in gesture 
look somewhat similar across the four groups on the verbally easier sweater task, 
this was clearly not the case on the more difficult accident task. Apart from the 
verbal difficulty level of the tasks, there are other differences between the tasks 
that may account for this difference. On the sweater task, nonverbal control 
participants made frequent use of outlining/molding and handling to replace 
speech, whereas on the accident task, they relied far more on object/enacting. 
Also, on the sweater task, there was not much difference in the techniques used 
by verbal and nonverbal control participants, whereas on the accident task there 
was. The verbal control participants only produced deictic gestures on the 
accident task. While the moderate aphasic speakers mostly used deictic gestures 
on this task as well, the severe aphasic speakers produced relatively many 
outlining/molding gestures. This may indicate that the severe aphasic speakers 
were trying to express information in gesture in ways different from the verbal 
control participants, possibly because they needed to rely more on gesture 
(Tradeoff Hypothesis). Yet it seems that most severe aphasic speakers could not 
use the technique of object/enacting to do so, which nonverbal control 
participants preferred for replacing speech on the accident task. Thus, it may be 
Chapter 5: Gesturing by aphasic speakers 
 
 151 
the case that the severe aphasic speakers could use outlining/molding gestures 
still, but had difficulty in producing object/enacting gestures. This may also hold 
for handling gestures. Although the severe aphasic speakers used some handling 
gestures on the sweater task, they made relatively little use of this technique on 
the accident task. In the absence of speech, severe aphasic speakers also 
produced many more outlining/molding gestures than object/enacting and 
handling gestures. 
The nonverbal control participants made frequent use of object/enacting and 
handling gestures to describe the car accident. For example, they used their hand 
to represent a biker that first drove and then fell (the hand changing orientation), 
or they illustrated the collision between the car and the biker by letting their 
hands collide. Aphasic speakers did not tend to use these object/enacting 
techniques, with one notable exception, which we describe below. The nonverbal 
control participants also held their hands as though steering a car or a bike 
(handling). In our data sample, aphasic speakers never did this. So the aphasic 
speakers did not make much use of the techniques of object/enacting and 
handling to depict vehicles and relevant actions, despite these techniques being 
very suitable to do so, and despite their difficulty/ inability to convey this 
information verbally. Interestingly, the aphasic speakers did make some use of 
handling on the sweater task. Possibly, the physical presence of the referent, the 
sweater, sometimes helped in producing a handling gesture. Yet not all handling 
gestures could easily be interpreted. Some were no more than a quick grabbing 
motion in the air. 
Both the verbal and nonverbal control participants produced a considerable 
proportion of outlining/molding gestures on the sweater task, indicating that on 
this task, this technique is suitable for producing co-speech gestures as well as to 
replace speech. Many people were outlining features of a sweater, such as a V-
neck or sleeve length, with respect to their own body. Both groups of aphasic 
speakers also used this technique on the sweater task, showing similarity with 
the control participants in the representation techniques used. Speakers with 
severe aphasia also used this technique in gestures that were not accompanied by 
speech, which they expectedly produced more than the other speaking groups. 
However, neither control group used outlining/molding much on the accident 
task. Nonverbal control participants hardly used molding gestures to depict 
vehicles like cars, or bikes. Yet aphasic speakers did sometimes do this, instead 
of using techniques like object/enacting or handling, like the nonverbal control 
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participants did. Especially the severe aphasic speakers used outlining/molding 
relatively frequently on the accident task, whereas moderate aphasic speakers 
seemed to rely more on deictic gestures. This may indicate that these techniques 
were the only way of gestural depiction that were readily available to most 
aphasic speakers for depicting the information needed in the accident task.  
It thus may be the case that most aphasic speakers were unable to use the 
techniques of handling and object/enacting to depict on the accident task. 
However, the verbal control participants did not use these techniques on the 
accident task either. Therefore, given the task, these techniques may be more 
common for gestures replacing speech (pantomimes) than for co-speech 
gestures. It would be interesting to test whether these techniques are more 
readily available to aphasic speakers if they are asked to fully rely on pantomime 
in conveying the information. Although many aphasic speakers were 
unsuccessful in explaining the accident scenario verbally, their attempts at 
speaking may have caused them to produce co-speech gestures rather than 
pantomimes.  
There were a few cases in our data where aphasic speakers produced readily 
interpretable gestures using object/enacting or handling, which they first 
performed without speech (possibly as a pantomime) and then repeated with 
some speech accompanying the gesture. For example, one person with Global 
aphasia first made movements as though putting on a sweater without speech, 
and then repeated them saying ‘ja, zo’ (‘yes, like this’). Another person with 
Broca’s aphasia who clearly had a problem saying a word, as she later tried to 
use a speech computer to convey it, used the gesture where the hand represents a 
biker that falls, as indicated by the hand palm changing from a vertical to a 
horizontal orientation. This gesture too was performed without speech (initial 
five times), before it was performed with speech (final time). Her eye-gazing 
behavior added to the impression that this gesture was intended as a pantomime, 
as she repeatedly looked at the gesture, then to the addressee, and then back at 
her gesture. This may have been in order to guide the addressee’s attention to her 
gesture (Gullberg & Kita, 2009). After using her speech computer, this speaker 
said ‘dood’ (‘dead’) with the gesture, but then immediately corrected herself 
verbally, saying ‘nee’ (‘no’). These two cases suggest that indeed the techniques 
that most aphasic speakers did not use in co-speech gesturing, may be available 
to some still, especially when they are giving up on conveying the message 
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verbally, thereby using their ability to produce pantomimes, rather than co-
speech gestures. 
General discussion  
Our perception studies showed that gestures produced by speakers with aphasia 
were less informative than gestures by non-aphasic speakers and by non-aphasics 
who used gesture instead of speech. Moreover, gestures by people with more 
severely impaired speech were less informative than those by people with a more 
moderate speech impairment. It therefore seems that aphasic speakers could not 
fully compensate for their impaired expressivity in speech by gesturing. This 
supports the theory that gesture and speech are two sides of a coin (McNeill, 
2005). That being said, being able to see the speakers too, rather than just 
hearing them, was sometimes helpful for judging the topic of the speakers’ 
communication. This shows that gesture contained some information that was 
not contained in speech, which suggests that some speakers could compensate 
for their speech impairment somewhat by using gesture.  
We found few significant differences in the representation techniques used 
by aphasic and non-aphasic speakers on the sweater task, consistent with the 
study by Carlomagno and Cristilli (2006). However, our analysis of gesture form 
did show that on the accident task, speakers with severe aphasia made relatively 
more use of outlining/molding than speakers with moderate aphasia and also 
more than non-aphasic control participants who either were or were not allowed 
to speak. We also found that aphasic speakers used outlining/molding gestures 
for referents for which control participants preferred other techniques, such as 
for vehicles. The control participants depicted vehicles by pretending to handle 
them or by having their hand represent the vehicle and depicting its movement 
with their hand movement, whereas the aphasic speakers tended to use 
outlining/molding instead. Therefore, people with aphasia may not be able to use 
all possible techniques for depicting in gesture freely. 
 It seems that especially techniques which require access to conceptual 
knowledge of the thing depicted (handling and object/enacting), were used 
relatively little by people with aphasia, while techniques using perceptual 
features (outlining/molding) were still available. This could be explained as a 
problem in translating conceptual knowledge into uttered speech and gesture (see 
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McNeill & Duncan, 2010). However, we need to be cautious with this 
interpretation, since the fact that most aphasic speakers did not use these 
techniques in their co-speech gesturing in our data sample does not necessarily 
mean they are unable to use these techniques at all. 
It may be the case that depicting techniques requiring the use of conceptual 
knowledge are still available to some aphasic speakers when using pantomime 
rather than co-speech gesturing. Some special cases in our data, which we 
described in the previous section, support this hypothesis. Previous research 
already found evidence that co-speech gesturing and pantomime production 
result from different processes (Bartolo, et al., 2003; Rose & Douglas, 2003). 
Our findings confirm this in a way, because none of the people in the nonverbal 
control condition had difficulty gesturing without speaking, whereas speaking 
without gesturing tends to be much harder (e.g. Hoetjes, Krahmer, & Swerts, 
2009). This may be because pantomime production is not linked to speech as 
tightly as co-speech gesturing, which may also be why some aphasic speakers 
tended to use more (conceptual) techniques when producing co-silence gestures 
compared to co-speech gestures. We intend to test this hypothesis in a follow-up 
study. 
The finding that people with severe aphasia use gestures that outline shapes 
frequently is consistent with the case study by Cocks et al. (2011), who found 
that LT produced this type of gesturing frequently with difficulties in speech. 
This finding could be of use in clinical settings. For example, such gestures may 
be particularly suitable for training purposes since most aphasic speakers can 
still produce them. Also, it may facilitate understanding when others are aware 
that aphasic speakers use these gestures more widely than non-aphasic speakers. 
A question raised by our study is whether it would improve some aphasic 
speakers’ ability to communicate if they are taught to replace speech with 
gestures using techniques that are commonly used in pantomimes, such as 
handling an object, or representing the object with the hand. These techniques 
might be more readily available to some people with aphasia if they stop their 
attempts at verbal communication and try to use pantomime instead. 
Our studies into the informativeness of gesture, and our analysis of gestural 
representation techniques both suggest that like speech, co-speech gesture is 
impaired in most people with aphasia. It therefore seems that gesture and speech 
production are likely to break down together. This makes it likely, though not 
necessary, that the processes of speech and gesture production draw on many of 
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the same resources, and share an underlying process (McNeill, 2005). Although 
further research is needed to study the links between gesture and speech 
production, our study contributes to the accumulating evidence that these links 
are tight, rather than gesture and speech production largely being separate 
processes. This unfortunately limits aphasic speakers’ ability to communicate by 
means of co-speech gestures. It seems that aphasic speakers were trying to use 
gesture communicatively, and did so with some success on the accident task. 
However, their gestures were not as informative as those of non-aphasic speakers 
and those of non-aphasic people who were replacing speech with gesture. This 
may be because the aphasic speakers could not make use of all gestural 
representation techniques that people without aphasia employed. Yet despite 
these limitations, some of the gestures they produced were informative, and 
added information on top of speech.  
Acknowledgements 
We gratefully acknowledge all speakers for allowing us to analyze their data, 
Renske Hoedemaker for collecting the data of our control group, and Hans 
Westerbeek, Hanneke Schoormans, and Manon Yassa for their help in the 
perception studies. We thank Vera Nijveld for doing the reliability coding. 




Alibali, M. W., Heath, D. C., & Myers, H. J. (2001). Effects of visibility between 
speaker and listener on gesture production: Some gestures are meant to 
be seen. Journal of Memory and Language, 44, 169-188. 
Bartolo, A., Cubelli, R., Della Sala, S., & Drie, S. (2003). Pantomimes are 
special gestures which rely on working memory. Brain and Cognition, 
53, 483-494. 
Beattie, G., & Shovelton, H. (1999). Mapping the range of information contained 
in the iconic hand gestures that accompany spontaneous speech. 
Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 18, 438-462. 
Blomert, L., Kean, M. L., Koster, C., & Schokker, J. (1994). Amsterdam-
Nijmegen Everyday Language Test: construction, reliability and 
validity. Aphasiology, 8, 381-407. 
Butterworth, B., & Hadar, U. (1989). Gesture, speech and computational stages. 
Psychological Review, 96, 168-174. 
Carlomagno, S., & Cristilli, C. (2006). Semantic attributes of iconic gestures in 
fluent and non-fluent aphasic adults. Brain and Language, 99, 104-105. 
Carlomagno, S., Pandolfi, M., Marini, A., Di Iasi, G., & Cristilli, C. (2005). 
Coverbal gestures in Alzheimer's type dementia. Cortex, 41(4), 535-
546. 
Chui, K. (2005). Temporal patterning of speech and iconic gestures in 
conversational discourse. Journal of Pragmatics, 37(6), 871-887. 
Cienki, A., & Müller, C. (2008). Metaphor, gesture, and thought. In R. W. Gibbs 
(Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought (pp. 483-
501). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cocks, N., Dipper, L., Middleton, R., & Morgan, G. (2011). What can iconic 
gestures tell us about the language system? A case of conduction 
aphasia. International Journal of Language & Communication 
Disorders, 46(4), 423-436. 
De Ruiter, J. P., Bangerter, A., & Dings, P. (In Press). The interplay between 
gesture and speech in the production of referring expressions: 
Investigating the tradeoff hypothesis. Topics in Cognitive Science  
Goldin-Meadow, S., So, W. C., Özyürek, A., & Mylander, C. (2008). The 
natural order of events: How speakers of different languages represent 
Chapter 5: Gesturing by aphasic speakers 
 
 157 
events nonverbally. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
of the USA, 105(27), 9163-9168. 
Goodwin, C. (Ed.). (2002). Conversation and Brain Damage. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gullberg, M., & Kita, S. (2009). Attention to speech-accompanying gestures: eye 
movements and information uptake. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 
33(4), 251-277. 
Hoetjes, M., Krahmer, E., & Swerts, M. (2009). Untying the knot between 
gestures and speech. In B.-J. Theobald & R. Harvey (Eds.),  
Proceedings of the 8th international conference on auditory-visual 
speech processing  (pp. 96-101). Norwich, UK:   School of Computing 
Sciences, University of East Anglia. 
Kendon, A. (1988). How gestures can become like words. In F. Potyatos (Ed.), 
Crosscultural perspectives in nonverbal communication (pp. 131-141). 
Toronto, Canada: Hogrefe. 
Kendon, A. (2004). Gesture: Visible action as utterance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kita, S., & Özyürek, A. (2003). What does cross-linguistic variation in semantic 
coordination of speech and gesture reveal?: Evidence for an interface 
representation of spatial thinking and speaking. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 47, 16-32. 
Krauss, R. M. (1998). Why do we gesture when we speak? Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 7, 54-60. 
Krauss, R. M., Chen, Y., & Gottesman, R. F. (2000). Lexical gestures and lexical 
acces: A process model. In D. McNeill (Ed.), Language and gesture 
(pp. 261-283). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement 
for categorical data. Biometrics, 33, 159-174. 
McNeill, D. (2005). Gesture and Thought. Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press. 
McNeill, D., & Duncan, S. (2010). Gesture and growth points in language 
disorders. In J. Guendouzi, F. Loncke & M. J. Williams (Eds.), The 
handbook of psycholinguistic and cognitive processes (pp. 663-685). 
New York, London: Psychology Press. 
Melinger, A., & Kita, S. (2007). Conceptualisation load triggers gesture 
production. Language and Cognitive Processes, 22(4), 473-500. 
Language in the hands 
 
 158 
Melinger, A., & Levelt, W. J. M. (2004). Gesture and the communicative 
intention of the speaker. Gesture, 4(2), 119-141. 
Rose, M. L. (2006). The utility of arm and hand gestures in the treatment of 
aphasia. Advances in Speech-Language Pathology, 8(2), 92-109. 
Rose, M. L., & Douglas, J. (2003). Limb apraxia, pantomime, and lexical gesture 
in aphasic speakers: Preliminary findings. Aphasiology, 17(5), 453-464. 
So, W. C., Kita, S., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (2009). Using the hands to indentify 
who does what to whom: Gesture and speech go hand-in-hand. 
Cognitive Science, 33, 115-125. 
Van der Meulen, I., Van de Sandt-Koenderman, W. M. E., Duivenvoorden, H. J., 
& Ribbers, G. M. (2009). Measuring verbal and non-verbal 
communication in aphasia: reliability, validity, and sensitivity to change 
of the Scenario Test. International Journal of Language & 











Language in the hands 
 
 162 
Chapter 6: General discussion and conclusion 
 
 163 
General discussion  
We set out to address the question of whether gesture is part of a speaker’s 
attempt at communication, like speech is, or whether its role is limited to 
supporting a speaker’s cognitive processes underlying speech production. We 
aimed to test proposed theories empirically, thereby contributing to their 
grounding in empirical data and ultimately their further development. Each of 
our studies shows one way in which gesture production resembles speech 
production. 
Study 1 and 2 
Our first two studies show that gesture is influenced by the knowledge a speaker 
has about the addressee. Even when the identity of the addressee was provided 
only in the instruction prior to a communication task, while during the task the 
conditions were exactly the same across conditions, speakers gestured less 
frequently toward a presumed artificial audiovisual summarizer than toward a 
presumed human addressee, who would summarize their narration. Similarly, 
independent of whether speakers could see their addressee, they gestured more 
when they were told that their addressee could see them. Both these results show 
that speakers adapt their gesturing to their beliefs about their addressee, which 
supports the theory that gestures are part of a speaker’s communicative effort 
(Kendon, 2004). 
Importantly, we also assessed various variables partaking to speech in these 
studies. After all, if speakers speak differently toward different addressees, then 
the speech production process may place different demands on gesturing and 
gesture may change as a result. In our first study, participants spoke somewhat 
slower to the artificial than to the human addressee. It could be that speakers 
experienced less time pressure when addressing an artificial addressee, resulting 
in them needing to produce fewer gestures for speech facilitation. In this case 
still, there would be an effect of the speaker’s belief about the addressee on 
gesture production, but it may be mediated by speech production. Although we 
did not find any evidence for such mediation, it would be interesting to 
investigate the relation between time pressure and gesture rate in future work, 
and examine whether such mediation takes place. The mediation may also 
happen the other way around. That is, the beliefs a speaker holds may influence 
gesture production, which in turn could affect speech production. Alternatively, 
Language in the hands 
 
 164 
the effects found in gesture and speech may both result from the speaker’s 
beliefs about the addressee more directly, for example, because both are 
informed by the speaker’s communicative intention, which is influenced by the 
speaker’s beliefs. Based on our data, we think the latter explanation most likely, 
as explained in Chapter 2.  
In the study in which we manipulated visibility by using computer mediated 
communication, we did not find any differences in the number of words used, 
the diversity of words used, or the number of filled pauses between a mediated 
condition in which speakers could be seen by the addressee and a mediated 
condition in which they could not. Yet the difference in the number of gestures 
produced was striking. In the analyses of this study, we used speech rate as a 
covariate, correcting for any effects of the speech rate on speakers’ gesture rate. 
Still, significantly more gestures were produced when speakers knew they could 
be seen. This confirms that the beliefs the speaker held about the communicative 
setting also influenced gesture directly, rather than this effect being fully 
mediated by speech. Therefore, our first two studies provide evidence that 
gesture is also adapted to the addressee, rather than just to speech production. 
This suggests that gesture is part of a speaker’s attempt at communication itself, 
instead of just being facilitative to speech. Additionally, in our perception studies 
related to these first two production studies, raters showed great sensitivity to the 
differences in gesturing of speakers in different communicative settings, as one 
would expect if gesture serves a communicative purpose. 
Study 3 
In our third study, we compared the repetition of meaningful gestures across 
interlocutors to the repetition of meaningful units in speech, such as words or 
referring expressions. First, we found that speakers only repeated meaningful 
gestures that they had observed. That is, gestures that matched the meaning of 
the concurrent speech during perception and production. This shows that the 
property of carrying propositional meaning was important for gestures being 
copied. If speakers would copy each other’s gestures solely to express liking or 
to express that they belonged to the same group as another speaker, there is no 
reason why only meaningful gestures would be repeated. In this sense, gestures 
are like words or referring expressions, which are also repeated across 
interlocutors only if their meaning fits the current context closely enough (see for 
example, Brennan & Clark, 1996; Van Der Wege, 2009).  
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We found another similarity between speech and gesture when it comes to 
adaptation. Similar to a theory proposed for the repetition of referring 
expressions across interlocutors (Brennan & Clark, 1996), the repetition of 
gestures across interlocutors seems to be mediated by concepts.  Speakers did 
not copy just any feature of a gesture they had observed. Rather, perceiving 
gestures influenced the way speakers conceptualized their task. Only those 
features of a gesture that matched a certain concept were repeated when the 
speaker subsequently expressed this concept. Features that did not match the 
concept were not repeated, but rather changed to match it. This shows that the 
convergence of concepts across interlocutors may underlie the convergence of 
gesture forms, as Brennan and Clark, among others, proposed for lexical forms.  
In this third study, speech cannot have been the discriminating factor when it 
came to concept formation, since participants heard the same speech in each 
condition. Only the gestures they perceived differed. Therefore, gesture is the 
most probable cause for participants forming different conceptualizations of the 
task at hand. Thus, this study also shows that concepts can be communicated 
through gesture.  
It is important to replicate our findings on the repetition of gesture forms 
across interlocutors with different paradigms in future work, to test if our results 
generalize to different contexts. Importantly, we do not mean to imply that no 
aspect of gesture is ever copied across interlocutors without a representation of 
meaning driving this process. We only looked at gestures that were meaningful 
in an iconic way. Different processes may underlie the copying of other types of 
gestures and of other aspects of gesture, such as gesture rate, and how 
information is structured in gesture. Our study is one of the first studies to 
systematically look at adaptation in gesture. Much more work is needed in this 
area. Yet the gestures we examined seemed to behave just like words when it 
came to the adaptation of one interlocutor to another.  
Study 4  
Our final study assessed the similarity between gesture and speech when it 
comes to the processes underlying their production. We studied gestures 
produced by aphasic speakers, who had severe or moderate difficulty expressing 
themselves verbally, as a result of brain damage.  
In a perception study, we found that gestures of speakers with severe aphasia 
were less informative than those of speakers with moderate aphasia, which in 
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turn were less informative than those of healthy controls. This shows that rather 
than gesture taking on more of the communicative burden when speech is 
impaired, it tended to degrade with speech.  
Next, we looked at gesture form more closely. We compared gestures 
produced by aphasic speakers to those of healthy controls, who either were or 
were not allowed to speak. The aphasics were using more ways of representing 
in gesture than the controls who could speak, indicating that they may have tried 
to communicate more information through gesture. Yet we found that aphasic 
speakers did not use the same ways of representing in gesture as the controls 
who were asked to communicate through gesture instead of speech. The aphasics 
hardly depicted referents by pretending to handle them, or by having their hands 
represent the referent. Instead, they produced relatively many gestures that 
outlined shapes. This may indicate that they had difficulty with gestures that 
express conceptual rather than perceptual information.  
This may be because especially gestures expressing conceptual information 
co-develop with speech from an idea unit into a bimodal utterance, the way 
McNeill describes the co-production of gesture and speech in his growth-point 
theory (McNeill, 2005). In the model by Kita and Özyürek (2003), gesture is not 
only informed by the conceptualization stage of language production, but also 
more directly by the spatio-motor store in working memory. Gestures expressing 
perceptual features may rely on the content of working memory more heavily 
than gestures expressing conceptual information. In future work, we intend to 
test this hypothesis and to examine whether the gestures that healthy speakers 
produce during word finding problems resemble the gestures produced by 
aphasic speakers in that they depict perceptual rather than conceptual 
information.  
Both our perception study and our analyses of gesture forms provide 
evidence that gesture degrades with speech in aphasia. That is, gesture 
production tended to be impaired when speech production was. This does not 
show conclusively that gesture and speech production partly rely on the same 
resources, or that gesture and speech are two outcomes of a single process. They 
could still be separate processes that rely on different parts of the brain, which 
happened to be damaged at the same time in most of the patients whose gestures 
we examined. It does seem though that gesture and speech production are likely 
to break down together, which makes it more likely that the underlying 
production processes are closely linked. 
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In future work, it would be interesting to test whether aphasic speakers can 
use more representation techniques still and perhaps gesture more informatively 
when they rely on their ability to produce pantomimes rather than co-speech 
gestures. Pantomimes are gestures that are produced without speech and that are 
intended to be intelligible without speech. Since pantomime production is likely 
to be linked to speech less tightly than co-speech gesturing, some aphasic 
speakers may be more successful when expressing themselves through 
pantomime than through co-speech gesturing. It would also be interesting to see 
if there are differences in the extent to which gesture is impaired between 
speakers with verbal problems on different linguistic levels, such as the 
phonological and the semantic level. This may give insight into the question at 
what levels gesture and speech production are linked. 
Conclusion 
In sum, the four studies in this dissertation show various ways in which speech 
and co-speech gesture production are alike. Both speech and gesture can be 
produced with a communicative intent, both bear a close link to meanings and 
concepts, and both may break down together in aphasia. The fact that gestures 
can be part of speakers’ communicative effort does not limit the functional roles 
of gesture to communication. Yet based on our findings, we argue that it is not 
limited to serving speech or serving a speaker’s cognition either. Rather, we 
consider gesture to be part of language itself. Gesture is language in the hands. 
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This dissertation addresses the question of whether gesture is part of a speaker’s 
attempt at communication, like speech is, or whether it rather serves speaker-
internal purposes, like facilitating speech production and other cognitive 
processes. Each of our four empirical studies shows one way in which gesture 
production resembles speech production. 
Study 1 
In our first study, we tested whether speakers produce equally many and similar 
gestures when addressing an artificial addressee, as when addressing a human 
addressee. The novelty of this approach is that we only varied the beliefs a speaker 
had about the addressee, while the speaker’s environment and other characteristics 
of the communicative setting were exactly the same across conditions. Speakers 
were asked to retell the story of an animated cartoon they had watched, while 
being seated in front of a camera. Beforehand, they were either told that the 
camera recording was shown to a person in another room, or that it was used as 
input to an audiovisual speech recognizer that was located in another room.  
Our reasoning was that if speakers produce some gestures for their addressee, 
then their beliefs about the addressee are likely to influence their gesture 
production, whereas if gesturing solely serves speech production, such a 
difference would not be expected. We found that whether speakers thought to be 
addressing another person or an audiovisual speech recognition system influenced 
their gesture production. Speakers produced fewer gestures per word and fewer 
large gestures toward the presumed artificial system. In a subsequent perception 
study, we found that this difference in gesture production could be interpreted 
meaningfully by other participants, who reliably judged whether a speaker had 
been addressing a human or an artificial addressee, from seeing the speaker’s 
gesturing alone. These results support the hypothesis that speakers gesture partly 
for their addressee, that is, with a communicative intent. 
Study 2 
In our second study, we further explored what knowledge about their addressee 
speakers apply to their gesturing. Previously, it had been found that speakers 
gesture less frequently when interlocutors cannot see each other. However, it was 
unknown whether this resulted from speakers using their knowledge that the 
addressee could not see them, or from speakers not seeing their addressee.  
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By means of computer-mediated communication, we created four settings in 
which each interlocutor either could or could not see the other interlocutor. This 
way, we independently assessed the effects of seeing the addressee and being seen 
by the addressee on gesture production. We used the same cartoon narration task 
as in our first study.  
We found that speakers gestured more when they knew their addressee could 
see them, independent of whether they could see their addressee. This shows that 
speakers applied their knowledge of their addressee’s visual perspective to their 
gesturing. While being seen always increased speakers’ gesture rate, seeing the 
addressee only increased gesture production if the mediated setting allowed for 
natural gazing behavior. An additional perception study showed that an increased 
gesture rate was associated with higher expressivity. In sum, knowing that their 
addressee can see them causes speakers to produce more gestures and thereby to 
be more expressive than when they know they cannot be seen. This is additional 
support for the hypothesis that some gestures are intended communicatively. 
Study 3  
In our first two studies we found that gesture resembles speech in that gesture can 
be intended communicatively. In our third study, we examined how a 
phenomenon that is well known in speech, the adaptation of one interlocutor’s 
communicative behavior to another’s, occurs in gesture. Studying adaptation in 
gesture not only tells us something about the extent to which gesture and speech 
are similar, but it can also inform us on what mechanisms underlie adaptation.  
First, we tested whether the repetition of representational gestures across 
interlocutors is related to these gestures carrying propositional meaning. 
Participants saw video clips in which a speaker performed a gesture during a 
narration. Half the participants saw the speaker perform gestures that matched the 
content of his concurrent speech. For example, he moved his hands as though 
running while talking about someone running away. The other half of the 
participants saw the speaker perform gestures that did not match the content of his 
speech. For example, he performed the running gesture while he was talking about 
someone looking through binoculars. We found that only those gestures that 
matched the content of concurrent speech were likely to be repeated by 
participants in their subsequent retellings of the narrations. This shows that a 




We subsequently manipulated the correspondence between a gesture’s form 
and meaning more subtly. A confederate and a participant took turns describing 
routes that were presented to them on little maps. The confederate either gestured 
as though pointing out the route on a vertically oriented map, or as though 
following the route through a (horizontal) city. In a pre-study, we found that when 
pointing on a map, people tend to point with one finger extended, while when 
pointing out a route in the streets both this hand shape and a hand shape with all 
fingers extended are used. Therefore, the confederate independently varied 
whether she gestured with all or just one finger extended as an index. We 
measured whether participants copied the confederate’s hand shape and 
perspective (vertical map or horizontal route) in their own gesturing. 
We found that participants adapted to the confederate’s perspective. When the 
confederate gestured in the vertical map perspective, participants were more likely 
to do so as well. However, participants adapted to the confederate’s hand shape 
only if she gestured in the horizontal route perspective. This can be explained in 
terms of meaning. In the horizontal route perspective, both hand shapes are 
commonly used in the Netherlands for giving directions. Therefore, participants 
could and did adapt to meaningful gestures. However, when pointing on a map, it 
is far more common to point with one finger extended as opposed to four. 
Therefore, if the confederate’s vertical gestures led participants to think of the task 
as describing the route on a map, we would expect them to gesture with one 
finger, independent of the confederate’s hand shape. This is indeed what we 
found. On the other hand, if participants would copy the confederate’s movements 
without ascribing meaning to them, this would not be expected. Therefore, these 
results further support the hypothesis that it is not just a gesture’s form that is 
being copied, but also its meaning. 
In sum, we found that only meaningful gestures, and only meaningful aspects 
of gestures were copied across interlocutors. This suggest that the repetition of 
gesture forms across interlocutors is a result of concepts converging across 
interlocutors, rather than it being automated copying of form. This has also been 
suggested for the repetition of referring expressions across interlocutors. Speech 
and gesture thus seem to act alike when it comes to adaptation.   
Study 4  
We have already seen that like speech, gesture can be intended communicatively 
and that meanings can converge across interlocutors through gesture as well as 
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through speech. These similarities between gesture and speech raise the question 
of how closely gesture and speech production are linked to one another. In our 
fourth and final study, we aimed to shed light on this issue by examining gestures 
produced by aphasic speakers. 
First, we examined the intelligibility of aphasic speakers’ gestures by means of 
perception studies. Raters watched video-clips played without sound and were 
asked to judge whether the speaker was trying to communicate about buying a 
sweater or about a traffic accident. We found that gestures of speakers with severe 
aphasia were less informative than those of speakers with mild aphasia, which in 
turn were less informative than those of healthy control participants. This shows 
that rather than gesture taking on more of the communicative burden when speech 
was impaired, it tended to degrade with speech.  
Second, we looked at the representation techniques employed in gesture. We 
found that aphasic speakers did not use all the techniques used by healthy control 
participants who were asked to communicate with gesture instead of speech. This 
showed especially when talking about the traffic accident and referring to 
vehicles. Instead of pretending to handle a vehicle or representing it with a hand 
like the gesturing control participants did, people with severe aphasia frequently 
used gestures that outlined shapes. People with severe aphasia also used outlining 
gestures relatively more frequently than speakers with more moderate aphasia and 
healthy speakers. It seemed that aphasic speakers were trying to express meaning 
in gesture, but could not use gesture as freely as healthy control participants.  
Both our perception study and our analyses of representation techniques 
provide evidence that gesture degrades with speech in aphasia. This supports 
theories and frameworks in which the production of gesture and speech are 
interrelated and share common resources. 
Conclusion 
The four studies in this dissertation show various ways in which speech and co-
speech gesture production are alike. Both speech and gesture can be produced 
with a communicative intent, both bear a close link to meanings and concepts, and 
both may break down together in aphasia. The fact that gestures can be part of 
speakers’ communicative effort does not limit the functional roles of gesture to 
communication. Yet based on our findings, we argue that it is not limited to 
serving speech or serving a speaker’s cognition either. Rather, we consider gesture 













An ordinary day in the lab… I turn up the lights, take two cameras from the 
cabinet and set them up in the room. Throughout the day, the hand gestures 
participants produce are captured on videotapes. Those I digitalize in order to 
analyze the captured movies on my computer, playing them back frame-by-
frame, again and again, allowing me to study participants’ movements in great 
detail. How different from the start of science in Europe, when one had to 
undertake an expensive and rather dangerous trip to Paris even to obtain a 
reliable ruler. Needless to say there are an endless number of scientists without 
whom the work presented in this dissertation would have never been 
accomplished by me. I admire their dedication to science and I have gratefully 
made use of their accomplishments. 
This holds for three scholars in particular. I like to seize this opportunity to 
thank Emiel Krahmer, Fons Maes and Marc Swerts for supporting and inspiring 
me throughout my PhD project. I also thank Tilburg University for generously 
funding my PhD project as well as my academic development. 
It was Emiel who initially suggested the topic of gesture to me. Perhaps that 
was his one suggestion that I did not fight. Emiel has always been available for 
rigorous scientific discussion, which I very much appreciate. Also, Emiel 
initiated many of my experiences abroad, by encouraging me to attend 
international courses and conferences. Moreover, he is an inspiring researcher 
with unbelievable time management skills, and everlasting optimism. I thank 
Emiel for being such a reliable and inspiring advisor. 
Fons has been very supportive to me during the first few years of my project, 
when I was still overwhelmed by all the different opinions and ideas of my three 
advisors. He was first to hear me out and I felt he was most likely to side with 
me, supporting me to pursue my own insights. As the leader of the department I 
worked in, I feel he had a major part in me being able to work in a fun and 
cooperative environment throughout this project. Fons is a very inspiring leader, 
whom I felt I could turn to with anything that kept me from reaching my 
academic goals. As a researcher, Fons never let me get away with being fuzzy, 
or putting down only half of my thoughts, which greatly improved my papers. 
Yet I foremost thank Fons for going the extra mile in supporting me in this 
project. 
Marc I admire mostly for his creativity. Marc can look at scientific problems 
from infinitely many angles. No matter how impossible a question seemed or 
how stuck I was, Marc could always make me see yet another way of 
Language in the hands 
 
 182 
approaching the problem. Also, Marc has played a major role in me developing 
some confidence as a scientist. His endless streams of positive feedback have 
kept me going when the going got tough. I thank Marc for showing so much 
faith in me. As a researcher, Marc has inspired me with his achievements as well 
as his perseverance, setting an example to live up to. Marc also has excellent 
mediation skills, which helped this arrangement of having three full professors as 
thesis advisors to work out like it did. I could not have wished for more! 
I gratefully thank all members of my PhD committee: Susan Brennan, Jan de 
Ruiter, Sotaro Kita, Asli Özyürek, and Mieke van de Sandt-Koenderman, for 
their careful reading of my manuscript and their insightful comments to it. I look 
forward to discussing my work with them at my thesis defense. Kita I also thank 
for always asking the right question after one of my presentations, and repeating 
it until I saw its import. This has greatly helped me direct my studies. I am also 
thankful for the opportunities I got to present at other labs, which enabled me to 
meet many scholars working on similar and related topics.  
Over the years, I have come to know many researchers in the field of 
Gesture. I am thankful for their warm welcome, their enthusiasm and their 
constructive comments. I like to thank all reviewers and editors who helped me 
improve the papers that this dissertation is based on, in particular, I thank Jan de 
Ruiter, Adam Kendon and Victor Ferreira. 
Since I have not included any acknowledgements in my master’s thesis, I still 
like to thank Rineke Verbrugge and Petra Hendriks, who supervised me at the 
time. They provided a fascinating research question to me and I much enjoyed 
the freedom they allowed me in approaching it. As highly successful women in 
science, they are inspiring role models to me and they never hesitated to help me 
advance in my academic career. In this light, I also thank Niels Taatgen and John 
Anderson, for helping me obtain my first research position right after finishing 
my master’s degree. Working and living abroad has been an invaluable 
experience to me. 
During this PhD project, I got the opportunity to advise Nelianne van den 
Berg in writing her master’s thesis. I greatly enjoyed this process and I was 
inspired by her discipline and work pace. Nelianne collected and coded part of 
the data in Chapter 3. I am thankful for this fruitful cooperation. I also like to 
thank Vera Nijveld, who repeatedly helped me out with reliability coding and I 




I thank all participants to my studies for allowing me to analyze their videos. 
It happened to me quite a few times that I greeted someone a bit too 
enthusiastically in the hallways of Tilburg University or in the city of Tilburg 
itself. After analyzing their gestures for about an hour, it simply felt like I knew 
people a lot better than I actually did. 
I gratefully thank Hans Westerbeek for designing the cover of this 
dissertation for me. If it were not for him this thesis would have looked 
completely boring. He has been incredibly patient with all my concerns about 
minor issues that no one else will actually notice. I also thank Hans for helping 
me out time and time again as our ZLAU (very local IT support).  
I thank Carel van Wijk for teaching me how to apply statistics to my data and 
Lennard van der Laar for teaching me how to work with video files. I thank 
Bernd Hellema for patiently helping me with numerous technical issues and for 
writing the software for my line of five failed pilot studies (which I still believe 
will work out some day, but just in case). I thank Rein Cozijn for managing and 
improving the lab at Tilburg University and for getting the Eye-Catchers and 
Noldus Observer. Although it remains a time-consuming process, the latter sped 
up my gesture coding considerably. I thank the supportive staff at Tilburg 
University for all the ways in which they enable me to do my job. 
I thank all my coworkers at Tilburg University for their help and their 
excellent company, especially during our Thursday cookie meetings and the 
walks in the woods at lunchtime. In particular I thank my roomie Lisanne van 
Weelden, both for distracting me from my work and for urging me on with it. I 
thank all my fellow PhD students for taking part in my pilots, listening to my 
stories, and the lively PhDinners we had. I thank Lauraine Sinay for giving our 
‘fourth floor’ a more homely feel to it. It is just not the same when she is not 
there. Not in the least I thank both Marieke Hoetjes and Lisanne van Weelden for 
being my paranymphs and for supporting me as enthusiastically as they do. 
It is a little silly to thank my friends and other special people here. I hope 
they all know what they mean to me without me writing a dissertation. 
Nevertheless, I like to thank everyone who travels or traveled with me for part of 
the way, including Frits Knaack, Bernd Hellema, Carina Pals, Nathalie 
Bastiaansen, Sandra van der Helm, Robin Waart, Chistine Kühnel, Saskia 
Hutten, the Ruijter family, Jef and Bettina Bakker, Jos, Maria and Martijn de 
Koning, Adinda Visser, Harry de Roest and Marian van Item, Jan and Marita 
Mol, Lennie Mol and Hans Banens, Terry Chung, Michelle Gusic, Monique van 
Language in the hands 
 
 184 
de Sande, Maaike Warmerdam, Rob Leereveld, Annouck Leest, Loes van 
Benschop, Jessica Schouwenaars, Carel Veerman, Hennie van Woudenberg, 
John Keijzer, Viola van Wijngaarden, Janine van Trierum, Susan Zwakkenberg, 
Debby de Waal, Esmé Smits, Hans Kuijvenhoven, Dorinda Vredeveldt, 
Marjolein van Schaik – van den Berge, Henriëtte and René de Koning, Gerline 












 Journal publications    
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (In Press). Adaptation in gesture: 
Converging hands or converging minds? Journal of Memory and 
Language. 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (In Press). Seeing and Being 
Seen: The effects on gesture production. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication.  
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2009). The communicative 
import of gestures: Evidence from a comparative analysis of human-
human and human-machine interactions. Gesture, 9(1), 97-126.  
Verbrugge, R., & Mol, L. (2008). Learning to apply Theory of Mind. Journal of 
Logic, Language and Information, 17(4), 489-511.  
Working papers 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., & Van de Sandt-Koenderman, W. M. E. (Submitted). 
Gesturing by aphasic speakers, how does it compare? 
Papers in conference proceedings (peer reviewed) 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., & Van de Sandt-Koenderman, W. M. E. (2011). Gesturing 
by aphasic speakers, how does it compare? In L. Carlson, C. Hölscher, 
& T. Shipley (Eds.), Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1454-1459). Austin, TX: Cognitive 
Science Society. 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2010). Converging Hands or 
Converging Minds? In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science 
Society (pp. 115-120). Austin, Tx: Cognitive Science Society. 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E. (2010). Handling what the other sees: The effects of seeing 
and being seen on gesture production. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive 




Mol, L., Krahmer, E., & Swerts, M. (2009). Alignment in iconic gestures: Does 
it make sense? In B-J. Theobald & R. Harvey (Eds.), Proceedings of the 
8th International Conference on Auditory-Visual Speech Processing 
(AVSP 2009) (pp. 3-8). Norwich, UK: School of Computing Sciences. 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2009). Communicative gestures 
and memory load. In N.A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (Eds.), Proceedings 
of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 
1569-1574). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society. 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2008). Gesticulation and 
audience design. In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on 
cognitive science (110-111). Moscow: Art and Publishing Center. 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2007). In J. Vroomen, E. J. 
Krahmer, & M. Swerts (Eds.), Proceedings of the 6th International 
Conference on Auditory-Visual Speech Processing (AVSP 2007) (pp. 
200-205). Tilburg: Tilburg University. 
Mol, L., Taatgen, N., Verbrugge, R., & Hendriks, P. (2005). Reflective 
Cognition as a Secondary Task. In: B.G. Bara, L. Barsalou, and M. 
Bucciarelli (Eds), Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting of the 
Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1525-1530). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.  
Mol, L., Verbrugge, R., & Hendriks, P. (2005). Learning to reason about other 
people's minds. In Proceedings of the Joint Symposium on Virtual 
Social Agents, SSAISB 2005 (pp. 191-198). Hatfield, UK: The Society 
for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour. 
Abstracts of spoken papers (peer reviewed) 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2010). Converging Hands or 
Converging Minds? Presented at: ‘Gestures, evolution, brain, and 
linguistic structures’: the 4th international conference of the 
International Society for Gesture Studies (ISGS), Frankfurt (Oder), 
Germany. 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2008). Audience Design en 
Handgebaren. Presented at: VIOT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2008). Cognitive Effort and 




Communication dedicated to the memory of Christian Benoît, Grenoble, 
France. 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2008). Look who’s being talked 
to. Presented at: Language, Communication, and Cognition (LCC), 
Brighton, United Kingdom. 
Mol, L., Krahmer, E., Maes, A., & Swerts, M. (2007). The communicative 
import of gestures: Evidence from a comparative analysis of human-
human and human-machine interactions. Presented at: ‘Integrating 
Gestures’: the 3rd international conference of the International Society 
for Gesture Studies (ISGS), Evanston, IL, USA. 
Mol, L., Taatgen, N., & Anderson, J. (2005). Individual Differences in Multi-




TiCC Ph.D. series 
 
TiCC Ph.D. series 
 
 194 
TiCC Ph.D. series 
 
 195 
1. Pashiera Barkhuysen. Audiovisual Prosody in Interaction. Promotores: 
M.G.J. Swerts, E.J. Krahmer. Tilburg, October 3, 2008. 
2. Ben Torben-Nielsen. Dendritic morphology: function shapes structure. 
Promotores: H.J. van den Herik, E.O. Postma. Co-promotor: K.P. Tuyls. 
Tilburg, December 3,  2008. 
3. Hans Stol. A framework for evidence-based policy making using IT. 
Promotor: H.J. van den Herik. Tilburg, January 21, 2009. 
4. Jeroen Geertzen. Dialogue act recognition and prediction. Promotor: H. 
Bunt. Co-promotor: J.M.B. Terken. Tilburg, February 11, 2009. 
5. Sander Canisius. Structured prediction for natural language processing. 
Promotores: A.P.J. van den Bosch, W. Daelemans. Tilburg, February 13,  
2009. 
6. Fritz Reul. New Architectures in Computer Chess. Promotor: H.J. van den 
Herik. Co-promotor: J.W.H.M. Uiterwijk. Tilburg, June 17,  2009. 
7. Laurens van der Maaten. Feature Extraction from Visual Data. Promotores: 
E.O. Postma, H.J. van den Herik. Co-promotor: A.G. Lange. Tilburg, June 
23, 2009 (cum laude). 
8. Stephan Raaijmakers. Multinomial Language Learning. Promotores: W. 
Daelemans, A.P.J. van den Bosch. Tilburg, December 1, 2009. 
9. Igor Berezhnoy. Digital Analysis of Paintings. Promotores: E.O. Postma, 
H.J. van den Herik. Tilburg, December 7, 2009. 
10. Toine Bogers. Recommender Systems for Social Bookmarking. Promotor: 
A.P.J. van den Bosch. Tilburg, December 8, 2009. 
11. Sander Bakkes. Rapid Adaptation of Video Game AI. Promotor: H.J. van 
den Herik. Co-promotor: P. Spronck. Tilburg, March 3, 2010. 
12. Maria Mos. Complex Lexical Items. Promotor: A.P.J. van den Bosch. Co-
promotores: A. Vermeer, A. Backus. Tilburg, May 12, 2010 (in 
collaboration with the Department of Language and Culture Studies). 
TiCC Ph.D. series 
 
 196 
13. Marieke van Erp: Accessing Natural History. Discoveries in data cleaning, 
structuring, and retrieval. Promotor: A.P.J. van den Bosch. Tilburg, June 
30, 2010. 
14. Edwin Commandeur: Implicit Causality and Implicit Consequentiality in 
Language Comprehension. Promotores: L.G.M. Noordman, W. Vonk. Co-
promotor: R. Cozijn. Tilburg, June 30, 2010. 
15. Bart Bogaert: Cloud Content Contention. Promotores: H.J. van den Herik, 
E.O. Postma. Tilburg, March 30, 2011. 
16. Xiaoyu Mao: Airport under Control. Promotores: H.J. van den Herik, E.O. 
Postma. Co-promotores: N. Roos, A. Salden. Tilburg, May 25, 2011. 
17. Olga Petukhova: Multidimensional Dialogue Modelling. Promotor: H. 
Bunt. Tilburg, September 1, 2011. 
18. Lisette Mol: Language in the hands. Promotores: F. Maes, E.J. Krahmer, 
M.G.J. Swerts. Tilburg, November 7, 2011. 
 
 

 
 

 
 
